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Active Labour Market Programme Participation for Unemployment Insurance Recipients: A Systematic Review

Trine Filges, Geir Smedslund, Anne-Sofie Due Knudsen,
Anne-Marie Klint Jørgensen



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Authors	Filges, Trine Smedslund, Geir Knudsen, Anne-Sofie Due Jørgensen, Anne-Marie Klint
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Corresponding author	Trine Filges SFI Campbell, SFI – The Danish National Centre for Social Research Herluf Trolles Gade 11 1052 København K Denmark E-mail: tif@sfi.dk

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The Campbell Collaboration
P.O. Box 7004 St. Olavs plass
0130 Oslo, Norway
www.campbellcollaboration.org

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Executive summary/Abstract

BACKGROUND

During the 1990s, many countries introduced Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) in an effort to reduce unemployment. The introduction of ALMPs is often motivated by the need to upgrade the skills of especially those suffering long-term unemployment to improve their productivity and, subsequently, their employability. Other ALMPs are designed to encourage the unemployed to return to work. Typically, compulsory programme participation is required after the individual has received unemployment benefits for a certain period of time.

A large variety of different ALMPs exist among countries. They can consist of job search assistance, training, education, subsidized work and similar programmes. Some of the programmes (such as subsidized work, training and education) demand full-time participation over a long time period (e.g. several months), while other programmes (such as job search assistance and education) are part-time and have a short duration (e.g. few days/weeks). It is possible to classify these programmes into a set of four core categories: A: (labour market) training, B: Private sector programmes, C: direct employment programmes in the public sector and D: Job search assistance. The categories we use broadly correspond to classifications that have been suggested and used by the OECD and Eurostat (OECD, 2004 and Eurostat, 2005), even though there are differences between OECD and Eurostat in how they define and categorise these programmes.

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this systematic review was to study the effectiveness of ALMP participation on employment status for unemployment insurance recipients. The primary outcome was measured as exit rate to work in a small time period and as the probability of employment at a given time. The two measures were analysed separately. We also investigated if participation effects differ with the type of ALMP programme and if participation in ALMP was associated with the quality of the job obtained as measured by employment duration and income.

SEARCH STRATEGY

Relevant studies were identified through electronic searches of bibliographic databases, government policy databanks, internet search engines and hand searching of core journals. We searched to identify both published and unpublished literature. The searches were international in scope. Reference lists of included studies and relevant reviews were also searched.

SELECTION CRITERIA

All study designs that used a well-defined control group were eligible for inclusion in this review. Studies that utilized qualitative approaches were not included due to the absence of adequate control group conditions.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The total number of potential relevant studies constituted 16,422 hits. A total of 73 studies, consisting of 143 papers, met the inclusion criteria and were critically appraised by the review authors. The final selection comprised 73 studies from 15 different countries. Only 47 studies provided data that permitted the calculation of an effect size for the primary outcome. Of these, six studies could not be used in the data synthesis due to their high risk of bias. An additional two studies could not be used due to overlap of data samples. A total of 39 studies were therefore included in the data synthesis. Only five studies provided data that permitted the calculation of an effect size for secondary outcomes.

Random effects models were used to pool data across the studies. We used the point estimate of the hazard ratio (the relative exit rate from unemployment to employment) and the risk difference (the difference in the probability of employment). Pooled estimates were weighted using inverse variance methods, and 95% confidence intervals were estimated. The impact of programme type was examined using meta regression and subgroup analysis. Sensitivity analysis was used to evaluate whether the pooled effect sizes were robust across study design, and to assess the impact of methodological quality and of the quality of data. Funnel plots were used to indicate the probability of publication bias.

RESULTS

The available evidence suggests that there is a general effect of participating in ALMP. The findings are mixed, however, depending on the approach used to investigate the effect, with no effect found of being assigned to ALMP participation at a particular *moment*. We found a statistically significant effect of ALMP post

participation as measured by hazard ratios and risk difference in separate analyses. The overall impact of ALMP participation obtained using hazard ratios was 1.09, which corresponds to a 52 per cent chance that a treated unemployed person will find a job before a non-treated unemployed person. The overall impact of ALMP participation was associated with a risk difference of 0.07, which corresponds to a number needed to treat of 15; i.e. for every 15 unemployed people who participate in ALMP, an additional unemployed person will be holding a job approximately one year after participation. The available evidence does not, however, suggest an effect of being assigned to ALMP participation at a particular *moment*.

There was inconclusive evidence that participation in ALMP has an impact on the quality of the job obtained.

Sensitivity analyses resulted in no appreciable change in effect size, suggesting that the results are robust. We found no strong indication of the presence of publication bias.

The available evidence does not suggest that the effect of ALMP participation differs by type of programme. Other reviews by for example Kluge, 2010 and Card et al., 2010 conclude job search assistance programmes are relatively better, and direct employment programmes in the public sector relatively worse, than other programmes in terms of the likelihood of these different programmes to estimate a significant positive and a significant negative employment outcome. However, it should be kept in mind that the apparently different conclusions concerning relative effectiveness of type of ALMP are obtained based on very different inclusion criteria concerning participants and substantially different approaches and statistical methods.

It was not possible to examine whether the participation effect varies with gender, age or educational group, or with labour market condition.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic review analysing the magnitude (and not merely the statistical significance) of the effect of ALMP participation in unemployed individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Overall, ALMP programmes display a limited potential to alter the employment prospects of the individuals they intend to help. The available evidence does suggest that there is an effect of participating in ALMP, but the effect is small and we found no effect of being assigned to ALMP participation at a particular *moment*.

The four different types of ALMP (labour market training, private sector programmes, direct employment programmes in the public sector and job search

assistance) were investigated. The available evidence does not suggest that the ALMP participation effect differs by type of ALMP.

It was not possible to examine a number of other factors which we had reason to expect as impacting on the magnitude of the effect and which may be crucial to policy makers. The results of this review, however, merely suggest that across a number of different programmes there is an overall small effect of ALMP participation on job finding rates, and no evidence of differential effects for different programmes.

While additional research is needed, the review does however suggest that there is a small increase in the probability of finding a job after participation in ALMP.

1 Background

1.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE CONDITION

During the 1990s, many countries introduced Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) in an effort to reduce unemployment. Public spending on labour market programmes is typically split into so-called ‘active’ and ‘passive’ measures (Martin, 2000). In 2012 the average spending on active measures across the OECD countries was 0.6 percent of GDP, and 0.9 percent of GDP was spent on passive measures (OECD Database on Labour Market Programmes (www.oecd.org/employment/database)). The active measures comprise a wide range of policies aimed at improving the access of the unemployed to the labour market and jobs, while the passive measures relate to spending on income transfers, protecting individuals against loss of income and providing unemployed individuals the possibility of finding a better match between their qualifications and job vacancies. (Filges, Geerdsen, Knudsen & Jørgensen, 2014). In countries such as Australia, USA, Denmark, Sweden, England and Switzerland, participation in an active labour market programme is required if an unemployed individual is to continue receiving benefits (Gerfin & Lecher, 2002; Geerdsen, 2003). Typically, compulsory programme participation is required after the individual has received unemployment benefits for a certain period of time.

The purpose of making benefit payments conditional on participation in ALMPs is twofold. Firstly, participation in ALMPs may improve the participants’ qualifications and so allow their reintroduction into the labour market. Secondly, the compulsory aspect may provide an incentive for unemployed individuals to look for and return to work *prior* to programme participation (Black, Smith, Berger & Brett, 2003; Jackman, 1994; Hansen & Tranæs, 1999). This is sometimes referred to as the ‘threat effect’, and a systematic review of this effect occurring prior to participation in compulsory labour market programmes is currently in progress (Filges & Hansen, 2014).

We focus on research on the outcome of programme participation, i.e. effects *during* and *after* programme participation (Heckman, Lalonde & Smith, 1999; Martin & Grubb, 2001). The effects of ALMP participation on job-finding rates are typically composed of two separate effects: a lock-in effect and a post-programme effect. The lock-in effect refers to the period of participation in a programme. During this

period, job-search intensity may be lowered because there is less time to search for a job, and participants may want to complete an on-going skill-enhancing activity; hence the lock-in effect. The post-programme effect refers to the period after participation in a programme. If the ALMP has increased the individual's employability, a rise in the job-finding rate is expected. The combination of these two effects consequently determines the net effects of ALMP participation on unemployment duration.

1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVENTION

In this review, the intervention is ALMP participation by those in receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. However, studies in which the participants are a mix of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits and individuals receiving other types of unemployment benefits are included if more than 60 per cent of the participants receive unemployment insurance benefits. A large variety of different ALMPs exist among countries. They can consist of job search assistance, training, education, subsidized work, and similar programmes. Some of the programmes (e.g. subsidized work, training and education) demand full-time participation over a long time period (e.g. several months), while other programmes (e.g. job search assistance and education) are part-time and have a short duration (e.g. few days/weeks). It is possible to classify these programmes into a set of four core categories: A: (labour market) training, B: Private sector programmes, C: direct employment programmes in the public sector and D: Job search assistance. The categories we use broadly correspond to classifications that have been suggested and used by the OECD and Eurostat (OECD, 2004 and Eurostat, 2005), even though there are differences between OECD and Eurostat in how they define and categorise these programmes. The four categories are described below in detail:

- A. The first programme type, **(labour market) training**, encompasses measures such as classroom training, on-the-job training and work experience. The training can either provide a more general education (as with language courses, or basic computer courses) or specific vocational skills (as with advanced computer courses or courses providing technical or manufacturing skills). Their main objective is to develop the productivity and employability of the participants and to enhance human capital by increasing skills. Training programmes constitute the 'classic' component of ALMP.
- B. **Private sector programmes** are those aimed at creating incentives to alter employer and/or worker behaviour in relation to private sector employment. Wage subsidies are the most commonly used measure in this category. The objective of subsidies is to encourage employers to hire new workers or to maintain jobs that would otherwise be broken up. These can either be direct wage subsidies to employers, or financial incentives that are offered to workers for a limited period of time. The use of self-employment grants form another type of subsidized private sector employment: these

grants may be offered to participants who start their own business, sometimes along with advisory support for a fixed period of time (OECD, 2004; Eurostat, 2005).

- C. In contrast to subsidies in the private sector, the third programme type, **direct employment programmes in the public sector**, focuses on the direct creation and provision of public works or other activities that produce public goods or services. These measures are mainly targeted at the most disadvantaged individuals, pursuing the aim of keeping them in contact with the labour market and precluding the loss of human capital during a period of unemployment. The created jobs are, nevertheless, often additionally generated and at a distance from the ordinary labour market.
- D. The fourth type of programme, **Job search assistance**, encompasses measures aimed at enhancing job search efficiency. The services included are job-search courses and related forms of intensified counselling for those who have difficulty finding employment. The public employment services (PES) often target the disadvantaged and long-term unemployed, whereas private services may focus on the more privileged employees and white-collar workers. These programmes are usually the least expensive.

1.3 HOW THE INTERVENTION MIGHT WORK

Active labour market programmes were adopted by most advanced countries during the 1990s (Gerfin & Lechner, 2002). The declared purpose of such policies is to protect workers who are exposed to negative employment shocks due to changing market conditions (Filges, Kennes, Larsen & Tranæs, 2011; Aarnio, 1996).

Programmes that involve subsidized work, training and education are designed to reduce skill loss during extended periods of unemployment and to redirect the skills of those who are left without work as a result of new technology or increased international trade (Kluve et al., 2007). The introduction of ALMPs is thus often motivated by the need to upgrade the skills of especially those suffering long-term unemployment to improve their productivity and, subsequently, their employability. If participation in an ALMP increases the individual's employability, a rise in the job-finding rate is to be expected; however, the increased human capital may result in higher reservation wages¹, effectively offsetting the positive employment effect (Filges et al., 2011; Mortensen, 1987). Moreover, some programmes may stigmatize workers in the view of potential employers. Programmes associated with participants having poor employment prospects (e.g. the long term unemployed) may carry a stigma. Because of asymmetric information (a situation where there is imperfect knowledge where one party has different information from another), employers cannot know the productivity of new workers, some of whom they might hire from the pool of the unemployed. Prospective employers might then perceive participants in such employment programmes as low productivity workers or as

¹ The minimum wage at which a job offer is acceptable.

workers with a tenuous labour market attachment (Kluve, Lehmann & Schmidt, 1999; Kluve et al., 2007).

Finally, some ALMPs are designed to encourage the unemployed person to return to work and may increase the efficiency of the matching process. For example, job search assistance is expected to increase the search intensity of participants and therefore directly enhance the matching efficiency between vacancies and the unemployed (Pissarides, 2000).

1.4 WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO DO THIS REVIEW

There is currently considerable political interest in reducing levels of unemployment, and the use of ALMPs as a means of achieving this goal has been highly advocated (Filges et al., 2011; Kluve et al., 2007). At the same time, ALMPs have been heavily criticized for lack of effectiveness.

Several papers summarise the effect of ALMP (Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve, 2010; Kluve & Schmidt, 2002; Martin, 2000; Card, Kluve & Weber, 2010; Martin & Grubb, 2001). However, none are systematic in their search of relevant literature and none provide a synthesis of the magnitude of the effect size, although Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) offer a meta-analysis based on vote counting and an analysis of the contribution of different covariates to the probability of obtaining a significant positive, a significant negative or a non-significant effect.

The effect of active labour market programmes for unemployed people receiving other kinds of unemployment benefits is reviewed in the Campbell Systematic Review 'Work programmes for welfare recipients' (Smedslund et al., 2006) where the objective was to estimate the effects of work programmes on welfare recipients' employment and economic self-sufficiency. Individuals who are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits or who have pensions of any kind were, however, excluded in Smedslund et al. (2006).

To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no systematic review on the effect of ALMP participation in unemployed individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits - the focus of this review.

2 Objective of the review

The objective of this systematic review is to study the effectiveness of ALMP participation on employment status for unemployment insurance recipients.

3 Methods

3.1 TITLE REGISTRATION AND REVIEW PROTOCOL

The title for this systematic review was registered on November 30, 2010. The systematic review protocol was approved on September 2, 2013. Both the title registration and the protocol are available in the Campbell Library at:

<http://campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/185/>

3.2 CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING STUDIES FOR THIS REVIEW

3.2.1 Types of studies

The study designs eligible for inclusion were:

- Controlled trials:
 - RCTs - randomised controlled trials
 - QRCTs - quasi-randomised controlled trials where participants are allocated by, for example, alternate allocation, participant's birth date, date, case number or alphabetically
 - NRCTs - non-randomised controlled trials where participants are allocated by other actions controlled by the researcher
- Non-randomised studies (NRS) where allocation is not controlled by the researcher and two or more groups of participants are compared. Participants are allocated by, for example, time differences, location differences, decision makers, policy rules or participant preferences.

We only included study designs that used a well-defined control group, i.e. ordinary (passive) unemployment insurance benefits or the usual services available to unemployment insurance recipients (that are not ALMPs). Studies that utilized qualitative approaches were not included in the review due to the absence of adequate control group conditions.

We only included studies that used individual micro-data. We excluded studies that rely on regional or national time series data, even though micro-econometric estimates of individual treatment effects merely provide partial information about the full impact of ALMP (Calmfors, 1994; Calmfors, 1995).

The micro economic literature disregards any deadweight loss and substitution effects², as well as any productivity and competition effects. However, reliable empirical evidence which considers all direct and indirect effects on programme participants and on workers not targeted by the intervention is very difficult to generate. At the aggregate level, expenditures for ALMP tend to be high in times of economic recession: this two-way causality between policy measures and outcomes makes it very difficult to assess the impact of the former on the latter and reliable evidence from macro studies is limited. As Heckman et al. (1999) emphasize, accounting for *general equilibrium effects*³ in a convincing way generally requires the construction of a structural model of the labour market. However, the difficulty of assembling all behavioural parameters for a structural general equilibrium model is substantial, and the conclusions from these models remain controversial, so that their relative value compared to the more traditional ‘treatment effect’ evaluations continues to be an open research question (Smith, 2000a, 2000b).

3.2.2 Types of participants

The participants were required to be unemployed individuals who received unemployment insurance benefits. The International Labour Office (ILO) definition of an unemployed individual is a person, male or female, aged 15-74, without a job who is available for work and either has searched for work in the past four weeks or is available to start work within two weeks and/or is waiting to start a job already obtained (ILO, 1990); however, different countries may apply different definitions of an unemployed individual, see for example Statistics Denmark (2009). The eligibility rules of unemployment insurance benefits differ between countries. We excluded individuals receiving other types of benefits such as social assistance benefits or benefits not related to being unemployed. Studies including a mix of individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits and other individuals receiving social assistance benefits and/or other types of benefits were only included if more than 60 per cent of the included individuals received unemployment insurance benefits.

² The **deadweight loss** is defined as the hirings from the target group that would have occurred also in the absence of the programme. The **substitution effect** is defined as the extent to which jobs created for a certain category of workers simply replace jobs for other categories, because relative wage costs are changed.

³ All direct and indirect effects on programme participants and on workers not targeted by the intervention and interactions with other policies.

3.2.3 Types of interventions

The intervention is participation in ALMP. ALMPs can include a wide range of activities as listed below. ALMPs typically apply to unemployment insurance beneficiaries and (if different) employable social assistance beneficiaries⁴, but similar principles are increasingly being applied to lone-parent and disability beneficiaries⁵. In this review, ALMPs were understood in the narrow sense of training or employment measures for the unemployed receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

A large variety of different ALMP programmes exists among countries which may be classified into four core categories. In this review, we adopted categories which broadly correspond to classifications suggested and used by the OECD and Eurostat (OECD, 2004; Eurostat, 2005) even though there are differences between OECD and Eurostat in how they define and categorise these programmes. The four categories are: A: (labour market) training, B: Private sector programmes, C: direct employment programmes in the public sector and D: Job search assistance. They are described in detail in section 1.2.

Programmes that only consist of monitoring (such as carrying out surveillance of the search activities of the unemployed) were not included. Specialized types of ALMPs targeting only particular groups (such as specialized youth programmes, vocational rehabilitation, sheltered work programmes or wage subsidies for individuals with physical, mental or social disabilities) were excluded.

3.2.4 Types of outcomes

The objective of this review was to study the effect of ALMP participation on employment status. Our main interest was to include studies in a meta-analysis where hazard ratios⁶ and variance were either reported or were calculable from the available data. The primary outcome was exits from the unemployment insurance system and into employment⁷. Studies which only examine exits to other

⁴ In most OECD countries, a secondary benefit (known as social assistance benefit) is available for those who have exhausted regular unemployment insurance benefits (OECD, 2007).

⁵ In the US, disability benefit is designed to provide income supplement to people who are physically restricted in their ability to be employed because of a notable, usually physical, disability (CBO, 2010), whereas in Denmark the disability may be both physical and mental (Høgelund & Holm, 2005). Disability benefits can be supplied on either a temporary or permanent basis, usually directly correlated to whether the person's disability is temporary or permanent.

⁶ The hazard ratio measures the proportional change in hazard rates (defined as the event rate (finding a job) at time t conditional on survival (staying unemployed) until time t or later) between unemployed persons who have participated in ALMPs and unemployed persons who have not participated in ALMPs.

⁷ When an unemployed person receiving unemployment insurance benefit leaves the unemployment insurance system (e.g. has found a job, withdraws from the labour force, exhausts the benefit period and receives other types of social benefits etc.) there is a tradition in the economics literature for this to be termed an 'exit'.

destinations, such as other types of social benefits or non-employment, were not included. The included studies reported outcomes in the form of hazard ratios and risk difference (the difference in the probability of employment) or data that permitted the calculation of a hazard ratio or risk difference.

In addition to the primary outcome, we considered secondary outcomes that are relevant to the impact ALMP has on the duration of employment and on income. A few studies provided data on the exit rate from re-employment. We included the measure of exit rate from re-employment in the analysis of secondary outcomes. A higher exit rate from re-employment may indicate that the participation in ALMP forces unemployed individuals to find jobs that do not match their qualifications and, therefore, to return to unemployment quickly.

Primary outcomes:

- a) Relative exit rate from unemployment to employment (measured as hazard ratio)
- b) Difference in probability of employment (measured as risk difference)

Secondary outcome measures:

- a) Duration of first employment spell post-intervention
- b) Relative exit rate from re-employment to unemployment (measured as hazard ratio)
- c) Re-employment income

3.3 SEARCH METHODS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF STUDIES

The search was performed by one review author (AKJ) and one member of the review team (PVH)⁸.

3.3.1 Electronic searches

Relevant studies were identified through electronic searches of bibliographic databases, government policy databanks and internet search engines. No language or date restrictions were applied to the searches. The searches were conducted during September 2012.

3.3.2 Search terms

An example of the search strategy for Business Source Elite and modifications of the search are listed in Appendix 10.1. Trial filters were not used as this review also includes non-randomised study designs..

