Stéphanie Vincent Lyk-Jensen
Ane Glad

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WHY DO THEY SERVE? CHANGES AND DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVES OF DANISH SOLDIERS DEPLOYED TO PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-ENFORCING MISSIONS

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The Danish National Centre for Social Research
Copenhagen, Denmark

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Stéphanie Vincent Lyk-Jensen[1] and Ane Glad[2]

Authors' affiliation:
The Danish National Centre for Social Research (SFI)
Herluf Trolles Gade 11
1052 Copenhagen
Denmark

Abstract:
This paper investigates what motivates young people to volunteer for peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions and how their motives change between pre- and post-deployment. Data includes information about social and military background, and motives for more than 600 soldiers, 444 of whom answered the survey both before and after deployment. Soldiers are deployed to different missions under the same circumstances. To conceptualize motives among soldiers, we use factor analysis and find three factors: *challenge*, *self-benefit*, and *fidelity*. *Challenge* represents an occupational orientation; *fidelity*, an institutional orientation; and *self-benefit*, a desire for adventure. Exploiting the within-subject design of our data, we find that pre- and post-deployment motives vary significantly according to the type of mission and soldiers' previous experiences (first-timers or experienced soldiers). Our results suggest that after the mission peace-keepers are generally more disappointed than peace-enforcers. Our results also show that *self-benefit* motives are important for younger soldiers with only a high school education, and that this group usually serves as peace-enforcers during their gap year.

1. Corresponding author: svj@sfi.dk
2. Gormsgade 10, lejlighed 67,2200 København N, ane_glad@hotmail.com.

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INTRODUCTION

Since 2001, with the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the number of military personnel deployed overseas in many countries has dramatically increased, and many countries have to face recruitment problems. Denmark, with its population of only 5.5 million, has sent about 30,000 soldiers to more than 50 international military missions, resulting in more than 60,000 individual deployments in the last twenty years. Denmark is both a small and militarily active country with a large number of volunteers, making it valuable for the study of enlistment motives and retentions.

The literature has studied not only the motives for enlistment in peace-keeping missions in different European countries—Italy (Battistelli, 1997), Slovenia (Vegic, 2007), Sweden (Hedlund, 2011), and Switzerland (Bennett et al. 2005)—but also how motives may change before and after deployment (Jelusic and Gard, 2005; and Tomforde and Keller, 2005). Unlike these studies, which have primarily focused on peace-keeping missions, this study compares a sample of Danish peace-keepers and peace-enforcers deployed to Lebanon and Afghanistan, respectively, in the period February-August 2011, i.e., under the same historical, political, and economic contexts.

Understanding the differences in the motives of those volunteering for peace-enforcing (PE) or peace-keeping (PK) missions may yield valuable information for policy makers, army recruiters, or both. Many factors may influence who volunteers for a PE mission or a PK mission. More generally, the military actively recruits or excludes people based on various characteristics, such as intelligence and physical and psychological strength. In addition, historical context, increase in manpower, and economic changes may also influence the

motives of young people and affect the number of volunteers for military service. Consequently, we expect differences between people choosing a PK or a PE mission.

This article analyzes motives for two groups of soldiers deployed to Afghanistan (hereafter, PE) and Lebanon (hereafter, PK), accounting for socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age, level of education, family status) and military characteristics (e.g., rank, types of contract, experiences). It also analyzes the impact of deployment on soldiers' motives by comparing pre- and post-deployment motives and distinguishes between experienced soldiers (one or more previous deployments) and first-timers (no previous deployments). To conceptualize motives among soldiers, we use factor analysis. This analysis finds three factors: *challenge*, *self-benefit*, and *fidelity*. Comparing pre- and post-deployment mean scores of the motives factors in a difference-in-differences (DID) setting, our results suggest that pre- and post-deployment motives vary significantly according to the type of mission and the soldiers' previous experiences. Peace-keepers are generally more disappointed. Furthermore, we also find that a group of peace-enforcers serves during their gap year and do not expect to have a career in the military.

The article is structured as follows. First, we describe the theoretical framework and previous research. Then we present the institutional context in Denmark and the research questions. Next, we discuss the data and analytical approach, followed by the results. The final section contains the discussion and conclusion.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Research in soldiers' motives has been an important field of investigation, especially when changes in the recruitment system occur, as in the United States in the 1960s (when recruitment went from a draft to an all-volunteer system) or in Sweden, which introduced an

all-volunteer system in July 2010. Thus investigating soldiers' motives is relevant for both the recruitment and the retention of future soldiers.

Charles C. Moskos (Moskos, 1977; Moskos and Wood, 1988; and Moskos, 1986) describes how the change from conscription to an all-volunteer force in the U.S. military has led to a change in the military organization. Moskos views the conscripted military of the 1960s as largely institutional and the all-volunteer force as more occupational. Thus changes in soldiers' motives may also reflect changes in the military's organizational structure.

Many studies on soldiers' motives build on Moskos's dichotomy. Battistelli (1997) expands Moskos' dichotomy into a trichotomy by adding a postmodern dimension. Battistelli (1997) finds not only a 'paleomodern' (Moskos's institutional dimension) and a 'modern' (Moskos's occupational dimension) dimension but also attitudes traceable to neither, thereby showing a third dimension. Battistelli argues that these attitudes are post-materialistic; however, like modern values, they have a 'selfish' perspective that he calls 'postmodern'. In the postmodern dimension, the soldier's relationship to the military organization can be understood in terms of its effect on the soldier's search for identity through satisfying a desire for adventure and meaningful personal experiences.