The following databases were searched:

⁸ Members of the review team at SFI Campbell were: the research assistants Pia Vang Hansen, Simon Helth Filges and Trondur Møller Sandoy.

Business Source Elite (Ebsco platform, searched until Sept. 2012)
EconLit searched until (Ebsco platform, searched until Sept. 2012)
PsycINFO searched until (Ebsco platform, searched until Sept. 2012)
SocIndex searched until (Ebsco platform, searched until Sept. 2012)
Science Citation Index searched until Sept. 2012
Social Science Citation Index searched until Sept. 2012
The Cochrane Library searched until Sept. 2012
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences searched until Sept. 2012
IDEAS/Economist Online⁹ searched until Sept. 2012

3.3.3 Searching other resources

Hand searching

Reference lists of included studies and reference lists of relevant reviews were searched. ‘The Journal of Labor Economics’ and ‘Labour Economics’ were hand searched for the year 2012 and the available issues of 2013 (1, 2 and 3).

Grey Literature

Google (including Google Scholar) was used to search the web to identify potential unpublished studies. Advance search options were used to refine the grey search strategy. OpenGrey was used to search for European grey literature (<http://www.opengrey.eu/>)

The private independent research institutes and economic networks:

IZA – Institute of the Study of Labor (www.iza.org)

CEPR – Centre for Economic Policy Research (www.cepr.org)

NBER – National Bureau of Economic Research (www.nber.org)

CESifo – the cooperation between CES (Center for Economic Studies) and IFO (Institute for Economic Research) – (www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome) are all covered via IDEAS.

SSRN – Social Science Research Network (www.ssrn.com) have also been searched to uncover potential preprint discussion papers.

Copies of relevant documents were made, recording the exact URL and date of access.

Personal contacts

⁹ The search strategy had to be considerably modified for searching the IDEAS/Economist Online databases which does not allow complex searching. Even though these two databases contain similar references, we searched both in an attempt to achieve as thorough a search as possible.

Personal contacts with national and international researchers were made to identify unpublished reports and on-going studies.

3.4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

3.4.1 Selection of studies

One review author (ADK) and two members of the review team (SHF, TMS) independently read titles and available abstracts of reports and articles identified in the search to exclude reports that were clearly irrelevant. Citations considered relevant by at least one reviewer were retrieved in full text versions. If there was insufficient information in the title and abstract to judge relevance, the full text was retrieved.

Two reviewers (ADK, TF) and two members of the review team (SHF, TMS) read the full text versions to ascertain eligibility based on the selection criteria. Any disagreements were resolved by discussion. A screening guide (see Appendix 10.2) was used to determine inclusion or exclusion and was provided in the protocol (Filges et al., 2013).

3.4.2 Data extraction and management

One review author (ADK) and two members of the review team (SHF, TMS) independently coded the included studies (see Appendix 10.3). A coding sheet was piloted on several studies (Filges et al., 2013). Any disagreements were resolved by discussion. Information was extracted on: characteristics of participants, intervention characteristics and control conditions, research design, sample size and censoring. Numeric data extraction (outcome data) was performed by one review author (ADK) and checked by a second review author (TF). Extracted data were stored electronically. Analysis was conducted in RevMan5 and STATA.

3.4.3 Assessment of risk of bias in included studies

Two review authors (TF & ADK) independently assessed the risk of bias for each included study. There were only minor disagreements and these were resolved by discussion. We assessed the methodological quality of studies using a risk of bias model developed by Prof. Barnaby Reeves in association with the Cochrane Non-Randomised Studies Methods Group.¹⁰ This model, an extension of the Cochrane Collaboration's risk of bias tool, covers risk of bias for RCTs as well as risk of bias for non-randomised studies that have well-defined control groups.

¹⁰ This risk of bias model was introduced by Prof. Reeves at a workshop on risk of bias in non-randomised studies at SFI Campbell, February 2011. The model is a further development of work carried out in the Cochrane Non-Randomised Studies Method Group (NRSMG).

The extended model is organised, and follows the same steps, as the risk of bias model described in the Cochrane Handbook, chapter 8 (Higgins & Green, 2011). The model is extended as follows:

1) The existing Cochrane risk of bias tool needs elaboration when assessing non-randomised studies because, for the latter, particular attention must be paid to selection bias and risk of confounding¹¹. The extended model therefore specifically incorporates a formalised and structured approach for the assessment of selection bias in non-randomised studies by adding an explicit item that focuses on confounding. This is based on a list of confounders considered important and defined in the protocol for the review. The assessment of confounding is made using a worksheet which is marked for each confounder according to whether it was considered by the researchers, the precision with which it was measured, the imbalance between groups, and the care with which adjustment was carried out (see Appendix 10.3). This assessment informs the final risk of bias score for confounding.

2) RCTs must have a protocol that is defined prior to commencing recruitment, whereas non-randomised studies need not. This makes NRCTs at greater risk of bias compared to RCTs. The item concerning selective reporting therefore also requires assessment of the extent to which analyses (and potentially other choices) could have been manipulated to bias the findings reported (for example, by the choice of method of model fitting, and by the potential confounders considered). In addition, the model includes two separate yes/no items asking review authors whether they judge the researchers to have had a pre-specified protocol and analysis plan.

3) Finally, the risk of bias assessment is refined, making it possible to discriminate between studies with varying degrees of risk. This refinement is achieved by the use of a 5-point scale for certain items (see the following section *Risk of bias judgement items* for details).

The refined assessment is pertinent when considering data synthesis as it operationalizes the identification of those studies with a very high risk of bias (especially in relation to non-randomised studies). The refinement increases transparency in assessment judgements and provides justification for excluding a study with a very high risk of bias from the meta-analysis.

Risk of bias judgement items

The risk of bias model used in this review is based on 9 items (see Appendix 10.4).

The 9 items refer to:

- **sequence generation** (Judged on a low/high risk/unclear scale)
- **allocation concealment** (Judged on a low/high risk/unclear scale)
- **confounders** (Judged on a 5 point scale/unclear)

¹¹ See next page for an explanation of the terms selection bias and confounding.

- **blinding** (Judged on a 5 point scale/unclear)
- **incomplete outcome data** (Judged on a 5 point scale/unclear)
- **selective outcome reporting** (Judged on a 5 point scale/unclear)
- **other potential threats to validity** (Judged on a 5 point scale/unclear)
- **a priori protocol** (Judged on a yes/no/unclear scale)
- **a priori analysis plan** (Judged on a yes/no/unclear scale)

Confounding

An important part of the risk of bias assessment of non-randomised studies (NRCT and NRS) is consideration of how the studies deal with confounding factors (see Appendix 10.4). Selection bias is understood as systematic baseline differences between groups which can therefore compromise comparability between groups. Baseline differences can be observable to the researcher (e.g. age and gender) and unobservable (e.g. motivation and ‘ability’). There is no single non-randomised study design that always solves the selection problem. Different designs attempt to provide solutions to the problem of potential selection bias under different assumptions, and consequently require different types of data. Designs particularly vary with respect to how they deal with selection on ‘unobservable’ factors. The “right” method depends on the model generating participation, i.e. assumptions about the nature of the process by which participants are selected into a programme.

As there is no universal correct way to construct counterfactuals for non-randomised designs, we looked for evidence that identification was achieved, and that the authors of the primary studies justified their choice of method in a convincing manner by discussing the assumption(s) leading to identification (the assumption(s) that make it possible to identify the counterfactual). Preferably the authors should make an effort to justify their choice of method and convince the reader that the only difference between an individual participating in ALMP and an individual not participating in ALMP is exactly the participation and that the source of difference between their participation status is not endogenous to the individuals’ exit rate to employment. The judgement is reflected in the assessment of the confounder ‘unobservables’ in the list of confounders considered important at the outset and defined in the protocol for this review.

In addition to unobservables for this review, we identified the following observable confounding factors to be the most relevant: age, gender, education, ethnicity, labour market conditions, censoring and unemployment duration. In each study, we assessed whether these factors had been considered, and in addition we assessed other factors likely to be a source of confounding within the individual included studies.

The motivation for focusing on age, gender, education and ethnicity is that these are the major determinants of the risk of being unemployed (Layard, Nickell & Jackman, 2005).

Concerning unemployment duration, most studies find that the genuine duration dependence is negative, so that the longer the unemployment spell, the smaller the individual's chance of finding a job¹² (see Serneels, 2002, for an overview). Thus if the study does not control for unemployment duration, the effect of ALMP participation will be biased.

Another potential source of bias arises from differences in labour market conditions. If the study explores changes in ALMP participation over time or space as their source of variation for example, it is very important to control for changes in labour market conditions over time (as a consequence of the business cycle, for example) or over space as the exit rate to employment most certainly will depend on this factor.

Censoring may also introduce bias. The effect of ALMP participation is often measured using survival data. Participants who do not leave the unemployment system before the end of the study are censored from the outcome data and have the potential for introducing bias if not adequately accounted for. Censoring of participants is therefore a potential threat, both in relation to the level of censoring and in relation to whether censoring is taken into account.

3.4.4 Measures of treatment effect

The treatment effect was measured either as the impact on the hazard rate or as the impact on the probability of employment at some date or time interval after the completion of the programme. Our main interest was to include studies in a meta-analysis where hazard ratios and variances were either reported or were calculable from the available data.

The hazard ratio measures the proportional change in hazard rates between unemployed individuals who have participated in ALMPs and unemployed individuals who have not participated in ALMPs. The hazard rate is defined as the event rate (in the present context, the event is finding a job) at time t conditional on survival (staying unemployed) until time t or later. A hazard rate is constructed as follows:¹³

The length of an unemployment spell for an unemployed individual (in the present context the length of stay in the unemployment system until finding a job) is a realization of a continuous random variable T . In continuous time, the hazard rate $\theta(t)$ is defined as:

¹² The reason for this is that unemployment implies a loss of skills or that long periods of unemployment lead to a loss of self-confidence.

¹³ The following description of hazard rates is based on Jenkins (2005) and van den Berg (2001).

$$\theta(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t \leq T < t + \Delta t | T \geq t)}{\Delta t} = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)} = \frac{f(t)}{1 - F(t)},$$

where the cumulative distribution function of T is:

$$F(t) = \Pr(T < t)$$

and the probability density function is:

$$f(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t \leq T < t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t} = \frac{dF(t)}{dt}.$$

$F(t)$ is also known in the survival analysis literature as the failure function and in the present context failure means finding a job. $S(t)$ is the survivor function:

$$S(t) \equiv \Pr(T \geq t) = 1 - F(t);$$

t is the elapsed time since entry to the state (since the individual entered the unemployment system).

Introducing covariates the hazard rate becomes:

$$\theta(t|x(t, s)) = \lim_{\Delta t \downarrow 0} \frac{\Pr(t \leq T < t + \Delta t | T \geq t, x(t, s))}{\Delta t},$$

where $x(t, s)$ is a vector of personal characteristics that may vary with unemployment duration (t) or with calendar time (s).

A proportional hazard rate is given by:

$$\theta(t|x) = \theta_0(t) * \exp(x'\beta),$$

where $\theta_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard, $\exp(x'\beta)$ is a scale function of the vector x of personal characteristics (and a treatment indicator) and β is a vector of estimated parameters.

The vector x of personal characteristics typically included in the studies used in the meta-analyses are age, gender, education, ethnicity, labor market conditions, individual labor market history and family. The baseline hazard is typically not completely specified; often the hazard function is modelled as piecewise constant. Thus whether the shape of the hazard generally increases or decreases with survival time is left to be estimated from the data, rather than specified a priori.

In the description of the hazard rate it is, so far, implicitly assumed that all relevant differences between individuals can be summarized by observed explanatory variables. But if there are unobservable differences, e.g. motivation and 'ability' (in the literature termed unobserved heterogeneity) and these differences are ignored, the estimated parameters will be biased towards zero. It is therefore common to control for both observed factors given by the vector x as well as unobserved factors, i.e. unobserved heterogeneity. The hazard rate, including unobserved heterogeneity, is now given by:

$$\theta(t|x, v) = \theta_0(t) * \exp(x'\beta)v,$$

where v represents factors unobserved to the researcher and independent of x . It is necessary to assume the distribution of v has a shape where the right-hand tail of the distribution is not too fat and whose functional form is summarized in terms of only a few key parameters, in order to estimate those parameters with the data available. In the studies used in the meta-analyses the unobserved components are typically assumed to follow a discrete distribution with two (or more) points of support.

The majority of studies provided hazard ratios and variances or data enabling the calculation of hazard ratios and variances. The acceptable outcome measurement frequency for calculating hazard ratios in this review was three months or less. A study reporting only outcomes measured on time intervals of more than three months was not included in the meta-analysis.

As stated in the protocol, Filges et al., 2013, individual participant data was *not* requested to calculate log hazard ratios as this may introduce bias due to the time span of studies (the time span between the earliest we knew of and the latest is 30 years).

Studies providing estimates of hazard ratios and variances typically based the estimation on the maximum likelihood method¹⁴. The principle of maximum likelihood is relatively straightforward. The likelihood function, regarded as a function of the parameters of the model, is the joint density of the observations. The maximum likelihood estimator yields a choice of the estimator as the value for the parameter that makes the observed data most probable.

Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity, the contribution to the likelihood for complete observations is given by the conditional density function of t :

$$f(t|x) = \theta(t|x)\exp(-\int_0^t \theta(s|x)ds)$$

and for censored observations:

$$S(t|x) = \exp(-\int_0^t \theta(s|x)ds)$$

The likelihood function is:

$$L = f(t|x)^d S(t|x)^{1-d}$$

where $d= 1$ for complete observations and $d= 0$ for censored observations. Often it is convenient to maximise the logarithm of the likelihood function rather than the likelihood function and the same results are obtained since $\log L$ and L attain the maximum at the same point.

The log likelihood function to maximize with respect to the parameters of the model is:

$$\log L = d\log f(t|x) + (1 - d)\log S(t|x) = d\log\theta(t|x) - \int_0^t \theta(s|x)ds$$

¹⁴ The following description of estimation is based on Lancaster, 1990.

Introducing unobserved heterogeneity with the random components assumed to follow a discrete distribution with two points of support ($v_1, v_2, \Pr(v_1) = \pi_1, \Pr(v_2) = \pi_2$) the log likelihood function becomes:

$$\log L = \left(d\log\theta(t|x) - \int_0^t \theta(s|x) ds \right) \pi_1 + \left(d\log\theta(t|x) - \int_0^t \theta(s|x) ds \right) \pi_2$$

If hazard ratios and variances were not reported, log hazard ratios and variances were computed directly using the observed number of events and log rank expected number of events (Parmar, Torri, & Stewart, 1998).

The log hazard ratio was calculated as: $\log(HR) = \log((Oa/Ea)/(Ob/Eb))$, where Oa and Ob is the number of observed events in each group and Ea and Eb is the number of expected events assuming a null hypothesis of no difference in survival. The standard error of the log hazard ratio was calculated as $\sqrt{(1/Ea + 1/Eb)}$.

Some studies reported risk difference and variances or data that enabled the calculation of risk difference and variance. The risk difference is the difference in the probability of employment at a given moment or in a given time period.

If risk differences were reported they were typically estimated using matching methods¹⁵. Matching is a statistical technique which is used to evaluate the effect of a treatment by comparing the treated and the non-treated units when the treatment is not randomly assigned. Matching attempts to mimic randomisation by creating a sample of units that received the treatment that is comparable on all observed covariates to a sample of units that did not receive the treatment. However, matching can become hazardous when the covariate matrix is of high dimension. To deal with this dimensionality problem, a much used method is propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The propensity score is the conditional probability of participation in a programme given the covariates, summarising the information of the relevant covariates into a single index function.

Define programme participation by $T = 1$ and non-participation by $T = 0$, the potential outcomes Y_1 and Y_0 and the covariates X . The propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of programme participation given covariates:

$$p(x) = \Pr(T = 1|X = x)$$

Then treatment assignment is (conditionally) unconfounded if potential outcomes are independent of treatment conditional on covariates X . This can be written compactly as:

$$Y_0, Y_1 \perp T|X$$

where \perp denotes statistical independence. If unconfoundedness holds, then:

$$Y_0, Y_1 \perp T|p(X)$$

¹⁵ The description of matching is based on Lee, 2005.

And the treatment effect:

$$E(Y_1|T = 1) - E(Y_0|T = 1)$$

where the first term is identified in the data by the observed outcome of the programme participants and the second term has been estimated.

If risk difference and variances were not reported they were computed directly using the observed number of events and the total number of participants (Borenstein et al., 2009). The risk difference was calculated as: $RiskDiff = Oa/Na - Ob/Nb$, where where Oa and Ob is the number of observed events in each group and Na and Nb is the total number of participants in each group. The standard error of the risk difference was calculated as: $\sqrt{(Oa(Na - Oa)/(Na)^3 + Ob(Nb - Ob)/ [(Nb)]^3)}$

We separately pooled studies where outcomes were measured (or could be calculated) as hazard ratios and risk difference. We performed the meta-analyses using the log hazard ratio and variance and the risk difference and variance. We report the 95% confidence intervals.

The secondary outcomes were also measured as hazard ratios and the effect sizes as log hazard ratios by two studies and in addition one study provided data on earnings that permitted the calculation of an effect size (Hedges' g was used for estimating standardized mean differences (SMD)) and two studies reported the effect on the duration of re-employment (calculation of a SMD was not possible but both studies reported the mean difference measured in months with variances). The different outcomes were analysed separately and we report the 95% confidence intervals.

Further, we analysed the effects measured by hazard ratios obtained using the so called timing-of-events approach separately from effects measured by hazard ratios obtained using other methods¹⁶.

The timing-of-events approach is special as it explores information on the *timing* of events (like the *moment* when the individual enrolls in training and the *moment* he finds a job) to estimate the individual training effect. The training effect obtained using this approach is the effect on the exit rate to work of being assigned to training at a particular *moment* as opposed to the effect of being assigned to training in general. The empirical approach involves estimation of models simultaneously explaining the duration of unemployment before obtaining work or participating in training programmes.

For individuals who enter training at time t , the natural control group consists of individuals unemployed for the same period of time at t , but who have not yet received training. A necessary condition for identification of an effect is that there is

¹⁶ These other methods used in the included studies are randomised assignment, matching, instrument variables and multiple regression.

some randomisation in the training assignment at that particular *t*. The model allows for selection effects by way of unobserved determinants that affect the treatment assignment as well as the outcome. It is thus not necessary to make a conditional independence assumption, i.e. that all determinants of the process of treatment assignment is captured by the data (the covariates used in the model) so that the remaining variation in assignment to treatment is independent of the determinants of the outcome. The timing-of-event model framework allows for randomisation because it specifies assignment by the *rate* of entering training. Thus there is a random component in assignment in a small time interval that is independent of the covariates. An essential assumption when using the timing-of-events approach is thus the no anticipation assumption. Individuals may know the determinants of the process leading to training, including the probability distribution of the duration until training, but it is assumed that they do not know the outcome of this process, the realisation of the moment of assignment, in advance. The random *realisation of the exact moment of assignment* is what identifies the effect and the effect obtained is the *effect of treatment at time t*.

3.4.5 Unit of analysis issues

To account for possible statistical dependencies, we examined a number of issues: whether individuals were randomised in groups (i.e. cluster randomised trials), whether individuals had undergone multiple interventions, whether there were multiple treatment groups, and whether several studies were based on the same data source.

Cluster Randomisation

No studies using cluster randomisation were found.

Multiple Intervention Groups

Two studies, analysing ALMP in Germany, provided results separately for East and West Germany. We used the effect estimates from East and West Germany separately in the meta-analysis. Further, one study provided results of participating in ALMP in West Germany for the years 1986 and 1993 separately. We used the effect estimates from 1986 and 1993 separately in the meta-analysis. Finally, one study analysed an RCT conducted in Florida and Washington DC. Results were reported separately for the two states, and we used the effect estimates separately in the meta-analysis.

Where studies reported separate effect estimates, for example separated by gender or by ALMP type, a synthetic (average) effect size was calculated and used in the analyses of the overall effect of ALMP participation to avoid dependence problems.

Multiple Interventions per Individual

There were no studies with multiple interventions per individual.

Multiple Studies using the Same Sample of Data

Three studies used the same sample of data, i.e. the studies used administrative register data from the same country covering the same time period. All three studies used data from Switzerland where the administrative registers provide complete coverage;¹⁷ that is, all registered unemployed in the selected period are included in the administrative registers. Two primary studies analysed a random sample from these administrative registers in Switzerland covering ALMP participation in 1998 and one primary study analysed a complete sample from one canton covering ALMP participation in 1998. The data used in these primary studies were thus (partly) representative of the same population of unemployed at the same time. We reviewed all three studies, but in the meta-analysis we only included one estimate of the ALMP participation effect from this sample of data. The choice of which estimate to include was based on our quality assessment of the studies. We chose the estimate from the study that we judged to have the lowest risk of bias paying particular attention to the confounding item. Two studies had equal scoring on the confounding item and we based the choice on the incomplete data item and sample selection choices.