Moskos's and Battistelli's theoretical frameworks have been extensively used in countries in which potential recruitment difficulty was expected because of a change in the recruiting system, as in Sweden in 2010 (e.g., Hedlund, 2011). Jans and Frazer-Jans (2009) also draw on Moskos' theoretical framework to examine the extent to which the professional orientation of Australian military personnel has shifted since September 11, 2001. They find the existence of the 'pragmatic professional,' who has neither a clearly institutional nor an occupational approach to service. In their extensive review of professional orientation[3], Jans and Frazer-Jans (2009) also refer to the socioeconomics approach introduced by Etzioni (1988), who

3. The professional orientation views an individual's motives for serving as the fit between that individual's values or self-image and the values projected by the organization.

argues that individuals are simultaneously under the influence of two major sets of factors: their pleasure (self-interest) and their moral duty (other-directed motives). Fields (1993) provided the first application of socio-economics to the military.

Other studies focus on changes in motives before and after deployment, showing that motives are not stable but instead influenced differently in the pre- and post-deployment phases. Tomforde and Keller (2005) find that motivation among German PK soldiers changes before, during, and after deployment: During deployment motivation decreases, while it increases after the return home, although without reaching as high a level as during pre-deployment. Jelusic and Garb (2005) find that in the pre-deployment phase, motives are mainly pre- and post-modern, whereas during deployment the postmodern motives diminish at the cost of modern motives. They also show that low-intensity missions attract first-timers, while more risky missions attract PK veterans.

High socioeconomic status is usually negatively related to the probability of joining the armed forces, i.e., the frequency of enlistment for military service is higher among men with relatively low socio-economic backgrounds, especially those who do not live with both parents or those who have parents with elementary or middle school education.[4] In Denmark, social differences are less pronounced than in the United States, and access to education both relatively easy and free. However, a Danish study (Bache, 1998) finds that conscripts who want to sign a three-year Danish International Brigade (DIB) PK contract[5] but were not accepted had more frequently experienced difficulties during their childhood than those who were accepted. In contrast to those who did not apply for a DIB contract, the successful DIB applicant was generally younger, had slightly less schooling, and scored slightly lower on the army IQ test. While these studies indicate that socio-demographics are relevant for inclusion

4. See, e.g., studies by Segal et al. (1998), Bachman et al. (2000), Kleykamp (2006), and Bachman (2000).
5. DIB was a PK force established in 1994. It was officially disbanded on February 15, 2005.

in studies of soldiers and their motives for deployment, they cover previous generations of soldiers. We now need to investigate whether changes in the military and the international missions have also led to changes in the soldiers' socio-demographic profiles.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Danish Armed Forces (DAF) has undergone major changes, moving from participation in PK missions to participation in PE missions. Moreover, military conscription based on a draft lottery was shortened in 2006 from eight months to four months.

As a new type of conflict has emerged, demanding Danish involvement in wars in Afghanistan (2002-2014) and Iraq (2003-2008), missions have changed from being primarily PK to being primarily PE. This shift has led to a change in military education and mission preparation. These changes are also reflected in the composition of the soldiers. Indeed, a study encompassing all Danish soldiers deployed between 1992 and 2009[6] shows that they constitute a very heterogeneous population and that both socio-demographic and military characteristics changed during that period. First, from 2006, the media heavily reported increased numbers of wounded and killed soldiers in Afghanistan, highlighting the danger of these missions. Second, the financial crisis of 2008 worsened job opportunities in Denmark, especially for the young and unskilled, making an army career more attractive to them. As the soldiers in this study were deployed in spring 2011, the first-timers were some of the first soldiers recruited during the financial crisis. Both the crisis and the media coverage likely influenced military recruitment, making a military career more appealing for some and less appealing for others.

6. See some of the reports from the Danish study of veterans deployed 1992 to 2009, e.g., Lyk-Jensen et al. (2011).

In Denmark the Armed Forces Day (AFD) is mandatory for all men turning 18 years old, and, since 2004, all women are also invited to participate. Before participating in the AFD, all prospective draftees fill out a health questionnaire that forms the basis of a health assessment; the military physician can, if necessary, seek additional medical information from public health records. On the AFD, prospective draftees receive a medical examination and assessment and a psychological evaluation, and take an IQ test (Armed Forces Qualification Test, AFQT).[7] They are then declared eligible or non-eligible for military service. On average, 60 percent of a birth cohort is declared eligible. Finally, a draft lottery assigns eligible men to military service.

Military service called *Hærens Basisdddannelse* (HBU: basic military education) can be followed by a voluntary eight months of further military training, the *Hærens Reaktionsstyrkeuddanelse* (HRU: military reaction forces education), which prepares soldiers for deployment to international military missions as privates. In contrast, officers tend to bypass HRU, going straight to a military training college for four years. Importantly, no matter what the lottery outcome, only personnel who volunteer for deployment can be deployed.[8]

Between 2006 and 2012, the percentage of volunteers for military service increased from 76 percent to 96 percent, along with an increase in number of deployments. By 2011 and 2012 the draft lottery was almost obsolete. Despite public discussions about whether the lottery should be abolished, the final government decision was to keep it but to reduce the number of conscripts.[9] Keeping the lottery allows the military to draft more conscripts if the economic cycle changes and fewer people volunteer.

7. The test comprises 78 assignments with four parts: letter matrices, word relationships, series of numbers, and geometric shapes (see Teasdale, 2009, and Teasdale et al., 2011).
8. Throughout the Vietnam era most soldiers were also volunteers (Angrist and Chen, 2008).
9. In November 2012 a majority in the Danish Parliament reduced the number of conscripts from about 5,000 to about 4,200.