Multiple Time Points

All studies either reporting hazard ratios or where calculation of hazard ratios were possible reported the effect from the end of treatment. For the studies reporting the effect of timing of the event (participation in ALMP) all studies reported the effect on the hazard rate from end of treatment and some studies in addition¹⁸ reported the effect on the hazard rate from the beginning of treatment. Each time point, start of treatment and end of treatment, was analysed in a separate analysis. For the studies reporting risk difference (or where it was possible to calculate risk difference) it was possible to pool all the studies and we used the outcome measured closest to one year after treatment.

3.4.6 Dealing with missing data and incomplete data

Missing data and censoring were assessed in the included studies. For studies using questionnaire data, a sensitivity analysis was performed to assess potential bias. For studies, using time to event data in which the censoring level was high (more than 25%) or the level was not reported, a sensitivity analysis was performed to assess potential bias in the analysis. Attrition rates, reasons for attrition and whether intention to treat analysis (ITT) was conducted were recorded where possible from included RCTs and QRCTs. It was not possible to perform a sensitivity analysis as all RCTs and QRCTs conducted ITT analysis.

¹⁷ Complete coverage of administrative registers applies to other countries as well.

¹⁸ One study reported the effect from the beginning of treatment only.

3.4.7 Assessment of heterogeneity

Heterogeneity among primary outcome studies was assessed with Chi-squared (Q) test, and the I-squared, and τ -squared statistics (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). Any interpretation of the Chi-squared test was made cautiously on account of its low statistical power.

3.4.8 Assessment of reporting bias

We used funnel plots to identify possible publication bias.

3.4.9 Grading of evidence

The quality of evidence was assessed according to a systematic and explicit method (Guyatt et al., 2008). In order to indicate the extent to which one can be confident that an estimate of effect is correct, judgements about the quality of evidence were made for each comparison and outcome. These judgements considered study design (RCTs, QRCTs, NRCTs and NRSs), study quality (detailed study design and execution), consistency of results (similarity of estimates of effect across studies) and directness (the extent to which people, interventions and outcome measures were similar to those of interest). The following definitions were used in grading the quality of evidence (Balslem et al., 2011): **High**: We are very confident that the true effect lies close to that of the estimate of the effect. **Moderate**: We are moderately confident in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be close to the estimate of the effect, but there is a possibility that it is substantially different. **Low**: Our confidence in the effect estimate is limited: The true effect may be substantially different from the estimate of the effect. **Very low**: We have very little confidence in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be substantially different from the estimate of effect. Any estimate of effect is very uncertain.

3.5 DATA SYNTHESIS

As planned (outlined in section 3.4 of the protocol, Filges et al., 2013) we used random effects models to estimate the overall effect as ALMPs vary in their content and deal with diverse populations of participants and labour market conditions. Analysis was conducted in RevMan5, except the meta-regression which was conducted in STATA. Studies that were coded with a very high risk of bias (scored 5 on the risk of bias scale) were not included in the data synthesis.

As outlined in Section 3.4.5, it was possible to group outcomes as follows: hazard ratios from end of treatment and risk difference approximately one year after treatment as possible. As lock-in effects¹⁹ may be considerable, effects where lock-in

¹⁹ The lock-in effect refers to the period of participation in a programme.

effects were considered were analysed separately from estimates of post programme effects. Only studies using the timing-of-events method measured results where lock-in effects were considered. The proportional shift of the hazard rate was measured from the beginning of treatment, thus combining the lock-in and post programme effects. The combination of these two effects consequently determines the net effects (net of lock-in) of ALMP participation on the exit rate to employment.

We planned to distinguish between the counterfactual situations. The main distinction between counterfactual situations is whether the studies estimate an effect relative to a control group who is never going to participate or they estimate an effect relative to a control group who may participate at a later point in time. Only two studies estimated an effect relative to a control group who was never going to participate so we did not distinguish between the counterfactual situations.

When the effect sizes used in the data synthesis were hazard ratios, they underwent log transformations before being analysed. The reason is that ratio summary statistics all have the common feature that the lowest value that they can take is 0, that the value 1 corresponds with no intervention effect, and the highest value that a hazard ratio can ever take is infinity. This number scale is not symmetric. The log transformation makes the scale symmetric: the log of 0 is minus infinity, the log of 1 is zero, and the log of infinity is infinity. Graphical displays for meta-analysis performed on ratio scales sometimes use a log scale, as the confidence intervals then appear symmetric. This is however not the case for the software Revman 5 used in this review. The graphical displays use hazard ratios and the mean effect size is reported as a hazard ratio.

All analyses were inverse variance weighted using random effects statistical models that incorporate both the sampling variance and between study variance components into the study level weights. Random effects weighted mean effect sizes were calculated using 95% confidence intervals.

3.5.1 Moderator analysis and investigation of heterogeneity

With the aim of explaining observed heterogeneity, we planned to investigate the following factors: type of ALMP (labour market training, private sector programmes, direct employment programmes in the public sector and job search assistance); study-level summaries of participant characteristics (e.g. studies considering a specific age group, gender or educational level or studies where separate effects for men/women, young/old or low/high educational level are available); and labour market conditions.

It was not possible, however, to investigate the impact of either participant characteristics or labour market conditions. Among the studies used in the data synthesis, only three restricted its analysis to a specific age group and none

restricted their analyses to a specific educational level. No separate estimates within studies for young/old or low/high educational levels were available. Seven studies provided separate effect estimates by gender. Three of these reported risk difference and variances, or data that enabled the calculation of risk difference and variance. Four studies reported hazard ratios and variances, or data that enabled the calculation of hazard ratio and variance. One of these used the timing-of-events approach. The majority of studies did not report the labour market conditions and there was hardly any variation in this covariate among those that did.

It was possible to undertake a moderator analysis of different types of ALMP in order to explore potential differences in effects for the following outcomes:

- Risk difference post participation
- Hazard ratio net of lock in using the timing-of-events approach
- Hazard ratio post participation using the timing-of-events approach

In summary, it was possible to analyse only one moderator ('type of ALMP') of the five moderators we had planned to investigate (Filges et al., 2013), and then only for the outcomes mentioned above. Several of the included studies provided results separated by type of ALMP. We performed single factor subgroup analysis. The subgroup analyses were inverse variance weighted using random effects statistical models that incorporate both the sampling variance and between study variance components into the study level weights. Random effects weighted mean effect sizes for each subgroup were calculated using 95% confidence intervals.

The assessment of any difference between subgroups was based on 95% confidence intervals. No conclusions from single factor subgroup analyses were drawn and interpretation of relationships was cautious, as they were based on subdivision of studies and indirect comparisons.

In addition the risk difference post participation, outcome was investigated using meta-regression. Conventional meta-regression techniques rely on the assumption that effect size estimates from different studies are independent and have sampling distributions with known conditional variances. The independence assumption is violated when studies produce several estimates based on the same individuals which are the case in the present context where studies report effect sizes separated by ALMP type; the model was therefore estimated using the robust standard error method (Hedges, Tipton & Johnson, 2010). This more robust technique is beneficial because it takes into account the possible correlation between effect sizes separated by ALMP type within the same study and allows all of the effect size estimates to be included in meta-regression.

Since this robust standard error method uses degrees of freedom based on the number of studies (rather than the total number of effect sizes), it was only possible to perform an analysis for risk difference post participation (17 studies were

included in the analysis). For the remaining outcomes there were insufficient studies to perform a meta-regression using the robust standard error method. The technique used calculates standard errors using an empirical estimate of the variance: it does not require any assumptions regarding the distribution of the effect size estimates. The assumptions that are required to meet the regularity conditions are minimal and generally met in practice. Simulation studies show that both confidence intervals and p-values generated this way typically reflect the correct size in samples, requiring between 20-40 studies.

An important feature of this more robust standard error analysis is that the results are valid regardless of the weights used. For efficiency purposes, we calculated the weights using a method proposed by Hedges et al (2010). This method assumes a simple random-effects model in which study average effect sizes vary across studies (τ^2) and the effect sizes within each study are equi-correlated (ρ). The method is approximately efficient, since it uses approximate inverse-variance weights: they are approximate given that ρ is, in fact, unknown and the correlation structure may be more complex. For the results we calculated, weights were used based on estimates of τ^2 , where $\rho = 0.80$. Sensitivity tests were also conducted using a variety of ρ values; these indicated that the general results and estimates of the heterogeneity were robust to the choice of ρ . The residual variance component was estimated using the method-of-moments estimator.

Conclusions from meta-regression analysis were drawn with caution and were not based on significance tests.

3.5.2 Sensitivity analysis

Sensitivity analysis was used to evaluate whether the pooled effect sizes were robust across study design (RCT, QRCT and NRS) and components of the risk of bias tool. For risk of bias, we performed sensitivity analysis for the sequence generation²⁰, confounding²¹, incomplete data and selective reporting items of the risk of bias checklists, respectively. Sensitivity analysis was further used to examine the robustness of conclusions in relation to the quality of data (outcome measures based on weekly, monthly or quarterly data and whether data were based on questionnaires or administrative registers). The extent to which the results, measured by hazard ratios, might be biased by a high censoring level was also included in the sensitivity analysis.

²⁰ Only for RCTs and QRCTs.

²¹ Only for NRSs.

4 Results

4.1 RESULTS OF THE SEARCH


We ran the searches during September 2012. The total number of potential relevant studies constituted 16,422 (grey literature search: 720, database search: 18,129, snowball search: 18, hand-search of two journals (see Section 10.1.2): 186).

In total 677 hits were retrieved for full text screening. Of these, 534 did not fulfill the screening requirements and were excluded. No papers from hand searching or from the search of the grey literature were included. See Section 4.2.2 for further details regarding excluded and unobtainable studies.

A total of 73 studies, consisting of 143 papers, met the inclusion criteria and were appraised by the review authors. Thirty-nine studies were included in the data synthesis.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the flow chart for the literature search and screening. Furthermore, Figure 4.1 shows the division of studies used in the data synthesis and studies that could not be included in the data synthesis.

4.1: Flow chart for the literature search



4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDIES

4.2.1 Studies Included in the Systematic Review

The search resulted in a final selection of 73 studies that met the inclusion criteria for this review. Of these, 26 did not provide data sufficient for the calculation of an effect size. In general, standard errors were not reported and no other information making it possible to calculate standard errors was reported (with a few exceptions where not even an effect size could be extracted). In section 13.1.4 the reasons for each of these studies is reported. Of the remaining 47 studies, six were coded with a very high risk of bias (5 on the risk of bias scale) and were therefore not used in the data synthesis. Two studies could not be used in the data synthesis due to overlapping samples (i.e. three studies used administrative register data from the same country covering the same time period; see Section 3.4.5 for discussion of this methodological issue). These studies analysed ALMP in Switzerland. After these reductions, 39 studies remained and were included in the data synthesis.

In Table 4.1 we show the total number of studies that met the inclusion criteria for this review. The first column shows the total number of studies grouped by country of origin. The second column shows the number of these studies that provided enough data to calculate an effect estimate. The third column gives the number of studies that were coded with very high risk of bias. The fourth column gives the number of studies that were excluded from the data synthesis due to overlapping samples. The last column gives the total number of studies used in the data synthesis.

Table 4.1: Number of included studies

Country	Total	Provide effect estimate ¹	Reduction due to		Used in data synthesis
			Too high risk of bias	Overlap of data samples ²	
Germany	15	11	0	0	11
USA	11	9	3	0	6
Sweden	10	5	1	0	4
Denmark	7	7	0	0	7
Switzerland	6	4	0	3	2
Norway	4	1	1	0	0
Israel	3	1	0	0	1
France	3	2	0	0	2
Austria	3	1	0	0	1

Netherlands	2	2	0	0	2
UK	2	2	0	0	2
Finland	2	0	0	0	0
Hungary	2	0	0	0	0
Belgium	2	1	1	0	0
Romania	1	1	0	0	1
Total	73	47	6	3	39

Note: The reduction due to too high risk of bias preceded the reduction due to overlap of data sample.

¹Or data that enable the calculation of an effect estimate.

²The data samples used are representative for the same population at a given time (see Section 3.4.5 for this methodological issue).

For studies with overlapping samples, the choice of which study to use in the data synthesis was based on our risk of bias assessments. The citations for the 47 studies that provided effect size estimates can be found in Section 8.1.

A decision had to be made about which of the three studies from Switzerland (Gerfin, 2002; Prey, 2000; Frölich, 2010), which used data (partly) representative of the same population of unemployed at the same time, to use in the data synthesis. One of the studies was deselected as it was judged to have a higher risk of bias than the others due to confounding (Prey, 2000). The remaining two studies were judged to have the same risk of bias due to confounding as well as incomplete data, and the choice of which to include in the meta-analysis was based on the different sample selection choices of the two studies. The study with the least restrictive sample selection choice was included in the meta-analysis (Gerfin, 2002).

In total, the 39 studies provided effect estimates for 43 unique populations. Two studies (Hujer, 2010 and Caliendo, 2011), analysing ALMP in Germany, provided results separately for East and West Germany. We used the effect estimates from East and West Germany separately in the meta-analysis. Further, one study provided results of participating in ALMP in West Germany for the years 1986 and 1993 separately (Völter, 2007). We used the effect estimates from 1986 and 1993 separately in the meta-analysis. Finally, one study analysed a RCT conducted in Florida and Washington DC (Decker, 2000). Results were reported separately for the two states and we used the effect estimates separately in the meta-analysis. The studies are listed in Section 9.1.

The characteristics of the 43 effect estimates that were used in the data synthesis are shown in Table 4.2. Section 13 provides a description of the individual studies, including those who did not provide data sufficient for the calculation of an effect size..

The effect estimates provided were mainly from European countries. Seven effect estimates were from the US and 11 were from the Nordic countries. Twenty one effect estimates were provided using data from the 1990s. Eight effect estimates were provided using data from the 1980s and 14 effect estimates were provided using data from the period 2000-2008. Data were drawn mainly from administrative registers. The sample sizes were generally large; all but seven of the effect estimates provided were obtained using sample sizes of more than 1,000. The majority of effect estimates were obtained in circumstances where the counterfactual situation was potential participation in ALMP at a later time; only two studies providing two effect estimates reported that the counterfactual situation was no participation. The analyses were restricted to a specific age group (either young, 25 years old or younger; or old, aged 55 or 56 years) in only three cases, and none were restricted to analyse a specific educational level. One analysis included only females and seven effect estimates were provided separated by gender. The majority of studies did not report the labour market conditions (unemployment rate, vacancy rate and/or labour market tightness²²) – only eight studies (providing eight effect estimates) reported labour market conditions in the form of the unemployment level.

More than half of the effect estimates provided were obtained from analyses including one type of ALMP only; 16 effect estimates were reported separated into two or more types of ALMP. The majority of programmes could be classified into one of the four pre specified categories: (1) labour market training, (2) private sector programmes, (3) public employment programmes and (4) job search assistance. Effect estimates of job search assistance and labour market training were those reported most frequently. Four of the programmes (in Firth, 1999; Lalive, 2008 and Caliendo, 2011, for both East and West Germany) could not be categorised as either private or public and two programmes (in Frölich, 2010 and Benmarker, 2012) could not be classified.

Table 4.2: Characteristics of effect estimates used in the data synthesis

Characteristics			
Country		Sample size	
European countries (incl. Israel, excl. the Nordic countries)	25	Range	88-1,438,156
USA	7	Average	88,772
Nordic countries	11	Total	3,817,210
Analysis period		Type of data	
1980s	8	Administrative registers	31

²² Number of vacant jobs per unemployed

1990s	21	Questionnaire	7
2000s	14	Combination	5
Effect estimates separated into two or more types of ALMP		Compulsory activation a part of the system	
Two types	10	Yes	37
Three types	3	No	2
Four types	3	Unclear	4
Types of ALMP effect estimates reported		Considered specific age group or education level	
Labour market training	17	Specific age group	3
Private sector programmes	12		
Public employment programmes	11		
Job search assistance	25		
Employment programmes not separable into private/public	4	Specific education level	0
Unclear	2		
Considered specific gender or separated by gender		Labour market conditions	
Considered only females	1	Reported unemployment per cent	8
Separated estimates by gender	7	Not reported	35

4.2.2 Excluded studies

In addition to the 73 studies that met the inclusion criteria for this review, several studies at first sight appeared relevant for the review but did not end up meeting our criteria. In fifty three studies, the share of participants receiving unemployment insurance benefits were unclear/too low. Two studies used different data sources for treated/control and one study analyzed a programme that could not be classified as ALMP. None of these studies fulfilled our inclusion criteria and were therefore not included in the final review. The studies and the reasons for exclusion are listed in Section 9.2.

4.2.3 Studies awaiting classification

Three studies could not be classified as they were written in German and no one in the review team was able to read a German text (see Section 8.3).

One reference was not obtained in full text despite repeated attempts to locate it (see Section 8.4).

4.3 RISK OF BIAS IN INCLUDED STUDIES

The risk of bias coding for each of the 47 studies from which we could extract an effect estimate is shown in Section 13. Of the included studies, 32 used non-randomised designs and 15 studies used randomised designs. Of these, 13 were classified as RCTs and two as QRCTs. Only one of the studies had an a priori protocol and an a priori analysis plan.

A summary of the risk of bias associated with the 47 studies from which it was possible to extract an effect estimate is shown in Table 4.3. Six studies were given a score of 5 (five studies on the confounding item and one study on the other bias item), corresponding to a risk of bias sufficiently high for the findings not to be considered in the data synthesis. For these six studies, we did not judge the other items because they were already excluded from the data synthesis due to high risk of bias.

All studies using non-randomised designs were judged to have a high risk of bias on the sequence generation item and the allocation concealment item. Of the 15 studies using randomised designs only five were judged to have a low risk of bias on the sequence generation item and 3 on the allocation concealment item.

Due to the nature of the intervention, those in the treatment condition will always be aware that they are treated; therefore, assessment of the blinding item with regard to the participants did not differ across studies. The majority of studies were thus judged 3 on the blinding item. Furthermore, the nature of the outcome, employment, is objective and in the majority of studies data were obtained from administrative registers or questionnaires which were not collected with the aim of analysing ALMP participation. Six studies departed from these considerations concerning the nature of the outcome, which is reflected in the score on their blinding item.

The majority of the included studies obtained data from administrative registers. For those studies using administrative registers providing complete coverage, very few were lost due to missing data and they scored 1 on the incomplete data item. Other studies used administrative registers not providing complete coverage of the outcome variables or used questionnaires subject to missing data. The extent of missing data is reflected in their score on the incomplete data item.

Selective reporting was judged not to be a concern in the majority of studies. In many studies sensitivity analyses were conducted, with the results of these being reported together with very detailed information concerning the application of the

estimation procedures used. Deviations are reflected in the score on the selective reporting item. The 'other bias' item was not judged to be a concern, except for one study which scored 5 on this item.

Assessment of risk of bias due to confounding was not relevant for the 15 studies using randomised designs and neither for the one study that scored 5 on the other bias item. As mentioned, five studies scored 5 on the confounding item. The majority of the remaining studies were assessed to be of no concern regarding confounding or only of minor concern. The detailed assessment of confounding including all items in the confounding work sheet is shown in Section 13.

Table 4.3: Risk of bias - distribution of the 47 studies reporting an effect size

Risk of bias item	Judgement					Total number of studies			
	High	Low	Unclear	1	2		3	4	5
Sequence generation¹	29	5	7	-	-	-	-	-	41
Allocation concealment¹	29	3	9	-	-	-	-	-	41
Blinding¹	-	-	1	0	0	34	6	0	41
Incomplete data¹	-	-	2	19	6	8	6	0	41
Selective reporting¹	-	-	1	30	4	3	3	0	41
Other bias²	-	-	0	40	1	0	0	1	42
Confounding³	-	-	0	15	5	2	4	5	31

Notes: The judgement is based on a 5-point scale where 1 indicates low risk of bias and 5 indicates high risk of bias.

1: Not judged for six of the studies as five studies scored 5 on the confounding item and one study scored 5 on the other bias item and was thereby not included in the data synthesis. Therefore, it was not relevant to judge on the remaining items for these six studies.

2: Not judged for the five studies scoring 5 on the confounding item

3: Not judged for the 15 studies using randomised designs and neither for the one study that scored 5 on the other bias item

4.4 EFFECTS OF THE INTERVENTION

In order to carry out a meta-analysis, every study must have a comparable type of effect size. The majority of studies reported hazard ratios and variances (19) or provided data enabling the calculation of hazard ratios and variances (5). The

remaining studies reported risk difference and variances (13) or data that enabled the calculation of risk difference and variance (2).

For the studies reporting hazard ratios and variances (or where it was possible to calculate hazard ratios and variances) not using the timing-of-event approach the length of the time periods after participation varied. The majority of studies (10) had data covering less than a year after participation and the remaining studies (4) had data that covered less than 2 years after participation. For the studies using the timing-of-event approach the length of the time periods after participation/from beginning of treatment varied but on average studies had data covering four years after participation/from beginning of treatment.

For the studies reporting risk difference (or where it was possible to calculate risk difference) we used the outcome measured closest to one year after treatment. Seven studies reported outcome one year after participation, eight studies reported outcomes 1-2 years after participation and three studies reported outcomes 4-5 years after participation. In section 9.1 the time points/periods and form of outcome reporting for each individual study used in the data synthesis is listed.

The post effects measured by hazard ratios and risk difference were pooled separately and studies using the timing-of-events approach were pooled separately. Only studies using the timing-of-event approach reported effects net of locking-in. The proportional shift of the hazard rate was measured from the beginning of treatment, thus combining the lock-in (the lock-in effect refers to the period of participation in a programme) and post programme effects. The combination of these two effects consequently determines the net effects (net of lock-in) of ALMP participation on the exit rate to employment. The remaining studies reported post programme effects only. We pooled effects net of lock-in and post programme effects separately for the studies using the timing-of-events approach.

We did not conduct separate analyses distinguishing between counterfactual situations as only two studies estimated an effect relative to a world without compulsory ALMP.

Four studies reported effect measures separately for men and women. Of these, two studies further reported separate effect measures for eight different strata. One study reported separate effect measures for two former jobs. For these five studies, the average effect size was calculated and used to avoid dependence problems.


Several studies (16) reported effect measures for more than one type of ALMP and in addition four studies reported separate effect measures for different programmes which were of the same type of ALMP according to our classification (see Section 3.2.3). For these 16 studies, the average effect size was also calculated and used to avoid dependence problems.

4.4.1 Primary outcome results

Post effect measured by hazard ratios

Fourteen studies provided in total 15 effect estimates measured as hazard ratios post participation. The majority of reported results indicated a positive effect; only two of the study-level effects favoured the control group. Ten of the study-level effects were statistically non-significant; only five of the study-level effects were statistically significant. Pooled results showed a significant effect. The random effects weighted mean hazard ratio was 1.09 (95% CI 1.04 to 1.14, $p=0.0005$). Heterogeneity of effects among studies was ignorable ($\tau^2=0.00$, $Q= 23.72$, $df=14$, $p=0.05$). The forest plot is displayed in Figure 4.1.


Figure 4.1: Forest plot, re-employment, hazard ratio



Post effect measured by risk difference

Fourteen studies provided in total 18 effect estimates measured as risk difference post participation. The majority of reported results indicated a positive effect; only four of the study-level effects favoured the control group. Thirteen of the study-level effects were statistically significant; only four of the study-level effects were statistically non-significant. Pooled results showed a significant effect. The random effects weighted mean risk difference was 0.07 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.11, $p=0.0001$). Heterogeneity of effects among studies were ignorable, although it was statistically significant ($\tau^2=0.01$, $Q= 274.87$, $df=17$, $p<.00001$). The forest plot is displayed in Figure 4.2.


Figure 4.2: Forest plot, re-employment, risk difference



Net of lock in effect using the timing-of-event approach

Eight studies using the timing-of-event approach provided effect estimates net of lock in effects. The evidence is mixed; half of the reported results (4) indicated a positive effect and half of the reported results indicated a negative effect. Six of the study-level effects were statistically significant and two of the study-level effects were statistically non-significant. Pooled results showed a non-significant effect. The random effects weighted mean hazard ratio was 0.87 (95% CI 0.61 to 1.25, p=0.46). There were statistically significant heterogeneity of effects among studies ($\tau^2=0.26$, $Q= 373.03$, $df=7$, $p<.00001$). The forest plot is displayed in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Forest plot, re-employment, Timing-of-event, net of lock-in




Post effect using the timing-of-event approach

Nine studies using the timing-of-event approach provided effect estimates post participation. The evidence is mixed; five of the reported results indicated a positive effect and four of the reported results indicated a negative effect. Seven of the study-

level effects were statistically significant and two of the study-level effects were statistically non-significant. Pooled results showed a non-significant effect. The random effects weighted mean hazard ratio was 1.15 (95% CI 0.88 to 1.49, $p=0.30$). There were statistically significant heterogeneity of effects among studies ($\tau^2=0.15$, $Q= 450.87$, $df=8$, $p<.00001$). The forest plot is displayed in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: Forest plot, re-employment, Timing-of-event, post participation



4.4.2 Summary of primary outcome results

The primary outcome, the employment impact of ALMP, was analysed separately as the effect on the exit rate to work of being assigned to ALMP at a particular *moment* respectively as the effect on employment of being assigned to ALMP in general. The data synthesis for the effect of being assigned to ALMP in general, revealed a small and statistically significant effect favouring ALMP participation. Using the timing-of-events approach no significant effects were found of neither net of lock-in nor the post effect.


4.4.3 Secondary outcome results

In addition to the primary outcome, we considered secondary outcomes that are relevant to the impact ALMP has on re-employment. Results on the exit rate from re-employment, duration of re-employment and income were provided.

Two studies, Graversen (2006) and Crépon (2005), provided data on the exit rate from re-employment. Crépon (2005) used the timing-of-events approach and so results were not pooled. Graversen (2006) reported a non-significant hazard ratio of 0.98 (95% CI 0.89 to 1.08, $p=0.69$). Crépon (2005), using the timing-of-events approach, reported a significant hazard ratio favouring ALMP of 0.47 (95% CI 0.41 to 0.54, $p<.00001$). A hazard ratio of less than 1 indicates that ALMP participation is favoured. That is, the conditional exit rate from re-employment into unemployment is lower for persons who found a job after participating in ALMP than for persons who found a job without participation in ALMP.

Two studies provided data on the duration of re-employment. The evidence is inconclusive; one study reported results indicating a positive effect and one study reported results indicating a negative effect. Both of the study-level effects were statistically non-significant. Pooled results showed a non-significant effect. The random effects weighted mean difference was -0.03 (95% CI -0.18 to 0.13, $p=0.73$). There were no statistically significant heterogeneity of effects among studies ($\tau^2=0.00$, $Q=0.02$, $df=18$, $p=0.88$). Although the p -value of the Q -statistic is notoriously underpowered to detect heterogeneity in small meta-analyses, the estimated $\tau^2=0.00$ and $I^2=0\%$, implying that heterogeneity among these two studies is not present. The forest plot is displayed in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Forest plot, duration of re-employment



One study, Caplan (1989), provided data on earnings that permitted the calculation of an effect size (monthly earnings for those reemployed and standard deviation)²³. The result was a non-significant SMD of 0.06 (95% CI -0.16 to 0.29, $p=0.58$).

4.4.4 Moderator analysis and investigation of heterogeneity

We investigated the impact of ALMP type. Several studies (16) provided results separated by type of ALMP. We included all studies in the subgroup analyses and studies providing results for more than one type of ALMP contributed to more than one subgroup.

The risk difference post participation outcome was, in addition, investigated using meta-regression. The model was estimated using the robust standard error method (Hedges, 2010). A random-effects model in which study average effect sizes vary across studies and the effect sizes within each study are equicorrelated were used (see Section 3.5.1).

Subgroup analysis

Post effect measured by hazard ratios

It was not possible to investigate the impact of ALMP type. Only two of the 14 studies that provided a total of 15 effect estimates measured as hazard ratios post

²³ In addition 22 studies provided data on earnings; however not enough information was given to calculate a SMD. The majority of the 22 studies reported an effect estimate and standard error in local currency.

participation reported results separated by ALMP type. There was no variation in the type of ALMP among the remaining studies; they were all classified as job search assistance.

Post effect measured by risk difference

Of the 15 studies providing in total 18 effect estimates measured as risk difference post participation, six studies reported results separated by ALMP type. Twenty-eight effect estimates were available for subgroup analysis²⁴.

The forest plot for the 28 effect estimates is displayed in Figure 4.6. Pooled results for the four subgroups showed a statistically significant positive effect; risk difference=0.11 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.18) for private sector programmes and non-significant effects; risk difference=0.05 (95% CI -0.02 to 0.13) for labour market training; risk difference=0.04 (95% CI -0.01 to 0.08) for direct employment programmes in the public sector and risk difference=0.02 (95% CI -0.09 to 0.12) for job search assistance. There was a statistically significant heterogeneity of effects among studies in all four subgroups ($\tau^2=0.01$, $Q=74.06$, $df=6$, $p<.00001$) for labour market training; ($\tau^2=0.01$, $Q=225.00$, $df=7$, $p<.00001$) for private sector programmes; ($\tau^2=0.00$, $Q=40.01$, $df=7$, $p<.00001$) for direct employment programmes in the public sector and ($\tau^2=0.01$, $Q=139.64$, $df=4$, $p<.00001$) for job search assistance. The confidence intervals of the subgroups overlapped.

None of the coefficients of the meta-regression were statistically significant (see Table 4.4). The left-out ALMP type was labour market training. An increase in effect size was seen for private sector programmes, but this finding was not statistically significant (95% CI -0.08 to 0.22). There were no significant differences in effect sizes for direct employment programmes in the public sector (95% CI -0.07 to 0.07) and for job search assistance (95% CI -0.08 to 0.06). The estimated heterogeneity of effects among studies was small ($\tau^2=0.01$).

The available evidence does not suggest that the effect of ALMP participation differs by type of ALMP.

²⁴ Two effect estimates could not be classified as one of the four categories and were not included in the analysis.

Figure 4.6: Forest plot, subgroups, re-employment, risk difference




Table 4.4 Coefficients of meta-regression

Comparison: vs. Labour market training	Effect size difference (95% CI)
Private sector programmes	0.07 (-0.08, 0.22)
Direct employment programmes in the public sector	-0.002 (-0.07, 0.07)
Job search assistance	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.06)

Net of lock in effect using the timing-of-event approach

Of the eight studies using the timing-of-event approach providing effect estimates net of lock in effects, four studies reported results separated by ALMP type. Fourteen effect estimates were available for subgroup analysis²⁵.


The forest plot for the 14 effect estimates is displayed in Figure 4.7. There was only one effect estimate available for direct employment programmes in the public sector, showing a significant negative effect. The hazard ratio was 0.78 (95% CI 0.71 to 0.86). Pooled results for the remaining three subgroups showed non-significant effects; hazard ratio=0.89 (95% CI 0.56 to 1.43) for labour market training; hazard ratio=1.07 (95% CI 0.71 to 1.61) for private sector programmes and hazard ratio=1.09 (95% CI 0.75 to 1.60) for job search assistance. There was significant heterogeneity of effects among studies in all three subgroups ($\tau^2=0.34$, $Q= 365.47$, $df=5$, $p<.00001$) for labour market training; ($\tau^2=0.12$, $Q= 36.31$, $df=2$, $p<.00001$) for private sector programmes and ($\tau^2=0.15$, $Q= 210.49$, $df=3$, $p<.00001$) for job search assistance.

The confidence intervals for the subgroups differed only marginally with the exception of direct employment programmes in the public sector, where the confidence interval was narrow. The confidence intervals of the other three subgroups were however inclusive of the confidence interval of the subgroup of direct employment programmes in the public sector.

There was no evidence to suggest that the effect of ALMP participation net of lock in differs by type of ALMP.

²⁵ One effect estimate could not be classified as one of the four categories and was not included in the analysis.

Figure 4.7: Forest plot, subgroups, re-employment, Timing-of-event, net of lock-in



Post effect using the timing-of-event approach

Of the nine studies using the timing-of-event approach providing effect estimates of post participation five studies reported results separated by ALMP type. Twenty effect estimates were available for subgroup analysis²⁶.


The forest plot for the 20 effect estimates is displayed in Figure 4.8. Pooled results for the four subgroups showed a significant positive effect; hazard ratio=1.29 (95% CI 1.04 to 1.59) for labour market training and non-significant effects for private sector programmes, hazard ratio=1.11 (95% CI 0.74 to 1.68); for direct employment programmes in the public sector, hazard ratio=0.94 (95% CI 0.77 to 1.15); and for job search assistance, hazard ratio=1.06 (95% CI 0.74 to 1.51). There was significant heterogeneity of effects among studies in all four subgroups ($\tau^2=0.07$, $Q= 248.06$, $df=6$, $p<.00001$) for labour market training; ($\tau^2=0.17$, $Q= 142.69$, $df=3$, $p<.00001$)

²⁶ One effect estimate could not be classified as one of the four categories and was not included in the analysis.

for private sector programmes; ($\tau^2=0.03$, $Q= 20.22$, $df=2$, $p<.00001$) for direct employment programmes in the public sector and ($\tau^2=0.19$, $Q= 805.64$, $df=5$, $p<.00001$) for job search assistance.

The confidence intervals of the subgroups overlapped. There is no evidence to suggest that the effect of ALMP participation differs by type of ALMP.

Figure 4.8: Forest plot, subgroups, re-employment, Timing-of-event, post participation



4.4.5 Sensitivity analysis

Sensitivity analyses were planned to evaluate whether the pooled effect sizes were robust across study design and components of methodological quality. The majority of studies not using the timing-of-events approach and reporting hazard ratios were RCTs and QRCTs. The majority of studies reporting risk difference and all studies using the timing-of-events approach were NRSs. For study design, we examined the robustness of conclusions when we removed NRSs where effect sizes were measured

as hazard ratios and removal of RCTs where effect sizes were measured as risk difference. Studies using the timing-of-event were all NRSs so we could not evaluate the impact of study design.

For methodological quality, we carried out sensitivity analyses for the allocation sequence²⁷, confounding, incomplete data, and selective reporting components of the risk of bias checklists, respectively. We examined the robustness of our conclusions when we removed studies with risk of bias scores of 3 or 4 on confounding (only NRSs), incomplete data, or selective reporting. Sensitivity analyses were further used to examine the robustness of conclusions in relation to the quality of data (outcome measures based on weekly, monthly or quarterly data collection and whether data were derived from questionnaires or administrative registers). Finally sensitivity analyses were used to examine robustness of conclusion when we removed studies with a high (more than 25 per cent) or unknown level of censoring.

The results for studies with effects measured as hazard ratios and risk difference are provided in Table 4.5 and displayed in forest plots in Section 11.1.

Table 4.5: Sensitivity analysis – results for studies with effect sizes (ES) measured as hazard rate (HR) or risk difference (RD)

	Effect size measured as hazard rate	Effect size measured as risk difference
	HR [CI 95%] (Number of studies)	RD [CI 95%] (Number of studies)
All studies	1.09 [1.04, 1.14] (15)	0.07 [0.03, 0.11] (18)
<i>Characteristics of studies removed from the analysis:</i>	ES and confidence interval with studies removed	
RCTs	Not relevant	0.08 [0.04, 0.12] (15)
NRSs	1.09 [1.03, 1.15] (13)	Not relevant
Allocation score high/unclear	1.15 [1.03, 1.28] (4)	Not relevant
Confounding score of 4/3	Not relevant	0.07 [0.03, 0.11] (16)
Incomplete data score of 4/3	1.06 [1.01, 1.11] (7)	0.04 [0.00, 0.07] (12)
Selective reporting score of 4/3	1.10 [1.04, 1.16] (11)	0.07 [0.03, 0.11] (17)
Based on quarterly data	1.09 [1.03, 1.15] (11) ¹	0.08 [0.03, 0.12] (13)
Based on questionnaire data	1.06 [1.02, 1.10] (10)	0.04 [0.01, 0.07] (13)
High/unclear censoring level	1.09 [1.03, 1.16] (10)	Not relevant

1: Studies with data frequency equal to two months or more were excluded

²⁷ With the exception of two studies, all RCTs (and QRCTs) scored the same on the allocation sequence and concealment items.

For the studies with effects sizes measured as hazard ratios there was no appreciable change in the results following removal of NRSs or following removal of studies with a high/unclear risk of bias due to allocation sequence. There were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies with scores of 3 or 4 on the incomplete data, or selective reporting components of the risk of bias checklists. Finally, there were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies based on quarterly data, questionnaire data or studies with a high/unclear censoring level.

The overall conclusion does not change; the hazard rate significantly increases.

For the studies with effects sizes measured as risk difference there was no appreciable change in the results following removal of RCTs. There were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies with scores of 3 or 4 on the confounding, incomplete data, or selective reporting components of the risk of bias checklists. Finally, there were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies based on quarterly data or questionnaire data.

The overall conclusion does not change; the probability of employment significantly increases.

The results for studies using the timing-of-event approach are provided in Table 4.6 and displayed as forest plots in Section 11.1.

Table 4.6: Sensitivity analysis – results for studies using the timing-of-events approach

	Effect net of lock-in	Post effect
	HR [CI 95%] (Number of studies)	
All studies	0.87 [0.61, 1.25] (8)	1.15 [0.88, 1.49] (9)
<i>Characteristics of studies removed from the analysis:</i>	HR and confidence interval with studies removed	
Confounding score of 4/3	0.85 [0.42, 1.73] (5)	1.22 [0.67, 2.22] (5)
Incomplete data score of 4/3	0.70 [0.45, 1.08] (6)	1.13 [0.83, 1.56] (8)
Selective reporting score of 4/3	0.75 [0.52, 1.09] (7)	1.14 [0.86, 1.52] (8)
Based on monthly data	1.22 [1.00, 1.49] (5)	1.37 [1.00, 1.89] (6)
Based on questionnaire data	-	-
High/unclear censoring level	0.90 [0.56, 1.46] (2)	1.12 [0.88, 1.42] (2)

Note: “-” indicates that no studies were based on questionnaire data.

The same pattern of results was found for the effect net of lock-in and the post effect. There were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies with scores of 3 or 4 on the confounding, incomplete data, or selective reporting components of the risk of bias checklists. There were no appreciable changes in the results following removal of studies with a high/unclear censoring level. The effect net of lock-in and the post effect are, however, sensitive to the removal of studies where the effect estimates were based on monthly data. The point estimates increase and are just significant within a 95% confidence interval.

All confidence intervals overlap with the confidence intervals using all studies, and so the overall conclusion remains.

4.4.6 Publication bias

We assessed the possibility of publication bias visually by examining funnel plots. The four funnel plots are displayed in Section 11.2. There are too few studies and insufficient variation in the standard errors to assess whether the funnel plots are symmetric. However, there is no striking asymmetry visible in any of the funnel plots.

5 Discussion

5.1 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS

This review focused on the effect of participating in ALMP. The findings are mixed, depending on the approach used to investigate the effect. Two approaches were analysed separately; the effect of being assigned to ALMP at a particular *moment* (the timing-of-event approach), and the effect of being assigned to ALMP in general.

The available evidence does not suggest that there is an effect of being assigned to ALMP at a particular *moment*. The available evidence does, however, suggest that there is an effect of participating in ALMP, although the effect is small. We found a statistically significant effect of ALMP post participation. The post effects of ALMP participation were measured by hazard ratios and risk difference and were investigated in separate analyses. The pooled effect estimate measured as a hazard ratio is 1.09, which translates into an increase of approximately 9% in the exit rate from unemployment into employment. The pooled effect estimate measured as risk difference is an increase of 7 percentage points in the probability of being employed approximately one year post participation.

In the context of hazard ratios (the ratio of two hazard rates), the hazard is the rate within a short time interval at which the unemployed individual finds a job conditional on staying unemployed. In other words, the probability of finding a job in that short time interval is the hazard rate. The interpretation of a hazard ratio greater than one is that a treated unemployed person who has not yet found a job by a certain time has a higher chance of finding a job at the next point in time compared to someone in the control group.

There is an alternative interpretation of the hazard ratio that may be intuitively easier to understand. The hazard ratio is equivalent to the odds that an individual in the group with the higher hazard reaches the endpoint (finds a job) first. Stated another way, for any pair of unemployed people, one from the treatment group and one from the control group, the hazard ratio is the odds that the time to find a job is less in the unemployed from the treatment group than in the unemployed from the control group. The probability of finding a job first (P) can easily be derived from the odds or hazard ratio (HR) of finding a job first, which is the probability of finding a job first divided by the probability of not finding a job

first: $HR = \text{odds} = P/(1 - P)$; $P = HR/(1 + HR)$ (Spotswood et al. 2004). A hazard ratio of 1.09 therefore corresponds to a 52 per cent chance of the treated unemployed person finding a job first. The lower and upper 95% confidence interval corresponds to 51 respectively 53 per cent chance of the treated unemployed person finding a job first.