At the same time, Denmark has a history of active membership in voluntary organizations, and from 1990 to 2008 voluntary work increased among both younger and older generations (Gundelach, 2011). Denmark has the highest level of active membership and is among the European countries with the highest share of voluntary work (Ervasti et al., 2008). This feature may explain why the number of volunteers is increasing in Denmark while other countries are having recruitment problems.

In Denmark the problem is not recruiting or retaining new soldiers, as there have never been as many volunteers as now. Thus, given the increasing numbers of Danish young men and women volunteering for difficult missions involving a great risk of injury or death, investigating their motives is important. Moreover, understanding the differences in the motives of those volunteering for PE or PK missions may yield valuable information for policy makers, army recruiters, or both.

Our aim is to understand soldiers' motives in a conceptual framework. The two teams deployed from February through August 2011 (team 11 on the PE mission ISAF[10] and team 4 on the PK mission UNIFIL[11]) offer an excellent opportunity for analyzing differences in motives between peace-keepers and peace-enforcers. Moreover, we can analyze changes in pre- and post-deployment motives and how motives may vary with socio-demographics, with military characteristics, and between the two missions.

We attempt to answer the following three questions by testing their underlying hypotheses:

1. Are peace-enforcers and peace-keepers driven by different motives?

   Peace-enforcers (high-intensity missions) run a greater risk of being injured or killed while deployed than peace-keepers do. Consequently, we expect that soldiers from the

10. ISAF is the International Security Assistant Force in Afghanistan under NATO command. Danish soldiers have been deployed to ISAF since 2002.
11. UNIFIL is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The mission was initiated in 1978 but enforced since 2006.

two types of missions might be driven by different motives and that peace-enforcers are more institutionally motivated.

2. Does the motive change after deployment?

   Although the literature shows that motives vary before, during, and after deployment, we look more deeply into how pre- and post-deployment motives vary by mission type. According to previous studies, we anticipate finding a decrease in post-deployment motives.

3. Do young people volunteering for military missions have a military career in mind (i.e., see themselves in the military in five years)? Or do they basically want a 'once-in-a-lifetime' experience?

We hypothesize that institutionally motivated soldiers have a stronger commitment to the military and to the unit, and that they are therefore willing to stay in the military at least for the next five years. Furthermore, we expect officers who have undergone four years of military training to be more committed to the military.

DATA AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

This section presents the data collection, the questions about motives, and our analytical approach.

Survey Questionnaire and Administration

The data consists of two surveys and covers soldiers deployed to Afghanistan and Lebanon in the spring of 2011. In Afghanistan the mission is PE, with soldiers subject to great combat exposure and risk of injury; in Lebanon the mission is PK, with soldiers much less exposed to combat and thus having a lower risk of injury and other potentially traumatizing experiences. Our data allows us to distinguish not only between types of mission (PE and PK) but also between the soldiers' level of experience (first-timer or previously deployed). Therefore, we

can distinguish between differences in motives among these four different groups of soldiers and investigate whether changes in differences can also be imputed to socio-demographic or military characteristics.

During pre-deployment mission preparation and post-deployment debriefing, the soldiers filled out a questionnaire (pencil survey), including 11 statements about their deployment motives (see table 1), which they rated on a scale from 1 ‘not important at all’ to 10 ‘very important.’ These 11 statements are inspired by Eighmey (2006), who investigates motives for enlistment among U.S. soldiers, and by interviews with Danish soldiers (Kofod et al. 2010), both of which indicate that self-realization, challenges, comradeship, and military craft play important roles.

Table 1. Motivation Statements

1.	Have a challenging job
2.	Have a job with responsibilities
3.	Work with people whom I respect
4.	Do something for my country
5.	Make a positive difference for people in the mission area needing help
6.	Have a once in-a-lifetime experience
7.	Prevent a terrorist attack in Denmark
8.	Build democracy in the mission area
9.	Be a part of an elite team
10.	Experience comradeship during deployment
11.	Practice my military training

Based on the number of soldiers at each meeting, the response rate is 99 percent.[12] This rate is high because we chose to collect data during mission preparation and debriefing. We exclude civilian personnel, as they are not necessarily present at these meetings—in our case, only three were present, a number too small for making meaningful generalizations. Consequently, our population consists only of military personnel. In all, 595 soldiers gave pre-deployment answers. Analyses are based on responses from the 444 soldiers who answered all the questions about motives, along with the name of their current mission and total number of deployments both pre- and post-deployment. By restricting the sample to soldiers who answered questions both pre- and post-deployment, we ensure that potential differences do not result from differences in populations.

Analytical Approach

This article broadly covers the three previously mentioned research questions: What motivates soldiers to volunteer for PE and PK missions? How do their motives change after deployment? Is there a group of soldiers choosing deployment without wanting a military career?

To illustrate differences between the two missions, we run a logistic regression, with a dependent variable for being on PE and with socio-demographics and military characteristics as the independent variables. Then, to conceptualize soldiers' motives for deployment, we perform a factor analysis, as in Eighmey (2006)'s study of U.S. soldiers. This approach reveals the underlying structure of variables representing motives and provides the major groupings of the items by averaging them into single manageable variables.

12. In Denmark the average mission length is six months. However, soldiers are not necessarily deployed for the same period, and some could be absent from mission preparation, debriefing, or both—e.g., while most soldiers are deployed for six months, mechanics return after only four months. Moreover, some soldiers returned earlier because of injury or repatriation, and one was killed in action. Most soldiers had returned to Denmark less than one month before responding.