For interpretation of the effect measured as risk difference we apply the number needed to treat, defined as $1/\text{risk difference}$. The number needed to treat indicates, in the present context, how many unemployed people have to receive ALMP to produce one more positive event (i.e. find a job). A risk difference of 0.07 corresponds to a number needed to treat of 15 (rounded up to the next whole number). Thus, for every 15 unemployed people who participate in ALMP, an additional unemployed person will hold a job approximately one year after participation. The lower and upper 95% confidence interval corresponds to a number needed to treat of 34 and 10, respectively.

It was possible to assess the impact of four types of ALMP (labour market training, private sector programmes, direct employment programmes in the public sector and job search assistance). We found no evidence to suggest that the ALMP participation effect differs between these four types of ALMP.

Concerning secondary outcomes, we analysed the effect of ALMP participation on the subsequent exit rate from re-employment, on the earnings in re-employment and on the duration of re-employment. Only very few studies could be used in these analyses (two, one, and two respectively). Based on the low number of studies, the evidence was inconclusive on whether participation in ALMP has an impact on the quality of the job measured as either the exit rate of re-employment, earnings in re-employment or duration of re-employment.

5.2 OVERALL COMPLETENESS AND APPLICABILITY OF EVIDENCE

In this review we included 39 studies in the data synthesis. This number is relatively low compared to the large number of studies (73) meeting the inclusion criteria. If all the 73 studies had provided an effect estimate or provided data that enabled the calculation of an effect size, the final list of useable studies in the data synthesis would have been larger²⁸ which again would have provided a more robust literature on which to base conclusions. The reduction was caused by three different factors. Twenty six of the 73 studies did not report effect estimates or provide data that would allow the calculation of an effect size. Six studies were judged to have a very high risk of bias (5 on the scale) and, in accordance with the protocol, we excluded these from the data synthesis on the basis that they would be more likely to mislead than inform. Two further studies were excluded because of overlapping samples.

²⁸ Avoiding overlap of data samples, ten additional studies could have been used in the data synthesis.

The 39 studies used in the data synthesis covered the US, UK, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Romania, Israel and (East/West) Germany (11 countries), whereas 15 countries were represented by the 73 studies.

It was not possible to examine the impact on ALMP participation of gender, age, education or labour market conditions. It was possible to study the impact of four types of ALMP (labour market training, private sector programmes, direct employment programmes in the public sector and job search assistance).

In attempt to obtain a clearer picture of the effect of ALMP participation on the quality of the job obtained, we analysed the subsequent exit rate from re-employment, the duration of re-employment and the re-employment earnings as secondary outcomes. Too few studies provided sufficient data for the calculation of an effect size for these outcomes and we were unable to draw a conclusion.

5.3 QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE

The overall quality of evidence varied from moderate to very low, depending on how the effects were measured.

The risk of bias for each of the 47 studies from which it was possible to extract an effect size was examined using a newly developed tool for assessing risk of bias incorporating non-randomised studies. We attempted to enhance the quality of the evidence in this review by excluding studies judged to be at very high risk of bias using this tool. We believe this process excluded those studies that are more likely to mislead than inform.

Concerning the overall quality, the GRADE evidence profile (Section 11.3, Table 11.1) indicates that the quality of evidence is moderate for the post effect measured by hazard ratios, low for the post effect measured by risk difference, and very low for the effects obtained using the timing-of-event approach.

Some downgrading of evidence was undertaken for estimates of the post effect measured by hazard ratios where the majority of studies were RCTs. This was carried out because of risk of bias in the design of the studies (see section 13.2) due to limitations in the way study authors had reported the way the randomisation sequence had been generated and concealed. Apart from the problems with risk of bias, the directness, consistency, precision and publication bias were not downgraded.

No downgrading of evidence was undertaken for estimates of the post effect measured by risk difference where the majority of studies were of non-randomised design.

Some downgrading of evidence was undertaken for estimates using the timing-of-events approach where all studies were of non-randomised design. The reasons were (1) there was major uncertainty in the directness of the results because the effect obtained using the timing-of-events approach is the effect of being assigned to training at a particular *moment*, (2) there was important unexplained inconsistency (heterogeneity) in the results, (3) confidence intervals were very wide.

Furthermore, we performed a number of sensitivity analyses to check whether the obtained result is robust across study design, methodological quality and data quality. The overall conclusion did not change.

To check the robustness across methodological quality, the studies with relatively high risk of bias in sequence generation, confounding, incomplete data and selective reporting, respectively, were removed from the analysis. To check the robustness across data quality, studies with estimates on quarterly²⁹ data were removed. In addition, studies based on questionnaire data were removed.

5.4 POTENTIAL BIASES IN THE REVIEW PROCESS

We believe that all the publicly available studies on the effect of ALMP participation on employment up to the censor date were identified during the review process. However, one reference was not obtained in full text and three references await translation.

We believe that there are no other potential biases in the review process as one review author (ADK) and two members of the review team (SHF, TMS) independently coded the included studies. Any disagreements were resolved by discussion. Further, decisions about inclusion of studies and assessment of study quality were made by two review authors (ADK, TF) independently and disagreements resolved by discussion. Numeric data extraction was made by one review author (ADK) and was checked by a second review author (TF).

5.5 AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS WITH OTHER STUDIES OR REVIEWS

To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no systematic review on the effect of ALMP participation in unemployed individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits - the focus of this review. Several papers summarise the effect of ALMP (Heckman et al., 1999; Kluge, 2010; Kluge & Schmidt, 2002; Martin, 2000; Card, Kluge & Weber, 2010; Martin & Grubb, 2001). However, none are systematic in their

²⁹ Monthly data were removed in the sensitivity analysis of results based on the timing-of-event approach.

search of relevant literature and none provide a synthesis of the magnitude of the effect size, although Kluve & Schmidt (2002), Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) offer a meta-analysis based on vote counting and in addition investigate the contribution of covariates such as programme type, participant characteristic and country to the probability of obtaining a statistically significant positive effect. Further, Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010) apply ordered probit models investigating the contribution of covariates to the probability of obtaining a statistically significant positive effect, a statistically non-significant effect and a statistically significant negative effect.

The focus of all these reviews is very broad as they target unemployed individuals receiving all types of benefits. These include unemployment insurance benefits, social assistance benefits and benefits not related to being unemployed. In addition, they include specialized types of ALMPs that target specific groups. These include specialized youth programmes, vocational rehabilitation, sheltered work programmes and wage subsidies for individuals with physical, mental or social disabilities.

Narrative surveys of ALMP experience are given in Martin (2000) and Martin & Grubb (2001) who summarise the main results of on-going (at that time) OECD research into the effectiveness of ALMPs. Both papers draw on earlier surveys of ALMP and a few additional evaluation studies. None of the papers draw firm conclusions regarding the effect of ALMPs but merely states that the effect is not terribly encouraging.

Heckman et al. (1999) offers a descriptive summary of approximately 98 evaluation studies³⁰ conducted before 1994 from the US and Europe. Their search strategy is not described. No clear pattern emerges about the effectiveness of different ALMPs.

Kluve & Schmidt (2002) summarise European evaluation studies covering ALMPs conducted from 1983 to 1999, in total 53 observations. The number of studies is not reported. If a study evaluated more than one programme, treatment effect estimates for all different programmes were used and if different studies reported essentially identical evaluations (same programme, same time, same result) only one of them was used. Their search strategy is not described. Thirty-three different effect estimates of programmes from Europe used in Heckman et al. (1999) are included along with an additional 20 effect estimates of European programmes until 1999. The authors conclude that: “In summary, the estimates from recent evaluation studies suggest that treatment effects of European ALMP are rather modest (...)” (Kluve & Schmidt, 2002, p. 441). This is in line with the conclusion of our review. Further they conclude that different programmes are differently effective for different individuals. We were not able to investigate this aspect our method of

³⁰ The number is based on counts of the number of studies in Table 22, 24 and 25. Several of the evaluation studies use the same data sample.

analysis is very different from the one applied in Kluve & Schmidt, 2002, implying that too few studies were available for these kinds of moderator analyses.

Kluve (2010) focuses on European evaluation studies covering ALMPs that were implemented in the 1990s and the 2000s, in total 137 observations originating from 96 different evaluation studies³¹. The search strategy is not described. They do not conclude on the overall magnitude of effect size. They only conclude on the relative likelihood of different programmes to estimate a significant positive and a significant negative employment outcome and find, contrary to our findings, that the programmes differ in this respect. This difference in conclusions is most likely due to the very different approaches used in our review and in Kluve (2010).

Card et al. (2010) include in their analysis programme evaluations conducted between 1995 and 2007. To obtain what the authors term ‘a comprehensive sample of recent ALMP evaluations’, they emailed IZA research fellows who had indicated an interest in the programme area ‘Evaluation of labour market programmes’ (in total 231), and associates of the NBER Labour Studies programme (in total 113). For details concerning the search strategy, see Card et al., 2010, p. F454-F455. A total of 156 studies were received and 199 effect estimates (estimates for a specific programme and participant group) from 97 studies (of which 37 were also included in Kluve, 2010) were included in the analysis. They eliminated (among other things) studies which had substantial overlap with other studies included in the sample (e.g., earlier versions of the same study). For details concerning inclusion and exclusion criteria, see Card et al., 2010, p. F455-F456. The overall conclusion of their analysis is (in line with Kluve, 2010) that the relative likelihood of different programmes to estimate a significant positive and a significant negative employment outcome differ.

The available evidence analysed in our review does suggest that there is an effect of participating in ALMP, although the size of the effect is small. This conclusion is not in disagreement with the conclusions in the above mentioned reviews; to the extent they conclude on the overall effect, they conclude that the effect is modest. The most recent of the reviews (Kluve & Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2010 and Card et al., 2010) analyse the relative effectiveness of ALMP types. An overall conclusion from these three reviews is that job search assistance are relatively better, and direct employment programmes in the public sector relatively worse, than other programmes in terms of the likelihood of these different programmes to estimate a significant positive and a significant negative employment outcome. The available evidence analysed in our review does not suggest that there is a differential effect of different types of ALMPs. However, it should be kept in mind that the apparently different conclusions concerning relative effectiveness of type of ALMP are obtained

³¹ An evaluation study may yield more than one data point, if e.g. the study evaluates more than one type of ALMP.

based on very different inclusion criteria concerning participants and substantially different approaches and statistical methods.

6 Authors' Conclusion

6.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

In this review we have found evidence that participation in ALMP increases the probability of finding a job. The findings are, however, mixed depending on the approach used to investigate the effect. Two approaches were analysed separately; the effect of being assigned to ALMP at a particular *moment* (the timing-of-event approach), and the effect of being assigned to ALMP in general. The available evidence does not suggest that there is an effect of being assigned to ALMP participation at a particular *moment*, neither net of lock-in nor post participation.

The available evidence does, however, suggest that there is a post effect of participating in ALMP in general, although the impact is small. The post effects of ALMP participation were measured by hazard ratios and risk difference in separate analyses. The overall impact of ALMP participation obtained using hazard ratios corresponds to a 52 per cent chance of the treated unemployed person finding a job first. The overall impact of ALMP participation obtained using risk difference corresponds to a number needed to treat of 15; i.e. for every 15 unemployed people who participate in ALMP, an additional unemployed person will hold a job approximately one year after participation.

Overall, participation in ALMPs displays a limited potential to alter the employment prospects of the individuals they intend to help.

In addition to the primary outcome, we considered secondary outcomes that are relevant to the impact of ALMP on the duration of employment and on income. Based on the low number of studies providing data on duration of employment and income, we found no evidence to suggest that the ALMP participation has an impact on the quality of the job in terms of duration of employment and income. Thus we have been unable to fully investigate whether the unemployed workers who are affected may actually be worse off, in the sense that they accept 'bad' jobs, or they are better off being offered 'good' jobs. It is an important shortcoming of the current evidence that such potential detrimental side effects have not yet been fully investigated.

It was not possible to examine a number of factors which we have reason to expect have an impact on the magnitude of the effect. Knowledge of whether the effect depends on labour market conditions or whether different programmes are differently effective for different individuals may be crucial to policy makers. The results of this review, however, merely suggest that across a number of different programmes there is an overall small effect of ALMP participation on job finding rates, and no evidence of differential effects for different programmes.

The results of this review cannot be used to give advice as to whether it is appropriate to rely on ALMPs to reduce unemployment. Three reasons can be mentioned.

First, econometric estimates of individual treatment effects merely provide partial information about the impact of participation in ALMP. Any deadweight loss and substitution effects³², as well as any productivity and competition effects are not considered. Reliable empirical evidence which considers all direct and indirect effects on programme participants and on workers not targeted by the intervention is very difficult to generate.

Second, there was insufficient evidence to take the important aspect of lock-in effects into consideration. The lock-in effect refers to the period of participation in a programme. During this period, job-search intensity may be lowered because there is less time to search for a job, and participants may want to complete an on-going skill-enhancing activity; hence the lock-in effect. The post-programme effect refers to the period after participation in a programme. If the ALMP has increased the individual's employability, a rise in the job-finding rate is expected. The combination of these two effects consequently determines the net effects of ALMP participation and it may be negative if there are substantive lock-in effects even if post-programme effects are positive.

Third, the threat effect of compulsory participation in ALMPs should be taken into account when deciding whether or not ALMPs can be relied on to reduce unemployment. The compulsory aspect may provide an incentive for unemployed individuals to look for and return to work *prior* to programme participation which is sometimes referred to as the threat effect. Taking into account the threat effect may alter the evaluation of the total effects of a given programme, and this may be of potentially great importance when the cost effectiveness of such programmes is evaluated (or even in cost-benefit analyses of the programmes).

However, some lessons can be learned from the results of the review. It was possible to assess the impact of four types of ALMP and we found no evidence to suggest that the participation effect differs by type of ALMP. This may be of potentially great

³² The **deadweight loss** is defined as the hirings from the target group that would have occurred also in the absence of the programme. The **substitution effect** is defined as the extent to which jobs created for a certain category of workers simply replace jobs for other categories, because relative wage costs are changed.

importance when the cost effectiveness of ALMPs is evaluated. As some of the programmes (e.g. subsidized work, training and education) demand full-time participation over a long time period (e.g. several months), while other programmes (e.g. job search assistance and education) are part-time and have a short duration (e.g. few days/weeks); they are not equally expensive and the least expensive programmes may advantageously be selected. If the least expensive programmes coincide with the programmes with shortest duration, the risk of substantive lock-in effects turning the net effect of programme participation negative is also minimized.

6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

In this review we found evidence that participation in ALMP increases the probability of finding a job, although the impact is small and lock-in effects are not considered. The quality of the jobs obtained, in terms of duration and income, could not be fully investigated due to limitations in the data reporting.

The planned examination of many of the potential moderators of the ALMP participation effect was not possible as the covariates were often not reported in the included studies. Further, many of the available studies did not provide data that permitted the calculation of an effect size. If effect sizes of these studies had been available, additional valuable information about the heterogeneous effects of ALMP participation may have resulted.

These considerations point to the need for future studies that consider lock-in effects as well as heterogeneous effects of ALMP participation. Future studies should not merely report on the statistical significance of their findings but should provide their results in sufficient detail to allow their inclusion in systematic reviews examining the magnitude of effects.

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The review authors are responsible for any remaining errors.

8 References

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9 Characteristics of studies

9.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF INCLUDED STUDIES

This section lists important characteristics for the 39 studies included in the data synthesis. For further characteristics of all 73 included studies see the supplementary document.

Ahmad, N. & Svarer, M. (2009).

Country	Denmark
Start year of programme	2003
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	219348
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-1.5 years/0-2 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Baumgartner, H. J. & Caliendo, M. (2008).

Country	Germany	
Start year of programme	2003	
Type of data	Both	
Sample size	Treated	2018
	Control	2296
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching	
Type of effect	Risk difference	
Time point post participation	14 months	

Behaghel, L., Crépon, B., & Gurgand, M. (2012).

Country	France	
Start year of programme	2007	
Type of data	Administrative and questionnaire	
Sample size	Treated	88650
	Control	66442
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT/using IV (instrument variables)	
Type of effect	Risk difference	
Time point post participation	1 year	

Benmarker, H., Nordström Skans, O., & Vikman, U. (2012).

Country	Sweden	
Start year of programme	1996	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	8322
	Control	16824
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Regression	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-2 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Bloom, H.S. (1990)

Country	USA	
Start year of programme	1984	
Type of data	Questionnaire	
Sample size	Treated	1048
	Control	594
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Risk difference	
Time point post participation	1 year	

Caliendo, M. & Künn, S. (2012).

Country	Germany	
Start year of programme	2003	
Type of data	Both	
Sample size	Treated	128
	Control	250

Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	4.5 years

Caliendo, M., Künn, S., & Schmidl, R. (2011).

Country	Germany
Start year of programme	2002
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	Treated West: 7027; East: 5353 Control West: 26477; East: 12162
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	1-2 years

Caplan, R. D., Vinokur, A. D., Price, R. H., & Van Ryn, M. (1989).

Country	USA
Start year of programme	1986
Type of data	Questionnaire
Sample size	Treated 412 Control 281
Study design	RCT
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation	0-4 months

Corson, W., Decker, P. T., Dunstan, S. M., Gordon, A. R., Anderson, P., & Homrighausen, J. (1989).

Country	USA
Start year of programme	1986-1987
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	Treated 8675 Control 2385
Study design	RCT
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation	0-4 months

Crépon, B., Dejemeppe, M. & Gurgand, M. (2005).

Country	France	
Start year of programme	2001	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	56784
	Control	334161
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-3 years/0-3 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Decker, P. T., Olsen, R. B., Freeman, L., Klepinger, D. H., Gordon, W., & Decker, P. (2000).

Country	USA	
Start year of programme	1994-1995	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	Florida: 8963; DC: 6051
	Control	Florida: 2997; DC: 2006
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-4 months	

Dolton, P. & O'Neill, D. (1996).

Country	UK	
Start year of programme	1989	
Type of data	Questionnaire	
Sample size	Treated	4266
	Control	286
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-16 months (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Eden, D. & Aviram, A.(1993)

Country	Israel
Start year of programme	1988
Type of data	Questionnaire

Sample size	Treated	43
	Control	45
Study design		RCT
Type of effect		Hazard rate
Time period post participation		0-2 months

Firth, D., Payne, C., & Payne, J. (1999).

Country		UK
Start year of programme		1993
Type of data		Questionnaire
Sample size	Treated	941
	Control	979
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Matching
Type of effect		Hazard rate
Time period post participation		0-2 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Fitzenberger, B. & Völter, R. (2007).

Country		Germany
Start year of programme		1993
Type of data		Administrative
Sample size	Treated	Cohort 86/87:1714; Cohort 93/94: 2727
	Control	Cohort 86/87: 19188; Cohort 93/94: 22324
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Matching
Type of effect		Risk difference
Time point post participation		1-5 years

Gerfin, M., Lechner, M. & Steiger, H. (2002).

Country		Switzerland
Start year of programme		1998
Type of data		Administrative
Sample size	Treated	7472
	Control	5461
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Matching

Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	15 months

Gorter, C. & Kalb, G. R. J. (1996).

Country	Netherlands	
Start year of programme	1989	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	397
	Control	325
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-1 year	

Graversen, B. K. & Van ours, J. (2006).

Country	Denmark	
Start year of programme	2005	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	2229
	Control	2291
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-1 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Hujer, R. & Thomsen, S. L. (2010).

Country	Germany	
Start year of programme	2000	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	West: 5331; East: 13410
	Control	West: 593247; East: 367789
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching	
Type of effect	Risk difference	
Time point post participation	1 year	

Hujer, R., Thomsen, S. L., & Zeiss, C. (2006).

Country	Germany
Start year of programme	1999

Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	13644
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-less than 3 years/0-3 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Hujer, R. & Zeiss, C. (2007).

Country	Germany	
Start year of programme	2000	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	628
	Control	16847
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-3 years/0-4 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Hägglund, P. (2006).

Country	Sweden	
Start year of programme	2002	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	343
	Control	293
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-6 months	

Jespersen, S. T., Munch, J. R., & Skipper, L. (2008).

Country	Denmark	
Start year of programme	1995	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	3691
	Control	12327

Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	1-1.5 year

Johnson, T. R. & Klepinger, D. H. (1991).

Country	USA
Start year of programme	1986
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	
Treated	2553
Control	2871
Study design	RCT
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation	0-7 months

Kvasnicka, M. (2008).

Country	Germany
Start year of programme	1994
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	106,383
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time period post participation	Average over 4 years

Lalive, R., Van Ours, J. C., & Zweimüller, J. (2008).

Country	Switzerland
Start year of programme	1997
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	7088
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-2 years/0-2 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Munch, J. R. & Skipper, L. (2008).

Country	Denmark
Start year of programme	1995
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	102411
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation	0-5 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Osikominu, A. (2012).

Country	Germany	
Start year of programme	1999	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	13859
	Control	31600
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-5 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Pedersen, J. M., Rosholm, M., & Svarer, M. (2012).

Country	Denmark	
Start year of programme	2008	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	2644
	Control	2767
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	4 months-2 years (maximum not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Richardson, K. & Berg, G. J. (2001).

Country	Sweden
Start year of programme	1993
Type of data	Administrative

Sample size	Treated	656
	Control	8000
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect		Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment		0-7 years/0-7.5 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Rodriguez-Planas, N. & Benus, J. (2007).

Country		Romania
Start year of programme		1998
Type of data		Questionnaire
Sample size	Treated	1626
	Control	1501
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Matching
Type of effect		Risk difference
Time point post participation		2 years

Rosholm, M. & Skipper, L. (2009).

Country		Denmark
Start year of programme		1994
Type of data		Both
Sample size	Treated	423
	Control	387
Study design		RCT
Type of effect		Risk difference
Time point post participation		1 year

Rosholm, M. & Svarer, M. (2004).

Country		Denmark
Start year of programme		1998
Type of data		Administrative
Sample size	Treated	13060
	Control	80229
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage		NRS/Timing-of-event

Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-4 years/0-4 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data (duration of ALMP not reported))

Sacklén, H. (2002).

Country	Sweden	
Start year of programme	1994	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	3499
	Control	4804
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching	
Type of effect	Risk difference	
Time point post participation	1 year	

Van den Berg, G. J. & Van der Klaauw, B. (2006).

Country	Netherlands	
Start year of programme	1998	
Type of data	Administrative	
Sample size	Treated	205
	Control	189
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-1 year (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)	

Vinokur, A. D., Price, R. H., & Schul, Y. (1995).

Country	USA	
Start year of programme	1991	
Type of data	Questionnaire	
Sample size	Treated	933
	Control	442
Study design	RCT	
Type of effect	Hazard rate	
Time period post participation	0-2 months	

Völter, R., Osikomnu, A., & Fitzenberger, B. (2007).

Country	Germany
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Start year of programme	1993
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	
	Treated
	2385
	Control
	9661
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	Varies between programmes: 1-2 years

Weber, A. & Hofer, H. (2004).

Country	Austria
Start year of programme	1999
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	
	Treated
	2498
	Control
	10785
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event
Type of effect	Hazard rate
Time period post participation/start of treatment	0-2- years/0-3 years (not reported but based on the time period covered by their data and duration of ALMP)

Winterhager, H., Heinze, A., & Spermann, A. (2006).

Country	Germany
Start year of programme	2003
Type of data	Administrative
Sample size	
	Treated
	30,402
	Control
	1,407,754
Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching
Type of effect	Risk difference
Time point post participation	1 year

9.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCLUDED STUDIES

Jensen, 1993	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Andrén, 2004	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Bergemann, 2009	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Bidani, 2009	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Blache, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Bonin, 2006	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Calderón-Madrid, 2006	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Calderón-Madrid, 2005	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Carling, 2001	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Chan, 2003	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Crépon, 2007	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Cueto, 2009	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Delajara, 2006	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Edin, 1991	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Eichler, 2000	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low; not ALMP
Eichler, 2002	Not ALMP
Fitzenberger, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Fitzenberger, 2000	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Gaure, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Ham, 1991	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Hujer, 1997	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Hämäläinen, 2004	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Kluve, 1999	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Kluve, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Kraus, 1997	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low

Lechner, 1999	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Lechner, 2001	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Lee, 2005	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Lubyova, 1999	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Lubyova, 1997	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Lubyova, 1998	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Main, 1968	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Malmberg-Heimonen, 2005	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Moore, 2009	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Nivorozhkin, 2005	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Nivorozhkin, 2007	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Nordlund, 2011	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Nunes, 2009	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
O'Connell, 2002	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low and different data sources for treated/control
O'Connell, 1996	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
O'Connell, 2002	Different data sources for treated/control
O'Connell, 1997	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Perry, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Perry, 2007	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Puhani, 1998	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Regnér, 2002	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Reinowski, 2006	Different data sources for treated/control
Reynolds, 2010	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Raaum, 1997	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Speckesser, 2004	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
Stephan, 2008	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
van Dijk, 2006	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
van Ours, 2000	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
van Ours, 2002	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low

Vuori, 2005	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low
White, 1992	Share of participants receiving UI unclear/too low

10 Appendices

10.1 SEARCH DOCUMENTATION

10.1.1 Electronic searches

Business Source Elite
Ebsco platform September 2012

#	Query	Results
S37	s36 not s16	112
S36	S34 or S35	2799
S35	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	307
S34	S22 or S23 or S25 or S26 or S29 or S30 or S33	2498
S33	S31 and S32	261
S32	TI ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*))	1110647

S31	TI ((job n1 finding or job-finding)) OR AB ((job n1 finding or job-finding))	830
S30	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	19
S29	S27 and S28	1017
S28	TI (help or assistance or incentive or initiative* or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) OR AB (help or assistance or incentive or initiative* or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*)	970537
S27	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	3974
S26	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	73
S25	S21 and S24	691
S24	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	29501
S23	TI ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP) OR AB ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)	461
S22	TI ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)) OR AB ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))	132
S21	S17 or S18 or S19 or S20	16733
S20	TI ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)) OR AB ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or	2055

(Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment))

S19 TI ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work)) OR AB ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work))

S18 TI ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs)) OR AB ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs))

S17 TI ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR

	(Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job)) OR AB ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job))	
S16	S14 or S15	2694
S15	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	307
S14	S1 or S2 or S5 or S6 or S9 or S10 or S13	2393
S13	S11 and S12	225
S12	TI ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*)) OR AB ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*))	1039884
S11	TI (((job n1 finding) OR job-finding)) OR AB (((830 (job n1 finding) OR job-finding))	
S10	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) 19 OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	
S9	S7 and S8	954
S8	TI ((help OR assistance OR support OR training 913184 OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*)) OR AB ((help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))	
S7	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed 3974 work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	
S6	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme 73	

S5	S3 and S4	656
S4	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	29501
S3	TI (((Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job) OR (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs) OR (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment))) OR AB (((Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job) OR (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs) OR (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR	15658

(Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR
 (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR
 (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR
 (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR
 (Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1
 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR
 (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1
 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR
 (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1
 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment)
 OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training
 N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)))

S2	TI (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)) OR AB (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP))	461
S1	TI (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))) OR AB (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)))	132

Cochrane Library
 September 2012

Search number	Terms	Totals
S2	"active labo?r policy":ti,ab,kw	14
S3	"labo?r market program*" OR LMP OR ALMP	58
S4	(job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) AND (program* OR training or incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative*OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support	20737
S5	(un-employ* OR unemploy*):ti,ab,kw	515
S6	#4 and #5	340
S7	(replac* AND schem*)	531
S8	"job search*" OR "job applicat*" OR "subsidi?ed work"	42
S9	help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*	272683

Search number	Terms	Totals
S10	#8 and #9	36
S11	"job opportunity and basic skills program"	0
S12	(job AND finding) OR job-finding	663
S13	program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*	310811
S14	#12 and #13	602
S15	#2 or #3 or #6 or #8 or #10 or #14	946
S16	help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*)	284867
S17	(job or jobs or work or employment*) and (help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*))	19980
S18	#8 and #16	36
S19	#5 and #17	455
S20	#12 and #16	589
S21	#2 or #3 or #6 or #18 or #19 or #20	1047
S22	21 not 15	124

EconLIT

Ebsco platform September 2012

#	Query	Results
S37	s36 not s16	107
S36	S34 or S35	1983
S35	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	0
S34	S22 or S23 or S25 or S26 or S29 or S30 or S33	1983
S33	S31 and S32	146
S32	TI ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme*	192713

	or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*))	
S31	TI ((job n1 finding or job-finding)) OR AB ((job n1 finding or job-finding))	384
S30	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	4
S29	S27 and S28	523
S28	TI (help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) OR AB (help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*)	153497
S27	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	1764
S26	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	13
S25	S21 and S24	723
S24	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	22152
S23	TI ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP) OR AB ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)	502
S22	TI ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)) OR AB ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))	475
S21	S17 or S18 or S19 or S20	4767
S20	TI ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR	1244

(Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)) OR AB ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment))

S19 TI ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work)) OR AB ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work)) 2450

S18 TI ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs)) OR AB ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs)) 1346

S17 TI ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job)) 1346

	(Support* N1 job)) OR AB ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job))	
S16	S14 or S15	1876
S15	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	0
S14	S1 or S2 or S5 or S6 or S9 or S10 or S13	1876
S13	S11 and S12	132
S12	TI ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*)) OR AB ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*))	185797
S11	TI (((job n1 finding) OR job-finding)) OR AB (((job n1 finding) OR job-finding))	384
S10	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	4
S9	S7 and S8	435
S8	TI ((help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*)) OR AB ((help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))	117266
S7	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	1764
S6	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	13
S5	S3 and S4	678
S4	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	22152
S3	TI (((Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job) OR (Program*	4576

N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs)
 OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR
 (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR
 (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR
 (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs) OR
 (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR
 (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR
 (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR
 (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR
 (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR
 (Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1 Employment)
 OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1
 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR
 (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1
 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR
 (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1
 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR
 (Support* N1 Employment))) OR AB (((Program* N1
 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR
 (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1
 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job)
 OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR
 (Support* N1 job) OR (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training
 N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs)
 OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR
 (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR
 (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR
 (Support* N1 jobs) OR (Program* N1 work) OR
 (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR
 (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course*
 N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1
 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1
 work) OR (Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1
 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR
 (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1
 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR
 (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1
 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR
 (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1
 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)))

S2 TI (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)) 502
 OR AB (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)
)

S1	TI (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))) 475 OR AB (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)))
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International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
PROQUEST September 2012

#	Query	Results
S22	((TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)))) OR (TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)) OR (TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)) OR (TI(job opportunity AND basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity AND basic skills program)) OR DE(employability) OR (TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*))) OR (TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*))) OR ((TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience*	299*

OR experiment* OR support*)))) NOT (((TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies))) OR (TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)) OR ((TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*))) AND (TI(un-employ* OR unemploy*) OR AB(un-employ* OR unemploy*))) OR (TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)) OR ((TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work))) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))) OR (TI(job opportunity AND basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity AND basic skills program)) OR ((TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)))) OR DE(employability))

S21 (TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) 1983
OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies))) OR (TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)) OR (TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)) OR (TI(job opportunity AND basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity AND basic skills program)) OR DE(employability) OR (TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR

scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR (TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR (TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR ((TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*))

S20 (TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) 42*

S19 (TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work))) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB(help OR assistance OR program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)) 562*

S18	<p>TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*))</p>	354*
S17	<p>TI(help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*) or AB(help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)</p>	262029*
S16	<p>((TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies))) OR (TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)) OR ((TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*))) AND (TI(un-employ* OR unemploy*) OR AB(un-employ* OR unemploy*))) OR (TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)) OR ((TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)))) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))) OR (TI(job opportunity AND basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity AND basic skills program)) OR ((TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(program* OR incentive OR</p>	1661*

	scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)))) OR DE(employability)	
S15	DE(employability)	18*
S14	(TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies))) OR (TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)) OR ((TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*))) AND (TI(un-employ* OR unemploy*) OR AB(un-employ* OR unemploy*))) OR (TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)) OR ((TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work))) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))) OR (TI(job opportunity AND basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity AND basic skills program)) OR ((TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*))))	1644*
S13	(TI((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding) OR AB((job within 1 finding) OR job-finding)) AND (TI(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR	37*

	initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*))	
S12	TI(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*) OR AB(program* OR incentive OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR support*)	241671*
S10	TI(job opportunity and basic skills program) OR AB(job opportunity and basic skills program)	4*
S9	(TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work))) AND (TI(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))	367*
S8	(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*) OR AB(help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*)	156283*
S7	TI((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work)) OR AB((job search*) OR (job applicat*) OR (subsidi?ed work))	1390*
S6	TI(replac* within 1 scheme*) OR AB(replac* within 1 scheme*)	1*
S5	(TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*))) AND (TI(un-employ* OR unemploy*) OR AB(un-employ* OR unemploy*))	13*
S4	TI(un-employ* OR unemploy*) OR AB(un-employ* OR unemploy*)	14058*
S3	TI((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR	335*

	experiment* OR support*)) OR AB((job OR jobs OR work OR employment*) within 1 (program* OR training OR incentive OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course* OR initiative* OR experience OR experiment* OR support*))	
S2	TI((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP) OR AB((labo*r market program*) OR LMP OR ALMP)	875*
S1	TI((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies)) OR AB((active labo*r policy) OR (active labo*r policies))	512*

PsycINFO

Ebsco platform September 2012

#	Query	Results
S37	s36 not s16	216
S36	S34 or S35	2468
S35	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	859
S34	S22 or S23 or S25 or S26 or S29 or S30 or S33	1641
S33	S31 and S32	358
S32	TI ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*))	1290185
S31	TI ((job n1 finding or job-finding)) OR AB ((job n1 finding or job-finding))	555

S30	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	16
S29	S27 and S28	700
S28	TI (help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) OR AB (help or assistance or incentive or initiative*or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*)	1000136
S27	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	1361
S26	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	9
S25	S21 and S24	520
S24	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	8900
S23	TI ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP) OR AB ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)	118
S22	TI ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)) OR AB ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))	19
S21	S17 or S18 or S19 or S20	19321
S20	TI ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)) OR AB ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR	2830

	(Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment))	
S19	TI ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work)) OR AB ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work))	13755
S18	TI ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs)) OR AB ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs))	3552
S17	TI ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job)) OR AB ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job))	3555

Science Citation Index
12-09-17

#	Query	Results
S28	#26 NOT #13	84
S26	#25 OR #24 OR #18 OR #15 OR #14 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,530
S25	#23 AND #19 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	92
S24	#23 AND #22 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	407
S23	Topic=(help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	5,065,365
S22	Topic=((job SAME finding) or job-finding)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	813
S21	Topic=((job opportunity) and (basic skills program)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	0
S20	Topic=(job opportunity and basic skills program) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	0
S19	Topic=("job search*" or "job applicat*" or "subsidized Work") Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	283
S18	#17 AND #16 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,055
S17	Topic=((un-employ* or unemploy*)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	6,690
S16	Topic=((job or jobs or work or employment*) SAME (help or assistance or program* or training or incentive	327,334

	or scheme* or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	
S15	Topic=("Labo\$r market program*" OR ALMP) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	15
S14	Topic((((("active labour policy" or "active labour policies")) OR (("active labor policy" or "active labor policies")))) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1
S13	#12 OR #9 OR #8 OR #5 OR #2 OR #1 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,458
S12	#11 AND #10 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	398
S11	Topic=((program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	5,120,243
S10	Topic((((job SAME finding) or job-finding)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	813
S9	Topic=((job opportunity) AND (basic skills program)) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	0
S8	#7 AND #6 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	77
S7	Topic=(help or assistance or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2,280,531
S6	Topic(((("job search*" or "job applicat*" or "subsidi\$ed Work")))) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	283
S5	#4 AND #3 Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	997
S4	Topic=(un-employ* or unemploy*) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	6,690
S3	Topic((((job or jobs or work or employment*) SAME (program* or training or incentive or scheme* or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*))	316,031

	Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	
S2	Topic=("Labo\$r market program*" OR ALMP) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	15
S1	Topic=((("active labour policy" or "active labour policies")) OR (("active labor policy" or "active labor policies"))) Databases=SCI-EXPANDED Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1

Social Science Citation Index
September 2012

#	Query	Results
S27	#26 not #13 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	333
S26	#25 OR #24 OR #18 OR #15 OR #14 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	4,825
S25	#23 AND #19 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	689
S24	#23 AND #22 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	662
S23	Topic=(help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	941,927
S22	Topic=((job SAME finding) or job-finding)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,248
S21	Topic=((job opportunity) and (basic skills program)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2
S20	Topic=(job opportunity and basic skills program) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2
S19	Topic=("job search*" or "job applicat*" or "subsidized Work") Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,659
S18	#17 AND #16	3,893

	Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	
S17	Topic=((un-employ* or unemploy*)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	23,647
S16	Topic=((job or jobs or work or employment*) SAME (help or assistance or program* or training or incentive or scheme* or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	119,332
S15	Topic=("Labo\$r market program*" OR ALMP) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	34
S14	Topic((((("active labour policy" or "active labour policies")) OR ("active labor policy" or "active labor policies")))) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2
S13	#12 OR #9 OR #8 OR #5 OR #2 OR #1 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	4,512
S12	#11 AND #10 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	639
S11	Topic=((program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	940,870
S10	Topic((((job SAME finding) or job-finding)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,248
S9	Topic=((job opportunity) AND (basic skills program)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2
S8	#7 AND #6 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	506
S7	Topic=(help or assistance or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	657,584
S6	Topic(((("job search*" or "job applicat*" or "subsidized Work")))) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	1,659
S5	#4 AND #3 Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	3,681

S4	Topic=(un-employ* or unemploy*) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	23,647
S3	Topic=((job or jobs or work or employment*) SAME (program* or training or incentive or scheme* or counsel* or course* or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or training or support*)) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	113,408
S2	Topic=("Labo\$r market program*" OR ALMP) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	34
S1	Topic((((("active labour policy" or "active labour policies")) OR (("active labor policy" or "active labor policies")))) Databases=SSCI Timespan=All Years Lemmatization=Off	2

SocINDEX

Ebsco Platform September 2012

#	Query	Results
S37	s36 not s16	1297
S36	S34 or S35	2675
S35	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	265
S34	S22 or S23 or S25 or S26 or S29 or S30 or S33	2432
S33	S31 and S32	305
S32	TI ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*)) OR AB ((help or assistance or program* or incentive or scheme* or training or counsel* or course*or initiative* or experience* or experiment* or support*))	547220

S31	TI ((job n1 finding or job-finding)) OR AB ((job n1 finding or job-finding))	496
S30	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	75
S29	S27 and S28	599
S28	TI (help or assistance or incentive or initiative* or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*) OR AB (help or assistance or incentive or initiative* or experience* or experiment or support or training or program* or scheme* or counsel* or course*)	448892
S27	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	1434
S26	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	18
S25	S21 and S24	1091
S24	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	22176
S23	TI ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP) OR AB ((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)	352
S22	TI ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies)) OR AB ((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))	212
S21	S17 or S18 or S19 or S20	16156
S20	TI ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)) OR AB ((help n1 employment) or (assistance n1 employment) or (Program* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR (Experience* N1	3494

	Employment) OR (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment))	
S19	TI ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work)) OR AB ((help n1 work) or (assistance n1 work) or (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Support* N1 work))	10264
S18	TI ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs)) OR AB ((help n1 jobs) or (assistance n1 jobs) or (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs))	3380
S17	TI ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job)) OR AB ((help n1 job) or (assistance n1 job) or (Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job))	3380
S16	S14 or S15	2592
S15	DE "EMPLOYABILITY"	265

S14	S1 or S2 or S5 or S6 or S9 or S10 or S13	2349
S13	S11 and S12	285
S12	TI ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*)) OR AB ((program* OR incentive* OR scheme* OR training OR counsel* OR course OR initiative* OR experience* OR experiment* OR training OR support*))	543288
S11	TI (((job n1 finding) OR job-finding)) OR AB (((job n1 finding) OR job-finding))	496
S10	TI ((job opportunity and basic skills program)) OR AB ((job opportunity and basic skills program))	75
S9	S7 and S8	562
S8	TI ((help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*)) OR AB ((help OR assistance OR support OR training OR program* OR scheme* OR counsel* OR course*))	425109
S7	TI ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work)) OR AB ((job search* OR job applicat* OR subsidi#ed work))	1434
S6	TI replac* n1 scheme OR AB replac* n1 scheme	18
S5	S3 and S4	1049
S4	TI ((un-employ* or unemploy*)) OR AB ((un-employ* or unemploy*))	22176
S3	TI (((Program* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job) OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Support* N1 job) OR (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs) OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR (Support* N1 jobs) OR (Program* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course* N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1 work) OR	15428

(Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1 Employment)
 OR (Training N1 Employment) OR (Incentive N1
 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1 Employment) OR
 (Counsel N1 Employment) OR (Course* N1
 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1 Employment) OR
 (Experience* N1 Employment) OR (Experiment* N1
 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR
 (Support* N1 Employment))) OR AB (((Program* N1
 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR (Incentive N1 job) OR
 (Scheme* N1 job) OR (Counsel N1 job) OR (Course* N1
 job) OR (Initiative* N1 job) OR (Experience* N1 job)
 OR (Experiment* N1 job) OR (Training N1 job) OR
 (Support* N1 job) OR (Program* N1 jobs) OR (Training
 N1 jobs) OR (Incentive N1 jobs) OR (Scheme* N1 jobs)
 OR (Counsel N1 jobs) OR (Course* N1 jobs) OR
 (Initiative* N1 jobs) OR (Experience* N1 jobs) OR
 (Experiment* N1 jobs) OR (Training N1 jobs) OR
 (Support* N1 jobs) OR (Program* N1 work) OR
 (Training N1 work) OR (Incentive N1 work) OR
 (Scheme* N1 work) OR (Counsel N1 work) OR (Course*
 N1 work) OR (Initiative* N1 work) OR (Experience* N1
 work) OR (Experiment* N1 work) OR (Training N1
 work) OR (Support* N1 work) OR (Program* N1
 Employment) OR (Training N1 Employment) OR
 (Incentive N1 Employment) OR (Scheme* N1
 Employment) OR (Counsel N1 Employment) OR
 (Course* N1 Employment) OR (Initiative* N1
 Employment) OR (Experience* N1 Employment) OR
 (Experiment* N1 Employment) OR (Training N1
 Employment) OR (Support* N1 Employment)))

S2 TI (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)) 352
 OR AB (((labo#r market program*) or LMP or ALMP)
)

S1 TI (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r policies))) 212
 OR AB (((active labo#r policy) or (active labo#r
 policies)))

10.1.2 Hand searching

The Journal of Labor Economics” and “Labour Economics” have been hand searched for the year 2012 and the available issues of 2013 (1,2 and 3). This resulted in respectively 114 and 37 articles screened.