As previously mentioned, social background might affect a person's propensity for serving. We therefore investigate how motives vary for socio-demographic characteristics such as soldiers' educational achievement, military enrollment (draftee or volunteer), and family situation. We also investigate how these characteristics may explain changes in pre- and post-deployment motives for soldiers deployed to high-risk missions (PE) as opposed to those deployed to low-risk missions (PK). We then compare mean-differences pre- and post-deployment for soldiers in a difference-in-differences (DID) setting.

To investigate the effect of deployment on motives, we estimated equation (1), where the dependent variable *motives* is equal to the mean score of person *i* for a motive factor measured at *t:* before and after deployment.

$$Motives_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PE_i + \beta_2 after_{it} * PE_i + \beta_3 after_{it} + \gamma X_{i.} + u_{it} \,, \qquad (1)$$

Where,

PE is a dummy variable, equal to 1, if *i* has been deployed to PE mission, or else 0;

after is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the period is after the deployment, or else 0;

X_i is the matrix of socio-demographic and military variables measured before deployment (tables 2 and 3); and u is the error term.

The parameter of interest is $\boldsymbol{\beta_2}$ (the coefficient of the interaction term of being on a PE mission and after deployment, i.e., *after*PE*), which measures the difference between PE and PK motives after the mission.

Finally, using some of the previous results and accounting for respondents' background characteristics and motivations factors, we use logistic regressions to explain which soldiers are planning a military career.

Sample Description

Table 2 provides demographic details for the sample of soldiers deployed to PE and PK missions. It shows that, in addition to being slightly younger, PE soldiers differ from PK soldiers in at least three respects. First, soldiers deployed to PE are less likely to live with a partner or have children. A job in the military requires deployments that can strain relationships and family life, especially if the mission is associated with great risk of injury or death. Second, the percentage of women in PE missions is lower (5 percent) than for PK missions (21 percent). Third, while 33 percent of all soldiers have a 'youth education'[13] as their highest level of education, soldiers with a youth education are particularly overrepresented (35 percent) among PE soldiers. Less than one third (28 percent) of the soldiers deployed to PE have a basic education (i.e., elementary or middle school), while basic education is common among the soldiers deployed to PK (39 percent).

Compared to the U.S. soldiers deployed between 2001 and 2006 (see Wells et al. 2010), the percentage of women among the Danish soldiers is smaller (5 percent for DK vs. 17 percent for the U.S.). However, the Danish soldiers are much younger, with 37 percent under 25 years old compared to 5 percent among the U.S. soldiers. As expected, the percentage of soldiers with a high school education at most is higher among the Danish soldiers (63 percent, compared to 43 percent in the U.S.), likely because of their younger age. Given these differences, we try to understand how motives differ between the two missions and the soldiers' levels of experience.

13. Youth education in Denmark means either 'gymnasium' or an academic high school equivalent. We examine youth education separately because it is a prerequisite for all advanced education and may thus indicate plans for further education.

Table 2. Demographic Details of the Sample (percent)

	PE	PK	Total
Male	95	91	95
Female	5	9	5
Average age in years	28	29	29
18-24 years	37	36	37
25-29 years	31	28	30
30 years and older	32	37	33
Single	40	18	35
In a relationship	59	81	64
No children	78	68	76
With children	20	30	22
Basic education	28	39	30
Youth education	35	26	33
Vocational education	23	20	22
Further education	13	9	12
Parents divorced	38	53	41
Sample size	354	90	444

Notes: PE: ISAF 11 in Afghanistan.

PK: UNIFIL 4 in Lebanon.

Table 3, which compares the military characteristics of soldiers from the two missions, shows that PK missions have more privates and fewer officers than PE missions.[14] As to the type of contract, the shortest—3 years (K3)—is common among soldiers deployed to PE, while contracts up to age 35 (K35) are less common. K60 soldiers (permanent personnel having a contract up to age 60) have usually been previously deployed. The younger age of PE soldiers may explain this difference.

14. We only have three officers in PK who answered our survey both pre- and post-deployment. In the raw data we only had four officers from PK. Our data collection method is limited to soldiers present at mission preparation and post-deployment debriefing; thus, if officers from PK follow a different program on these days, we miss their responses.

Surprisingly, PE soldiers less often have family members who have been deployed. Thus soldiers choosing a harder mission are apparently not driven by a family tradition. Finally, the percentage of first-timers and those previously deployed is similar for PE and PK: two-thirds were deployed previously, and one-third are first-timers.

Table 3. Military Details of the Sample (percent)

	PE	PK	Total
Privates	72	81	74
Sergeants	20	16	19
Officers	8	3	7
K60: contract up to retirement, age 60	28	29	28
K35: contract up to age 35	54	66	56
K3: three-year contract	17	4	14
Having no deployed family members	73	63	71
First-timers	34	32	33
Previously deployed	66	68	67
Sample size	350	90	444

Notes: PE: ISAF 11 in Afghanistan.

PK: UNIFIL 4 in Lebanon.

RESULTS

Differences between missions

To determine the differences between the soldiers deployed to the two missions, we run a logistic regression with a dependent variable indicating the soldiers' mission (table 4). We find that soldiers with a youth education or vocational education (compared to basic education) are more likely found in PE. Jelusic and Garb (2005), in their study of motivation and job satisfaction among Slovenian soldiers and policemen in peace operations, find that low-intensity missions attract first-timers, while more risky missions attract PK veterans. In contrast, we find that soldiers employed on a K35 or a K60 contract are less likely to be in PE

than soldiers on a K3 contract, i.e., soldiers on shorter contracts are more likely to volunteer for high-risk missions. Soldiers who have one or more family members who have been deployed or whose parents were divorced during their childhood (compared to soldiers with no deployed family members and no parents divorced) are less likely to be in PE. In all, PE soldiers appear to come from more stable families than PK soldiers but are less likely to be in a relationship.