10.2 FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL SCREENING

First level screening is on the basis of titles and abstracts. Second level is on the basis of full text

Reference id. No. :

Study id. No.:

Reviewers initials:

Source:

Year of publication:

Duration of study:

Country/countries of origin

Author

The study will be excluded if one or more of the answers to question 1-3 are ‘No’. If the answers to question 1 to 3 are ‘Yes’ or ‘Uncertain’, then the full text of the study will be retrieved for second level eligibility. All unanswered questions need to be posed again on the basis of the full text. If not enough information is available, or if the study is unclear, the author of the study will be contacted if possible.

First level screening questions are based on titles and abstracts

1. Are the participants’ unemployed individuals receiving unemployment insurance benefits during their unemployment?
Yes - include
No – if no then stop here and exclude
Uncertain - include

Question 1 guidance:

This includes only unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. We are not interested in other types of unemployment benefits such as unemployment assistance benefits and social assistance benefits. In most OECD countries a secondary benefit is available for those who have exhausted regular unemployment insurance benefits. These are known as ‘social assistance benefits’. Unlike UI benefits, social assistance benefits are generally means-tested, pay a lower level of benefit, and have no time limit.

2. Does the study focus on ALMP (Active Labour Market Programme) participation?
Yes - include
No – if no then stop here and exclude
Uncertain - include

Question 2 guidance:

The intervention is ALMP participation. The programme may be compulsory (participants have to participate to continue receiving unemployment insurance benefits) or voluntary. This intervention can be referred to in different ways, e.g. job search assistance, employment counselling, job preparation activities, education and training and private or public sector employment programmes.

3. Is this study a primary quantitative study?
Yes - include
No – if no then stop here and exclude
Uncertain - include

Question 3 guidance:

We are only interested in primary quantitative studies, where the authors have analysed the data. We are not interested in theoretical papers on the topic or surveys/reviews of studies of the topic. (This question may be difficult to answer on the base of titles and abstracts alone.)

Second level screening questions based on full text

4. Does the study estimate an effect, using a control group or using an estimated counterfactual?
Yes - include
No – if no then stop here and exclude
Uncertain - include

Question 4 guidance

E.g. 1) Randomised controlled trials including cluster randomisation and quasi randomised controlled study designs (i.e. participants are allocated by means such as alternate allocation, person's birth date, the date of the week or month, case number or alphabetical order), 2) non randomised controlled study designs (i.e. quasi-experimental designs) such as controlled two group study designs or 3) study designs based on observational data, where the effect is estimated by statistical methods.

5. Does the study examine exits to employment?
Yes – include
No – if no then stop here and exclude
Uncertain – include

Question 3 guidance:

The primary outcome is exits to employment. Studies only looking at exits to other destinations (such as other kinds of benefits or out of the labour force) will not be included. Studies who do not distinguish between destinations will be included.

10.3 CODING FORM

Names of author(s)
Title
Language
Journal
Year
Country
Target group (age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation
Is the programme compulsory?
How are individuals informed about ALMP?
Types of ALMPs (labour market training/education, private sector programmes, public sector employment programmes, job search assistance)
Do individuals attend more than one programme?
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)
Duration of a ALMP (days, weeks, months)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?
Sanctions if individual refuses to participate in a programme
Labour market conditions (unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness, etc.)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other (specify))
Time period covered by analysis
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (the control group is never going to participate, participation will occur at a later point in time)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects
Sample size

OUT COME DATA

DICHOTOMOUS OUTCOME DATA

OUTCOME	TIME POINT (s) (record exact time from participation, there may be more than one, record them all)	SOURCE	VALID Ns	CASES	NON-CASES	STATISTICS	Pg. # & NOTES
		Questionnaire Admin data Other (specify) Unclear	Participation	Participation	Participation	RR (risk ratio) OR (odds ratio) SE (standard error) 95% CI DF P- value (enter exact p value if available) Chi2 Other	
			Comparison	Comparison	Comparison		

Repeat as needed

OUT COME DATA

TIME-TO-EVENT OUTCOME DATA

OUTCOME	TIME POINT (s) (record exact time from participation, there may be more than one, record them all)	SOURCE	STATISTICS	Pg. # & NOTES
		Questionnaire Admin data Other (specify) Unclear	HR (hazard ratio) SE (standard error) 95% CI DF P- value (enter exact p value if available) Chi2 Other	

Repeat as needed

CONTINUOUS OUTCOME DATA

OUTCOME	TIME POINT (s) (record exact time from participation, there may be more than one, record them all)	SOURCE (specify)	VALID Ns	Means	SDs	STATISTICS	Pg. # & NOTES
		Questionnaire Admin data Other (specify) Unclear	Participation	Participation	Participation	P t F Df ES Other	
			Comparison	Comparison	Comparison		

*Repeat as need

10.4 ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF BIAS IN INCLUDED STUDIES

Risk of bias table

Item	Judgement ^a	Description (quote from paper, or describe key information)
1. Sequence generation		
2. Allocation concealment		
3. Confounding ^{b,c}		
4. Blinding ^{?b}		
5. Incomplete outcome data addressed? ^b		
6. Free of selective reporting? ^b		
7. Free of other bias?		
8. <i>A priori</i> protocol? ^d		
9. <i>A priori</i> analysis plan? ^e		

^a Some items on low/high risk/unclear scale (double-line border), some on 5 point scale/unclear (single line border), some on yes/no/unclear scale (dashed border). For all items, record “unclear” if inadequate reporting prevents a judgement being made.

^b For each outcome in the study.

^c This item is only used for NRCTs and NRSs. It is based on list of confounders considered important at the outset and defined in the protocol for the review (*assessment against worksheet*).

^d Did the researchers write a protocol defining the study population, intervention and comparator, primary and other outcomes, data collection methods, etc. in advance of starting the study?

^e Did the researchers have an analysis plan defining the primary and other outcomes, statistical methods, subgroup analyses, etc. in advance of starting the study?

Risk of bias tool

Studies for which RoB tool is intended

The risk of bias model was developed by Prof. Barnaby Reeves in association with the Cochrane Non-Randomised Studies Methods Group.³³ This model, an extension of the Cochrane Collaboration's risk of bias tool, covers risk of bias in both randomised controlled trials (RCTs and QRCTs) and in non-randomised studies (NRCTs and NRSs).

The point of departure for the risk of bias model is the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of interventions (Higgins & Green, 2011). The existing Cochrane risk of bias tool needs elaboration when assessing non-randomised studies because, for non-randomised studies, particular attention should be paid to selection bias / risk of confounding. Additional item on confounding is used only for non-randomised studies (NRCTs and NRSs) and is not used for randomised controlled trials (RCTs and QRCTs).

Assessment of risk of bias

Issues when using modified RoB tool to assess included non-randomised studies:

- Use existing principle: score judgement and provide information (preferably direct quote) to support judgement
- Additional item on confounding used only for non-randomised studies (NRCTs and NRSs).
- 5-point scale for some items (distinguish “unclear” from intermediate risk of bias).
- Keep in mind the general philosophy – assessment is not about whether researchers could have done better but about risk of bias; the assessment tool must be used in a standard way whatever the difficulty / circumstances of investigating the research question of interest and whatever the study design used.
- Anchors: “1/No/low risk” of bias should correspond to a high quality RCT. “5/high risk” of bias should correspond to a risk of bias that means the findings should not be considered (too risky, too much bias, more likely to mislead than inform)

1. Sequence generation

- Low/high/unclear RoB item
- Always high RoB (not random) for a non-randomised study
- Might argue that this item redundant for NRS since always high – but important to include in RoB table (‘level playing field’ argument)

2. Allocation concealment

- Low/high/unclear RoB item
- Potentially low RoB for a non-randomised study, e.g. quasi-randomised (so high RoB to sequence generation) but concealed (reviewer judges that the people making decisions about including participants didn't know how allocation was being done, e.g. odd/even date of birth/hospital number)

3. RoB from confounding (additional item for NRCT and NRS; assess for each outcome)

³³ This risk of bias model was introduced by Prof. Reeves at a workshop on risk of bias in non-randomised studies at SFI Campbell, February 2011. The model is a further development of work carried out in the Cochrane Non-Randomised Studies Method Group (NRSMG).

- Assumes a pre-specified list of potential confounders defined in the protocol
- Low(1) / 2 / 3 / 4 / high(5) / unclear RoB item
- Judgement needs to factor in:
 - proportion of confounders (from pre-specified list) that were considered
 - whether most important confounders (from pre-specified list) were considered
 - resolution/precision with which confounders were measured
 - extent of imbalance between groups at baseline
 - care with which adjustment was done (typically a judgement about the statistical modelling carried out by authors)
- Low RoB requires that all important confounders are balanced at baseline (not primarily/not only a statistical judgement OR measured ‘well’ and ‘carefully’ controlled for in the analysis).

Assess against pre-specified worksheet. Reviewers will make a RoB judgement about each factor first and then ‘eyeball’ these for the judgement RoB table.

4. RoB from lack of blinding (assess for each outcome, as per existing RoB tool)

- Low(1) / 2 / 3 / 4 / high(5) / unclear RoB item
- Judgement needs to factor in:
 - nature of outcome (subjective / objective; source of information)
 - who was / was not blinded and the risk that those who were not blinded could introduce performance or detection bias
 - see Ch.8 in the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of interventions (Higgins & Green, 2011).

5. RoB from incomplete outcome data (assess for each outcome, as per existing RoB tool)

- Low(1) / 2 / 3 / 4 / high(5) / unclear RoB item
- Judgement needs to factor in:
 - reasons for missing data
 - whether amount of missing data balanced across groups, with similar reasons
 - whether censoring is less than or equal to 25% and taken into account
 - see Ch.8

6. RoB from selective reporting (assess for each outcome, NB different to existing Ch.8 recommendation)

- Low(1) / 2 / 3 / 4 / high(5) / unclear RoB item
- Judgement needs to factor in:
 - existing RoB guidance on selective outcome reporting (see Ch.8)
 - also, extent to which analyses (and potentially other choices) could have been manipulated to bias the findings reported, e.g. choice of method of model fitting, potential confounders considered / included
 - look for evidence that there was a protocol in advance of doing any analysis / obtaining the data (difficult unless explicitly reported); NRS very different from RCTs. RCTs must have a protocol in advance of starting to recruit (for REC/IRB/other regulatory approval); NRS need not (especially older studies)
 - Hence, separate yes/no items asking reviewers whether they think the researchers had a pre-specified protocol and analysis plan.

7. RoB from other bias (assess for each outcome, NB different to existing Ch.8 recommendation)

- Low(1) / 2 / 3 / 4 / high(5) / unclear RoB item

- Judgement needs to factor in:
 - existing RoB guidance on other potential threats to validity (see Ch.8)
 - also, assess whether suitable cluster analysis is used (e.g. cluster summary statistics, robust standard errors, the use of the design effect to adjust standard errors, multilevel models and mixture models), if assignment of units to treatment is clustered

Confounding Worksheet

Assessment of how researchers dealt with confounding		
Method for <i>identifying</i> relevant confounders described by researchers:	yes no	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
If yes, describe the method used:		
Relevant confounders described:	yes no	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
List confounders described on next page		
Method used for controlling for confounding		
At design stage (e.g. matching, regression discontinuity, instrument variable):		
.....		
.....		
.....		
At analysis stage (e.g. stratification, regression, difference-in difference):		
.....		
.....		
.....		
Describe confounders controlled for below		

Confounders described by researchers

Tick (yes[0]/no[1] judgement) if confounder considered by the researchers [Cons'd?]

Score (1[good precision] to 5[poor precision]) precision with which confounder measured

Score (1[balanced] to 5[major imbalance]) imbalance between groups

Score (1[very careful] to 5[not at all careful]) care with which adjustment for confounder was carried out

Confounder	Considered	Precision	Imbalance	Adjustment
Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Age	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labour market condition	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unemployment duration	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unobservables ³⁴	<input type="checkbox"/>	Irrelevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Censoring	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other:	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

³⁴ See user guide for unobservables

User guide for unobservables

Selection bias is understood as systematic baseline differences between groups and can therefore compromise comparability between groups. Baseline differences can be observable (e.g. age and gender) and unobservable (to the researcher; e.g. motivation and ‘ability’). There is no single non-randomised study design that always solves the selection problem. Different designs solve the selection problem under different assumptions and require different types of data. Especially how different designs deal with selection on unobservables varies. The “right” method depends on the model generating participation, i.e. assumptions about the nature of the process by which participants are selected into a programme.

As there is no universal correct way to construct counterfactuals we will assess the extent to which the identifying assumptions (the assumption that makes it possible to identify the counterfactual) are explained and discussed (preferably the authors should make an effort to justify their choice of method). We will look for evidence that authors using e.g. (this is NOT an exhaustive list):

Natural experiments:

Discuss whether they face a truly random allocation of participants and that there is no change of behaviour in anticipation of e.g. policy rules.

Instrument variable (IV):

Explain and discuss the assumption that the instrument variable does not affect outcomes other than through their effect on participation.

Matching (including propensity scores):

Explain and discuss the assumption that there is no selection on unobservables, only selection on observables.

(Multivariate, multiple) Regression:

Explain and discuss the assumption that there is no selection on unobservables, only selection on observables. Further discuss the extent to which they compare comparable people.


Regression Discontinuity (RD):

Explain and discuss the assumption that there is a (strict!) RD treatment rule. It must not be changeable by the agent in an effort to obtain or avoid treatment. Continuity in the expected impact at the discontinuity is required.

Difference-in-difference (Treatment-control-before-after):

Explain and discuss the assumption that outcomes of participants and nonparticipants evolve over time in the same way.

11 Analysis



11.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Figure 11.1: Forest plot, Timing-of-event, net of lock-in

Figure 11.2: Forest plot, Timing-of-event, post effect

Figure 11.3: Forest plot, re-employment, hazard ratio





Figure 11.4: Forest plot, re-employment, risk difference



11.2 PUBLICATION BIAS

Figure 11.1: Funnel plot, Timing-of-event, net of lock-in




Figure 11.2: Funnel plot, Timing-of-event, post effect




Figure 11.3: Funnel plot, re-employment, hazard ratio





Figure 11.4: Funnel plot, re-employment, risk difference



11.3 GRADE EVIDENCE PROFILE

Table 11.1 Quality assessment

Quality assessment							Summary of findings		
No. of effect estimates	Design	Limitations	Directness	Consistency	Precision	Publication bias	No of participants	Effect (95% CI)	Quality
Post effect measured by hazard ratios									
15	13 RCTs, 2 NRSs	serious limitation (-1)	none	none	none	none	81960	HR: 1.09 (1.04 to 1.14)	Moderate ¹
Post effect measured by risk difference									
18	15 NRSs, 3 RCTs	no limitation	none	none	none	none	2835951	RD: 0.07 (0.03 to 0.11)	Low
Net of lock in effect using the timing-of-event approach									
8	8 NRSs	no limitation	indirect evidence (-1)	important inconsistency (-1)	important imprecision (-1)	none	715898	HR: 0.87 (0.61 to 1.25)	Very low ^{2,3,4}
Post effect using the timing-of-event approach									
9	9 NRSs	no limitation	indirect evidence (-1)	important inconsistency (-1)	important imprecision (-1)	none	866139	HR: 1.15 (0.88 to 1.49)	Very low ^{2,3,4}

GRADE Working Group grades of evidence (Balshem et al., 2011)

High quality: We are very confident that the true effect lies close to that of the estimate of the effect.

Moderate quality: Moderate: We are moderately confident in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be close to the estimate of the effect, but there is a possibility that it is substantially different.

Low quality: Our confidence in the effect estimate is limited: The true effect may be substantially different from the estimate of the effect.

Very low quality: We have very little confidence in the effect estimate: The true effect is likely to be substantially different from the estimate of effect. Any estimate of effect is very uncertain.

1: High/Unclear sequence generation and allocation concealment. 2: The effect obtained using the timing-of-events approach is the effect of being assigned to training at a particular *moment*. 3: inconsistency (heterogeneity) in the results. 4: Wide confidence intervals

12 Differences between review and protocol

The majority of studies using matching to control for confounding reported risk difference and variance. Outcomes measured at a single time point were therefore analysed using risk difference and variance.

The moderator analysis of the risk difference outcome was undertaken using multiple meta-regression, estimated using the robust standard error method (Hedges, Tipton & Johnson, 2010).