Table 4. Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable Being on PE Mission

	Odds Ratio	Robust Std. Err
Male (ref. Female)	2.268	(1.135)
25-29 years (ref. 18-24 years)	1.319	(0.461)
30 years or older (ref. 18-24 years)	1.002	(0.487)
Parents divorced (ref. Parents not divorced)	0.607*	(0.157)
In a relationship (ref. Not in a relationship)	0.317***	(0.0980)
Children (ref. No children)	0.690	(0.287)
Youth education (ref. Basic Education)	1.767*	(0.555)
Vocational education (ref. Basic Education)	1.818*	(0.648)
Further education (ref. Basic Education)	2.092	(1.067)
Sergeant (ref. Private)	1.292	(0.470)
Officer (ref. Private)	2.596	(1.829)
K35 (ref. K3)	0.246***	(0.120)
K60 (ref. K3)	0.311**	(0.176)
Deployed family members (ref. No family members deployed)	0.632	(0.178)
Volunteered for military service (ref. Did not volunteer for military service)	1.405	(0.457)
More than one deployment (ref. First-timer)	1.456	(0.432)
Observations	444	
Log Likelihood	-197.7	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses.

Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

Major grouping of the motives items

To conceptualize soldiers' motives, we use factor analyses to aggregate the different motivation statements. We apply exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation, to the 11 statements about motives. Table 5 shows the results of our factor analysis and the motives factors according to which the statements are grouped. As pre-deployment motives are measured before the mission and better reflect the soldiers' expectations, we use them for the analysis. Factor scores are generated and used as predictors in regression models.

Table 5. Factor Loading for Item Responses

'How important to you is each of the following as a reason for being deployed?'	Fidelity	Benefit for self	Challenge
Do something for my country	0.858		
Make a positive difference for people in the mission area needing help	0.744		
Prevent a terrorist attack in Denmark	0.758		
Build democracy in the mission area	0.753		
Have a once-in-a-lifetime experience		0.890	
Be a part of an elite team		0.442	
Experience comradeship during deployment		0.866	
Practice my military training		0.692	
Have a challenging job			0.898
Have a job with responsibilities			0.976
Work with people whom I respect			0.389

Notes: Rotation is oblique promax.

Cronbach's alpha for factors: Fidelity: 0.77; Self-benefit: 0.73; Challenge: 0.73.

Blanks represent absolute values of factor loadings< .3.

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Eigenvalue	Percentage of Variance	Cumulative Percentage
Fidelity	4.082	0.371	0.371
Self-benefit	1.440	0.131	0.502
Challenge	1.258	0.114	0.616

Note: Extraction Method: Principal component factors.

Table 5 shows that motives among Danish peace-keepers and peace-enforcers can be described by three different factors: *fidelity*, *self-benefit*, and *challenge.* These factors account for 37 percent, 13 percent, and 11 percent of the total item variance, respectively, and correspond to both Moskos' institutional and occupational orientations and Battistelli's trichotomy of motives. According to Moskos, *fidelity* can be interpreted as an institutional orientation, or what Battistelli calls 'paleo-modern.' *Challenge* corresponds to an occupational orientation, or what Battistelli calls 'modern,' whereas *self-benefit* is close to Battistelli's 'postmodern orientation,' i.e., satisfying a desire for adventure and meaningful personal experiences. The Cronbach's alpha tests for items indicate that the motives' dimensions are both reliable and validly measured.[15]

In a study of motives for enlistment for military service among U.S. soldiers, Eighmey (2006) formulates a typology describing how motives can be either tangible or intangible and either self- or other-oriented. In this framework, our factors *challenge* and *self-benefit* are both self-oriented but tangible and intangible, respectively, whereas *fidelity* is other-oriented. Eighmey (2006) finds that tangible other-oriented goals, such as 'doing something for my country' and 'making a positive difference in society' were prominent among the soldiers he studied.

15. If the number of items is low, a threshold of 0.6 is acceptable (see Peterson, 1994).

We now examine how the motivation factors change before and after deployment for soldiers on different missions, and answer our three research questions.

Differences in Motives Between PE and PK Soldiers

To answer the first research question, we investigate whether PE and PK soldiers are driven by different motives. We expect PE soldiers to be more institutionally driven. To investigate this hypothesis, we first directly compare motives for PE and PK soldiers and then run a logistic regression, using motivation factors from the factor analysis as explanatory variables[16].

Table 6 compares how soldiers from PE and PK, respectively, rated the motives before deployment. PE soldiers, while more positive in their valuations of most statements, generally rate 'build democracy in the mission area' lowest. PK soldiers also rate 'build democracy in the mission area' as the lowest, followed by 'be a part of an elite team' and 'prevent a terrorist attack in Denmark'—a choice making sense, as the PK mission does not really fit the GWOT. Table 6 also shows that PK soldiers are generally less motivated than PE soldiers in terms of the three motives (lower valuations).

16. Factor scores generated by the factor analysis are used as predictors in regression models.

Table 6 Mean and Ranking by Missions Before Deployment

	BEFORE DEPLOYMENT				
	PE		PK		
Fidelity	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking	Sig.
Do something for my country	6.8	9	6.4	9	*
Make a positive difference for people in the mission area needing help	7.2	7	7.2	6	n.s.
Prevent a terrorist attack in Denmark	6.9	8	5.8	10	***
Build democracy in the mission area	5.6	11	4.9	12	***
Self-benefit					
Have a once-in-a- lifetime experience	7.8	6	8.1	3	n.s.
Be a part of an elite team	6.7	10	5.3	11	***
Experience comradeship during deployment	8.2	2	8.2	2	n.s.
Practice my military training	8.1	4	7.2	7	***
Challenge					
Have a challenging job	8.2	3	7.6	5	***
Have a job with responsibilities	7.9	5	7.7	4	n.s.
Work with people whom I respect	8.5	1	8.3	1	n.s.

Notes: PE: ISAF 11 in Afghanistan.

PK: UNIFIL 4 in Lebanon.

Significance levels: non-significant (n.s.), *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010

We also perform a logistic regression model predicting which mission soldiers with certain motives are most likely to volunteer for. The dependent variables are the three motivation factors. The regression in Table 7 shows that soldiers motivated by *fidelity* (p-value=0.098)—our equivalent of institutional motives—are more likely to be on PE than on PK missions (e.g., for one unit increase in the *fidelity* factor, soldiers are 1.2 times more likely to be on a PE mission). Table 7 also shows that soldiers who have volunteered for PE are more likely to give *challenge* (p-value=0.083) reasons than those who have volunteered for PK. Consequently, soldiers motivated by *fidelity* and *challenge*, not *self-benefit*, are more likely to be in PE. Thus PE soldiers, as individuals, can contribute more to Denmark and to the local

region on such missions (i.e., the 'institutional' basis for motivation). Similarly, as individuals, they would benefit more in terms of *challenge* on such missions.

Table 7 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable Being on PE

	Odds Ratio	Robust std. err.
Fidelity	1.248*	(0.167)
Self-benefit	1.008	(0.124)
Challenge	1.269*	(0.174)
Observations	444	
Log Likelihood	-218.3	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

Changes in Motives Within and Between Mission Pre- and Post-Deployment

To answer the second research question, we not only investigate whether motives change when we compare pre- and post-deployment motives for each mission but also whether these changes are different between the two missions.

Tomforde and Keller (2005) find that pre-deployment motives are influenced by 'euphoria,' while motives during deployment are influenced by specific matters and the 'reality' of coping with different tasks and problems. In contrast, motives after deployment are influenced by 'excitement' about returning home and the soldiers' commitment to the military. Consequently, they find that motives are generally high before deployment, decrease during deployment, and increase a little after the return home—but without ever reaching the same high level as before deployment.

In Table 8 we form three indices for the dimension of each motive, scaled from 1 to 10. Comparing mean differences between the two missions with DID regressions, we find that

motives generally decrease from pre- to post-deployment between 1 to 1.6 points on the scale between 1 and 10, as shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Within and Between changes. Results from difference-in differences regressions.

	Fidelity	Self-benefit	Challenge
After	-1.608***	-0.989***	-1.144***
	(0.186)	(0.181)	(0.204)
After*PE	0.337	0.358*	0.573***
	(0.205)	(0.198)	(0.220)
PE (ref. PK)	0.750***	0.407**	0.293*
	(0.225)	(0.165)	(0.164)
Male (ref. Female)	-0.766***	0.037	-0.680***
	(0.281)	(0.245)	(0.166)
25-29 years (ref. 18-24 years)	0.306	0.028	0.199
	(0.218)	(0.156)	(0.139)
30 years or older (ref. 18-24 years)	-0.139	-1.079***	-0.359
	(0.329)	(0.251)	(0.230)
Parents divorced (ref. Parents not divorced)	-0.003	-0.100	-0.063
	(0.169)	(0.129)	(0.112)
In a relationship (ref. Not in a relationship)	0.207	-0.197	-0.058
	(0.183)	(0.135)	(0.123)
Children (ref. No children)	0.137	-0.066	0.213
	(0.254)	(0.203)	(0.185)
Youth education (ref. Basic Education)	-0.790***	-0.477***	-0.317**
	(0.196)	(0.161)	(0.140)
Vocational education (ref. Basic Education)	-0.187	-0.036	-0.394**
	(0.227)	(0.188)	(0.164)
Further education (ref. Basic Education)	-0.255	-0.304	-0.294
	(0.342)	(0.270)	(0.240)
Sergeant (ref. Private)	0.061	-0.206	0.336**
	(0.222)	(0.188)	(0.147)
Officer (ref. Private)	-0.670*	-0.171	0.613**
	(0.398)	(0.317)	(0.261)
K35 (ref. K3)	-0.132	-0.365*	-0.428**
	(0.249)	(0.193)	(0.169)

Table 8 Continued

	Fidelity	Self-benefit	Challenge
K60 (ref. K3)	-0.079	-0.232	-0.002
	(0.327)	(0.266)	(0.225)
Deployed family members (ref. No family members deployed)	0.012	-0.056	0.071
	(0.182)	(0.148)	(0.123)
Volunteered for military service (ref. Did not volunteer for military service)	0.037	0.189	0.210
	(0.227)	(0.177)	(0.147)
More than one deployment (ref. First-timer)	-0.282	-0.216	-0.067
	(0.204)	(0.151)	(0.133)
Constant	7.063***	8.309***	8.835***
	(0.457)	(0.393)	(0.308)
Observations	888	888	888

Notes: Parameter estimates and robust standard errors in parentheses.

Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

Our results include coefficients on PE ($\boldsymbol{\beta_1}$) and the period after ($\boldsymbol{\beta_3}$). The coefficient of PE ($\boldsymbol{\beta_1}$) is significantly positive, capturing the higher valuation of the motives for peace-enforcers. Apparently, those strongly oriented toward institutional reasons for service (*fidelity*) may indeed be 'disappointed' by their actual experiences, which may not adequately fulfill what they were seeking when they volunteered, especially those from PK missions. Peace-enforcers have on average higher valuations (i.e., PE's parameters are positive and significant) both before and after their mission.

The coefficient of overall time effect ($\boldsymbol{\beta_3}$) is negative, meaning that motives valuations are lower after deployment. The effect of PE motives ($\boldsymbol{\beta_2}$) is significant, and positive for *challenge* and *self-benefit* showing a higher score for the motives after deployment for PE than for PK.

Among the covariates influencing the valuation of the three motives, we find that soldiers 30 years or older have a lower valuation of the three motives than soldiers younger than 18-24 years. Female soldiers usually have higher valuations of *fidelity* and *challenge* than male soldiers. Compared to soldiers with a basic education, soldiers with a youth education usually value the three motive dimensions lower, while soldiers with vocational education value only *challenge* lower. Sergeants and officers value *challenge* lower than privates do, and soldiers with contracts up to 35 years have a lower valuation of *challenge* and *self-benefit* than soldiers with three-year contracts.

Who Wants to Stay in the Military?

We examine the third research question by exploring whether motives among first-timers and soldiers with a youth education differ from the motives of the average soldier. We expect some soldiers to choose military deployment for their gap year following secondary or higher secondary education. Indeed, taking one or several gap years between finishing a youth education and beginning further education is very common in Denmark. During this period young people typically work, travel, or do both.

We measure a future career in the military by asking the soldiers whether they see themselves as being employed in the military in five years or not—the alternative being in education or in a civilian job. We asked the question both before and after deployment. The comparison of soldiers' pre- and post-deployment expectations for their career shows that while pre-deployment 37 percent of the soldiers deployed to PE do not see themselves in the army within five years, after they return that percentage increases to 41 (see table 9). If we look at their characteristics (not shown), most are employed on a K3 and are between 18 and

24 years old.[17] As expected, privates are over-represented among those who do not see themselves in the army, whereas officers are under-represented because of their longer military training and presumably greater commitment to the military.

Table 9 Do You See Yourself in the Army Five Years from Now? (Percent)

	PE			PK			Total
	First-timers	Previously deployed	Total PE	First-timers	Previously deployed	Total PK	
Do You See Yourself in the Army Five Years From Now? (Before Deployment)							
No	44	33	37	38	33	34	36
Yes	55	65	62	62	66	64	62
Not given	1	2	1	0	2	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Do You See Yourself in the Army Five Years from Now? (After Deployment)							
No	49	37	41	38	31	33	39
Yes	48	59	55	55	62	60	56
Not given	3	4	4	7	7	7	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sample size	119	235	354	29	61	90	444

Notes: PE: ISAF 11 in Afghanistan.

PK: UNIFIL 4 in Lebanon.

We perform two logistic regressions (tables 10 and 11), where the dependent variable describes whether soldiers see themselves in the army in the next five years and the explanatory variables are socio-demographics and motivation factors.We run the regressions with the question both pre- and post-deployment, with similar results. Therefore, we present

[17] To identify the socio-demographic and military profiles, as well as the motivation factors of those changing their mind after the mission for 'Do you see yourself as employed in the army in five years (yes/no),' we run a multinomial logit. The dependent variable equals 0 if seeing oneself as employed in the army in five years changed from yes to no, 1 if it did not change, and 2 if it changed from no to yes. We find that being younger than 25 years and having a youth education and a short-term contract explain the change from yes to no, while being motivated by *benefit for self* explains the change from no to yes.

the results of the regression with the question pre-deployment, for which we have more observations. The independent variables are socio-demographics (table 10) and motivation factors (table 11), respectively.

Table 10 shows that women and soldiers older than 24 years are more likely to desire a military career. Not surprisingly, the same applies for soldiers who are already employed on a K60 contract, as opposed to those on a K3. Soldiers on short contracts (K3), who wish to go on only one or maybe two deployments, are typically younger and privates, and may choose deployment for a gap year experience before returning to education. This finding is supported by soldiers with a youth education being less likely to desire a military career than those with basic education, likely because a youth education provides more options for a civilian education and (later) a civilian job.

Table 10 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Do You See Yourself as Employed in the Army in Five Years? (Yes/No)

	Odds ratio	Robust Std. Err.
PE (ref. PK)	1.228	(0.352)
Male (ref. female)	0.354**	(0.186)
25-29 years (ref. 18-24 years old)	2.068**	(0.624)
30 years or older (ref. 18-24 years old)	2.515*	(1.197)
Parents divorced (ref. parents not divorced)	1.861***	(0.446)
In a relationship (ref. not in a relationship)	1.241	(0.306)
Children (ref. no children)	1.556	(0.649)
Youth education (ref. Basic Education)	0.544**	(0.151)
Vocational education (ref. Basic Education)	1.387	(0.490)
Further education (ref. Basic Education)	1.401	(0.648)
Sergeant (ref. Private)	1.482	(0.460)
Officer (ref. Private)	0.678	(0.458)
K35 (ref. K3)	1.429	(0.526)
K60 (ref. K3)	7.598***	(4.628)
Deployed family members (ref. no family members deployed)	1.166	(0.299)
Volunteered for military service (ref. Did not volunteer)	0.696	(0.233)
More than one deployment (ref. First-timer)	0.731	(0.222)
Observations	438	
Log Likelihood	-231	

Note: Exponentiated coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

Table 11 shows that soldiers motivated by *self-benefit* are less likely to want to stay in the military, indicating that these young soldiers have postmodern motives and view the military

only as a way of seeing the world and gaining new experiences. In contrast, soldiers motivated by *challenge* are more likely to stay in the military.

We therefore find that while some soldiers are occupationally driven, many are not, and that a slightly significant relationship exists between having *challenge* as their motive and their seeing themselves in the military in five years. Private companies also require the skills that a deployment may provide, in terms of leadership skills and responsibility. Thus *challenge* is also a motive for soldiers planning a civilian career. Like Hedlund (2011), we find that *self-benefit* is the prominent motive, especially for the youngest PE soldiers with a youth education, i.e., 'the gap year tourists.'

Table 11 Logistic Regression with Dependent Variable: Do You See Yourself as Employed in the Army in Five Years? (Yes/No)

	Odds Ratio	Robust Std. Err.
Fidelity	1.121	(0.134)
Self-benefit	0.581***	(0.076)
Challenge	1.204*	(0.133)
Observations	438	
Log Likelihood	-278.4	

Notes: Exponentiated coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses.

Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study compares motives among two teams of Danish soldiers deployed in spring 2011 to PE and PK, respectively. This constellation provides a unique opportunity for comparing motives among two groups of soldiers deployed to different missions under the same circumstances and economic contexts.

Our analysis shows that motives for deployment among Danish PK and PE soldiers constitutes a trichotomy of the motivation factors *fidelity*, s*elf-benefit*, and *challenge*.

Following Moskos (1986), we interpret *fidelity* as an institutional orientation and *challenge* as an occupational orientation, whereas *self-benefit* corresponds to Battistelli's (1997) postmodern orientation. In Eighmey's (2006) framework, our factors *challenge* and *self-benefit* are self-oriented but tangible and intangible, respectively, whereas *fidelity* is other-oriented. Both before and after deployment and among PE and PK soldiers, *challenge* is rated highest, followed by s*elf-benefit* and *fidelity*. Thus, while Eighmey (2006) finds tangible other-oriented motives prominent, we find that self-oriented motives predominate.

Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on motives by comparing motives for peace-keepers and peace-enforcers. Our results confirm that more institutionally driven soldiers motivated by *fidelity* are more likely to choose a PE mission, not a PK mission. In contrast to Jelusic and Garb (2005) and their study of Slovenian peace-keepers, we find that the more risky high-intensity PE missions attract soldiers with short employment in the armed forces. Although different missions require different personnel and might attract soldiers with different previous deployment experience, the percentage of first-timers and experienced soldiers is approximately the same for the two missions. Compared to U.S. soldiers deployed between 2001 and 2006 (Wells et al. 2010), we find a lower percentage of women among Danish soldiers. Moreover, the Danish soldiers are much younger with less schooling. Surprisingly, PE soldiers less often have family members who have been deployed. Thus soldiers choosing a harder mission are apparently not driven by a family tradition.

Moreover, we find not only that motives decrease but also that the change from before deployment to after is different for peace-keepers than for peace-enforcers. This change varies with the soldier’s deployment experiences; for example, the decrease in motives’ valuations is higher for peace-keepers than for peace-enforcers. Soldiers are trained to meet combat and expect to experience adrenalin; when these expectations are not met, they may find a deployment period long—and perhaps monotonous.

Our results show that postmodern motives (*self-benefit*) are important for younger soldiers with a youth education. This group corresponds very well with the 'gap year tourist' described in Hedlund (2011). However, our study finds that the 'gap year tourists' volunteer for even harder, more extreme missions associated with higher risk.

Finally, we examine which soldiers want to remain in the military for another five years. We find a slightly significant relationship between being motivated by *challenge* and seeing oneself in the military in five years. However, motives associated with *challenge* may be relevant not only for a military career but also for a civilian career, as private companies are also interested in the skills that a deployment may provide, such as leadership. Therefore, *challenge* may also be a motivation for some soldiers planning a civilian career.

Soldiers who wish to stay in the military are generally those who already have a long-term contract, not the younger soldiers with a youth education. As international missions require young soldiers, few soldiers can remain in the DAF until retirement. Moreover, deployments abroad can strain relationships and family life. We find that soldiers in relationships and soldiers with children are more 'disappointed' relative to *self-benefit* and *challenge*, possibly indicating that they do not feel that the s*elf-benefit* of a deployment period is worth the risk of losing their lives or being unable to support their family if badly wounded.

Although our findings could be specific to the soldiers from PE ISAF 11 and PK UNIFIL 4 in 2011, interviews with Danish soldiers deployed to different missions—including in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan—provide evidence that supports our results (Kofod et al. 2010). Nonetheless, expanding the sample to include more respondents from PK and PE missions and investigating whether the results are stable for a broader population would be useful. Furthermore, even though our sample has a high response rate, it might not be representative for all ranks, especially as we have very few officers from PK missions. Given

these limitations, the results should be interpreted cautiously, and future studies could benefit from awareness of these limitations when developing new designs.

Our analysis leads to three major findings. First, motives generally decrease when we compare ratings before and after deployment. Second, changes in pre- and post-deployment motives vary according to the type of mission (PK or PE), with soldiers from the PK mission being generally more disappointed. Third, we find a group of young soldiers, deployed for the first time, who can be described as 'gap year tourists' and who do not plan to stay in the army. Surprisingly, these gap year tourists are deployed in a PE mission, even though the pay for a PE mission is only slightly higher and is associated with greater risk.

Thus the DAF has not experienced problems recruiting soldiers. Moreover, as this study shows, Danish soldiers deployed to PE and PK in spring 2011 are generally highly motivated. But new challenges to recruitment might appear with the end of mission in Afghanistan and the exit of the economic downturn, making military deployment a less appealing option for young people with a longer education.

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