13 Data appendices

13.1 DATA EXTRACTION

13.1.1 Descriptive data for studies with effect estimate

Author	Agell	Ahmad, Svarer	Anderson, Corson, Decker
Title	Swedish Labor Market Programs: Efficiency and Timing	The Effect of Sanctions and Active Labour Market Programmes on the Exit Rate From Unemployment	The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration Project: Follow-up Report
Year	1995	2009	1991
Country	Sweden	Denmark	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Swedish Economic Policy Review	Aarhus University	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper

<p>Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)</p>	<p>Compensation is paid to an unemployed individual who has been a member of a certified UI fund for at least 12 months. In addition, the individual has to have worked for at least five months during the 12-month period preceding the unemployment spell (p.69-70)</p>	<p>To qualify for UI benefits, membership of a UI fund is required. Membership is voluntary and requires that the individuals pay a monthly tax deductible fee to the UI funds. Entitlement to disbursement is obtained after at least 1 year's membership and a minimum of 52 weeks of employment within the last three years. (p.6) The sample is split according to gender. In addition, we discard unemployed individuals under the age of 26 (p. 10)</p>	<p>Target group was unemployed individuals who had received their first UI payment, were older than 25 years old and individuals who have worked at their last employer, prior to applying for UI, for a minimum of 3 years. Further individuals who expected to be recalled and had a specific recall date were excluded as were individuals who are typically hired through union hiring halls. (p. 3-4) UI eligibility requirements not specified.</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>Table 1 p. 75 shows days unemployed before participating in program.</p>	<p>During the 'passive period', which is the first 9 months of unemployment, the individuals are not required to participate in ALMPs. The individuals are however required to do so after the 9 months. (p.6)</p>	<p>"(...) began to receive services during their fifth week of unemployment", so 4 weeks (p. 4)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>Sort of, since registration at employment offices are compulsory if the unemployed are to receive UI, and participate in ALMPs. (p. 73)</p>	<p>After 9 months of unemployment, yes. (p.6)</p>	<p>All three treatments began with a common set of initial components (orientation, testing, a job-search workshop, and an assessment/counselling interview), this part was mandatory. (p. 4)</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Participants were notified through a notification letter, which was mailed to them after they received their first UI payment, which occurred about the third week after they filed their claims. (p. 4)</p>
<p>Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)</p>	<p>Four programmes are investigated: labour market training, temporary replacement schemes, job introduction projects, and relief work. (p.69)</p>	<p>Subsidized employment (private firms) (i), subsidized employment programmes (public employers) (ii), education(training programmes (iii), other programmes (iiii) (p.6)</p>	<p>All three treatment programs began with a common set of initial components. They were first notified, and then they receive orientation and are then tested. Then they have to</p>

			attend in a job-search workshop, and lastly they have to attend an assessment/counselling interview. Job search assistance (JSA): Claimants where expected to maintain periodic contact with the demonstration office. JSA plus training or relocation: Where also expected to maintain periodic contact with the demonstration office, and where also informed about availability of classroom and on-the-job training. JSA plus a reemployment bonus: Where also expected to maintain periodic contact with the demonstration office, and where further offered an economic bonus if they got reemployed quickly. (p. 4-5)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	NR	No
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Labor market training: the participants receive a taxable training grant equivalent to the UI benefit that the individual would have received as openly unemployed. Replacement schemes: paid according to the collective agreement at the work site. Job introduction projects: during participation the individual receives UI benefits. Relief work: the unemployed are paid according to the collective agreement at the work site. (p. 70-72)	NR	JSA: Normal UI benefits. JSA plus training or relocation: Normal UI benefits plus relocation support if needed. JSA plus a reemployment bonus: Normal UI benefits plus reemployment bonus (The maximum bonus equalled one-half of the claimant's remaining UI entitlement at the time of the assessment interview. This amount was available to the claimant if he or she started working either during the assessment week or in the next two weeks. Thereafter, the potential bonus declined at a rate of 10 per cent of the original amount per

			week until it was no longer available.). (p. 4-6)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Labor market training: about 6 months. Replacement schemes: NR. Job introduction projects: about 6 months. Relief work: 6 months. (p. 70-72)	(i) 6-9 months, (ii) 6-12 months. (p.6)	July 1986 - fall 1987, (p. ix)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	Relief work: 36 hours/week (p. 72)	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	If any of these criteria (there are a list of <u>criteria's</u> that unemployed need to fulfil) are violated the UI fund may initiate a sanction. These can be summarized by three categories: Loss of UI benefits for 2-3 days, loss of UI benefits for 3 weeks, and loss of UI benefits until the unemployed has worked for 300 hours within a 10 week period. Not all non-compliance results in a sanction (p.8)	If individuals refused to participate in the initial mandatory part of the treatment programs, they could be found not to be eligible for UI benefits. (p. 4)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	The unemployment rate was 1,6 % in 1990, and 8,2 % in 1993. (p.67)	NR	During the demonstration period, the New Jersey economy was experiencing the displacement of workers generated by a long-term secular decline in manufacturing, while substantial growth was occurring in other sectors. Overall, the state economy was quite strong, and the

			unemployment rate during the demonstration period was low (5 per cent). The unemployment rate continued to be low (less than 5 per cent) during the follow-up period. (p. 8)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	NR	Administrative data	Administrative registers
Time period covered by the analysis	Individuals in the sample were drawn from the inflow in September 1993, March-April 1994 and August-September 1994. Individuals were observed from the time they registered as looking for a job at the employment office (the earliest registration took place in January 1991) until sampling occurred (December 1994). (p. 74)	January 2003 - November 2005 (p.9)	Began operation in 1986, end of sample selection in 1987. Uses data up until 1993. (P.21 in Corson, footnote 4).
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	NR	Weekly (p. 9-10)	Weekly, (p. 13)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Different programmes are compared to one another, and to no-programme	The treatment group receives the intervention, while the control group receives the normal intervention (p.3) Time-to-event (p. 3)	Control group received services that were then currently available (p. 4) Control group received existing services (p. 14 in Corson).
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	NR	Yes (pp.17-18)	No, the measured effect is not net of lock-in effects - they report effects during and after participation.
Sample-size	2,561 individuals (p. 87)	79,334 men, and 85,628 women (p.12) Number of spells: Men: 109,476, Women: 109,872	8675 UI claimants were offered participation. 2385 UI claimants were control group. (p. ix)

Author	Baumgartner, Caliendo	Behaghel, Crépon, Gurgand	Benmarker, Skans, Vikman
Title	Turning Unemployment into Self-Employment: Effectiveness of Two Start-Up Programmes	Private and Public Provision of Counseling to Job-Seekers: Evidence from a Large Controlled Experiment	Workfare for the Old and Long-term Unemployed
Year	2008	2012	2012

Country	Germany	France	Sweden
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	IZA Discussion paper	IFAU Working paper
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Individuals who were unemployed in third quarter of 2003. Individuals also had to be eligible and apply for either (bridging allowance) BA or (start-up-subsidy) SUS. Results split up between men and women. Unemployed people are entitled to BA conditional on their business plan being approved externally, usually by the regional chamber of commerce. (...) In contrast to the BA, SUS recipients are obligated to contribute to the statutory pension insurance fund, and may claim a reduced rate for statutory health insurance (p. 351)	The target group for private providers are unemployed individuals who are eligible for at least a year of unemployment benefits. The public provider targets both unemployed individuals who are and are not eligible for UI benefits. (p. 6). Eligibility requirements for UI benefits are not specified.	Target group is workers aged 55 or 56 years. Further individuals should not have been unemployed for more than 10 days during the year before registration and should not have participated in some form of subsidized employment during the preceding year. Requirements for UI benefits: Individuals had to have been members of a UI-fund for 12 months, have been employed for six months before becoming unemployed and be registered at the Public Employment Service. (p. 5-6+9)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	NR	NR
Is the programme compulsory?	No, participation in ALMP programmes is not mandatory in Germany. (p. 356)	No, if individuals refuse participation they go back to the usual track. (p. 9)	Programs were mandatory requirement to receive benefits after UI-exhaustion. (p. 4)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	Upon randomization, the job-seeker was told by the employment service agent which track he was offered. (p. 9)	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Bridging Allowance (BA): From 1986 to 2002 the only program providing support to unemployed individuals who wanted to start their own business. Its main goal is to cover basic costs of living and social security contributions during initial stage of self-employment. (p. 350) Start-up subsidy (SUS): The main goal of SUS is to secure the initial phase of self-employment. It focuses on the provision of social security to the newly self-employed person. (p. 351)	Public and Private programmes, that are more intensive than the regular program. Includes weekly contact and monthly face to face meeting instead of the usual program where participants are contacted monthly. (p. 7)	"The contents of the programmes could vary, but the primary focus was on work practice schemes." (p. 7)

Do individuals attend more than one program?	No, individuals only attend one program in analysis.	NR	They exclude workers who participated in some form of subsidized employment during the preceding year (p. 9).
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	BA: Benefit is the same as individual would have gotten by staying unemployed, UB. Further receives a lump sum of approx. 70% of unemployment support is granted. SUS: 1. year lump sum of 600 Euro/month, 2. Year (3. year) 360 Euro/month (240 Euro/month). (p. 351)	NR	Activity Support, same levels as normal UI benefits, (p. 6)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	BA: 6 months. SUS: up to 3 years. (p. 351)	Up to six months, (p. 6-7)	NR
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	No, participation is voluntary and non-participants are entitled to UB.	No	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	Unemployment rate: 2002(7,9%), 2003(8,8%), 2004(8,8%)	At the beginning of the two programs - Unemployment rate 8,4%, (p. 6)	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers + survey data. (p. 356)	Administrative registers + survey data (p. 10)	Administrative registers, (p. 9)
Time period covered by the analysis	Third quarter of 2003 to 2006 (p. 356-357)	Random assignment took place: January 2007 - March 2008, (p. 9) measures employment within 3, 6, 9 and 12 months of randomization.	1996-2001 (p. 9-11).
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Monthly, (p. 364)	Monthly, (p. 10)	Weekly (p. 33)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Eligible unemployed individuals who did not choose to participate in the third quarter of 2003. Control group may participate at a later point. (p. 349+356)	Control group gets standard treatment and does not participate (except in some cases, "less than 3% in the worst case, for the private program). Study also compares effects from private and public programmes. (p. 12)	Control group will not participate. (p. 11) (...) using a control group consisting of a mix of slightly older and slightly younger workers (p. 5).

Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	The study reports cumulative results over time, beginning 1 month after program starts - that might be net of lock-in effect (see p. 365)	Depends on the length on the program - they measure the effect within 3 and 6 months of randomization - so net of lock-in if the program is longer than that.	No net-effect, but they distinguish between current program and lagged program (p. 33)
Sample-size	Participants: BA: 2018 observations SUS: 1082. Control group: 2296. (p. 357)	T: 88650; C: 66442 (p. 9 + table 4, p. 48)	Sample size 25,148 observations; 1996-1997: Control (8717) Treatment (4132), 1998-1999: Control (8107) Treatment (4190). (table 1, p. 12)

Author	Black, Smith, Berger, Noel	Bloom	Caliendo, Künn
Title	Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective Than the Services Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System	Back to Work: Testing Reemployment Services for Displaced Workers	Getting Back into the Labor Market: The Effects of Start-Up Subsidies for unemployed Females
Year	2003	1990	2012
Country	USA	USA	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	The American Economic Review	Book	IZA Discussion paper
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Center for Business and Economic Research (CBER) allocates program slots at each local office, serving those claimants with the highest profiling scores (according to profiling model, where scores range from 1-20). In the marginal score group, where there are enough slots to serve some but not all claimants with a given score, CBER randomly assigns persons to either a treatment group required to participate reemployment services as a condition of continued UI receipt or a control group exempt from this requirement (p. 1315).	Eligibility criteria for the demonstration required that applicants be in one of the following categories: 1. Unemployed with a poor chance of returning to work, as evidenced, for example, by a permanent plant shutdown or long-term layoff unrelated to regular cyclical activity. 2. Recipients of UI benefits or benefit exhausters. 3. Faced with special barriers to reemployment, such as being an older worker or not speaking English (p.10) + table 1.3 p. 11	Target group is female participants of start-up programs. To receive the subsidy in the Bridging Allowance (BA) program, individuals have to be eligible for unemployment benefits and to present an externally approved business plan. Eligibility to the other program, Start-up Subsidy (SUS), was not restricted to unemployed individuals with benefit entitlement but was also open to those with means-tested social assistance. (p. 8-9)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Around two weeks, (p. 1316)	Table 1.3 "UI status"	NR

Is the programme compulsory?	Yes. You have been identified as dislocated worker and selected under the UI Claimant Profiling Program to receive job search assistance services. You are obligated under law to participate. (p. 1315)	No (p. 87)	NR
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	Those claimants selected to receive reemployment services are contacted through the mail to inform them of their rights and responsibilities under the program. (p. 1315)	NR	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Employment services staff assesses the claimants and then refers them to specific services, such as assisted job search, employment counselling, job search workshops, and retraining programs. (p. 1316-1317) So there are more than one type of ALMP	Three major programmes are examined: SER/JOBS and SEE planned job-search assistance followed by occupational skills training for some. TEC/HCC consisted of job-search assistance, and then classroom training or on-the-job training (p.8)	Bridging allowance (BA): subsidised self-employment, restricted to individuals eligible for UI benefits. Start-up subsidy (SUS): subsidised self-employment open to both UI recipients and social assistance recipients. (p. 8-9)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	The average number of services received following orientation was 1.02. Conditional on completing at least one service, the average number of additional services received was 2.10. (p. 1317)	NR	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Normal unemployment benefits level, equal to control group. (p. 1315)	NR	BA: Normal UI benefits + a lump sum payment of 68,5% of benefits paid monthly. SUS: Normal UI benefits or means tested social assistance + a lump sum payment of 600 euros a month during the first year, 360 euros per month during the second year and 240 euros per month during the third year. (p. 8-9)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	2 weeks - unemployed receive a letter in week 3 of their spell, week 4 is for orientation and other services, in week 5 the services end (p. 1316).	TEC/HCC: The job search lasted for 5 days in a row, and the job club recommended participation daily for four weeks, but only once a week was	BA: six months. SUS: up to three years, approved yearly. (p. 8-9)

		required. All in all it was a six week program (p.13) SEE: The job search lasted 5 days, and the job club recommended that the participants took part in it once a week for three week duration. SER/JOBS: The job search lasted for 5 days as well. The job club was on a daily basis (p.9) All of the programmes did also provide either classroom training or on-the-job training (p.15)	
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	TEC/HCC: 6 hours/day. SEE: 4 hours/day. SER/JOBS: 4 hours/day (p.9)	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Yes. Failure to report or participate in reemployment services without justifiable cause may result in denial of your unemployment insurance benefits. (p. 1315)	NR	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	The Kentucky economy was extremely strong from October 1994 to June 1996, the period for which we currently have data. (p. 1315)	During 1980-81, unemployment was about 4 per cent in Houston, but over twice that rate in El Paso. For the next two years, unemployment rose sharply in both cities, peaking at over 12 per cent in El Paso and 9 per cent in Houston. (p.19) In summary, then, it appears that: 1. The El Paso economy was considerably weaker, with higher unemployment and lower wage rates. 2. Displacement in El Paso was more concentrated in specific industries and larger firms. 3. The El Paso labour force was less diverse and had more limited skills, especially with respect to education and English-speaking ability (p.24)	NR

Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers + survey data, (p. 1315+1318)	Data was gathered from the intake application + records - Table 3.2 p. 46	Administrative registers + survey data, (p. 10)
Time period covered by the analysis	October 1993 to June 1996, (p. 1315)	Intake was between May and July of 1984, and the programmes lasted approximately one year (p.5)	Third quarter of 2003 (start-up), 56 months from start-up, (p. 10 + 18)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Quarterly, (p. 1318)	The programme impacts are measured on earnings, employment and UI benefits (p.131) Quarterly (p. 48)	Monthly
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Control group will never participate (p. 1315)	Participation in one of the three programmes was compared to a control group	Control group is allowed to participate at a later point in time. (p. 10)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	NR	Yes (p. 18 + table 5, p. 30)
Sample-size	Treatment group: 1236 Control group: 745 (p. 1316)	2,259 individuals who made up the three treatment groups and control group. Follow-up consisted of 2,192 individuals (p.65)	Women in west Germany: Start-Up subsidy (448) Bridging allowance (231) Non-participants (591). Women in east Germany: Start-Up subsidy (186) Bridging allowance (136) Non-participants (271). (table 2, p. 27)

Author	Caliendo, Künn, Schmidl	Caplan, Price, H. Vinokur, van Ryn	Cockx
Title	Fighting Youth Unemployment: The Effects of Active Labor Market Policies	Job seeking, reemployment, and mental health: A randomized field experiment in coping with job loss.	Vocational Training of Unemployed Workers in Belgium
Year	2011	1989	2003
Country	Germany	USA	Belgium
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion paper	Journal of applied psychology	IZA Discussion Paper
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Unemployed youths in 2002. The study further only looked at youths that were 25 years old or younger. Eligibility requirements for UI benefits are not specified. (p. 10-12) Implemented restrictions: Entries in 2002 only, youth below 25 years only, data cleaning for missing information	Persons who were eligible for unemployment compensation or decided to apply for such compensation or both. Additional criteria were: must not be within 2 years of retirement, must not be expected to be recalled to their previous	All officially registered full-time unemployed workers. Workers should further be younger than 50 years old*. Workers are entitled to unemployment benefits if they have been employed for at least 75 days within a prescribed

	and deaths, individuals participating in different programs of ALMP to those under scrutiny are excluded (table A.1 p. 40)	job, must not show any obvious signs of mental illness and must not report having been unemployed for more than 4 months (p. 761)	period prior to their claim if younger than 18 years, and up to at least 600 days if older than 50 years. (p. 5) Any unemployed worker can apply (p. 4)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	No longer than 4 months (p. 761)	Median duration until training: 3 months for old, 6 months for young (table 1, p. 19)
Is the programme compulsory?	NR	Persons were asked if they were interested in participating (p. 761).	No, (p. 3)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	Respondents were approached while waiting in line and were briefly told about two programs that were being offered by the university of Michigan on how to seek jobs. One program was described as a 2-week series of morning sessions (the experimental condition); and the other was described as a self-guided booklet program(the control condition). Persons were asked if they were interested in participating. Their responses were used to assign them to the conditions listed in table 1. (p. 761)	Through their regional employment agency, FOREM, (p. 3)
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Job Search (JS) and Assessment of Employability: Professional counselling and short term measures to improve employability. Short-Term Training (STT): Full- or part-time training measures, including coaching for the application process, and training specific skills. Immediate Action Program for Lowering Youth Unemployment (JUMP) Wage subsidies (JWS): Wage subsidy to regular employment with minimum 15 hours per week. SGB III wage subsidies (WS): Wage subsidy to regular employment. Job Creation Schemes: Working opportunity in	The experimental condition consisted of eight 3-hour sessions distributed over 2 weeks, four mornings per week. The design for the eight sessions was based on the principles described previously. They included the application of problem-solving and decision-making processes, inoculation against setbacks, receiving social support and positive regard from the trainers, and learning and practicing job-seeking skills. (p. 762)	Vocational training programme. The majority of the programmes consist of developing basic skills required in particular vocations. (p. 4)

	<p>areas of the public interest.</p> <p>Further Training Measures: Long-Term training measures for youths with or without professional degree, providing them with job-specific skills.</p> <p>Preparatory Training (PT): Practical training/internship within a company that should help find and successfully participate in regular vocational training. (table 1, p. 33)</p>		
Do individuals attend more than one program?	They are allowed, but the main analysis only focuses on the first program participation. (p. 10)	No	Can't find anything regarding this - only that unemployed workers who participate in programs by other institutions are assimilated with non-participation (p. 5)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	JS: NR STT: NR JWS: Wage subsidy, with a maximum of 60% (40%) of the full wage for one (two) years. WS: Maximum amount of 50% of the full wage, for a maximum of one year. JCS: NR FT: NR PT: NR. (p. 6-7 + table 1, p. 33)	Not stated directly but the recruitment defined the population as persons who were eligible for unemployment compensation (p. 761)	Regular unemployment benefits, participants also get 1 Euro for each effective training hour and are reimbursed transportation costs. (p. 4)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	JS and STT: "Very short duration". JWS: Maximum duration of 1 or 2 years. WS: Maximum duration of 1 year. JCS: Maximum duration of 12 months, this can be extended if it leads to regular employment. FT: Approximately 1 year, but can be extended. PT: Varying, but limited to 1 year in JUMP. (p. 6-7 + table 1, p. 33)	2 weeks, (p. 762)	Median duration of time spent on training: Old:2 months, young: 2 months (table 1 p. 19)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	On average - eight 3-hour sessions distributed over 2 weeks (p. 762)	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	NR	No, (p. 4)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	Unemployment and long term unemployment youth-adult ratios are reported along with GDP growth rates in figure 2, p. 30	NR	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative data. (p. 10)	Survey data, (p. 761)	Administrative registers. (p. 5)

Time period covered by the analysis	2002-2008, (p. 10)	It took the trainers 5.5 months to deliver the intervention to all the participants. The post-tests were taken 4 weeks (T2) and 4 months (T3) after the intervention. (p. 761) An estimate of the period covered by the analysis will be around 10 months.	May 1989 - March 1993
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Monthly (p. 16)	They measure employment status at two follow-up points.	Monthly, but first 6 months are lumped together (p. 5)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Control group is allowed to participate at a later point in time (after the first 12 months of unemployment). (p. 8-10)	Control group will never participate. (p. 761)	Unemployed workers participating in such programmes are assimilated with non-participants. This contaminates our "control group". (p. 5)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes, cumulative effects are in table 5, p. 37.	No	No. They split their results between "during participation" and "post participation" (p. 20)
Sample-size	Sample size: East Germany (17515) whereof participants (5353), West Germany (33504 whereof participants (7027)). (table A.1, p. 40)	928 in total - 322 in control group, 606 in experimental group (308 participants and 298 dropouts) (Table 1 p. 762)	Sample size: All spells: Old(1048252) Young(313408), Spells with some time in training: Old(23407) Young(5284). (p. 19, table 1)

Author	Crépon, Dejemeppe, Gurgand	Decker, Olsen, Freeman, Klepinger	Dolton, O'Neill
Title	Counselling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?	Assisting Unemployment Insurance Claimants: The Long-term Impacts of the Job Search Assistance Demonstration	The restart effect and the return to full-time stable employment
Year	2005	2000	1996
Country	France	USA	UK
Language	English	English	English
Publication	PSE working paper	Mathematica Policy Research	Journal of the royal statistical society
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Generally target group is unemployed individuals, but some more specific target groups are for some of the ALMPs. Project assessment: is aimed at individuals with a	The eligibility requirements for participation i ALMP where: They had to be UI claimants. Those who had permanent ties to their previous	Participants were individuals who had been unemployed for 6 months, and therefore were eligible for a restart interview. Participants were chosen

	<p>professional experience who have difficulties finding a job corresponding to their skills. Job-search support: is aimed at individuals having a well-defined employment project, but experiencing difficulties in their job search, with the aim of finding rapidly a job. Project support: is aimed at individuals who wish or have to change profession, but need time and help to define a new employment project. (p. 5) Upper age limit 55 years old. (p. 9) Estimation must be limited to individuals with known exit (p. 9)</p>	<p>employer or some other reason not to search for work, claimants who had already been unemployed for a long time, and claimants who had faced severe obstacles to participating in the demonstration where all screened out of participation. (p. 9-10) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not stated.</p>	<p>randomly based upon the last three digits of their national insurance numbers (p. 277)</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Same as mean days to orientation, see "Duration of ALMP".</p>	<p>6 months, (p. 276)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>A first meeting with a caseworker is compulsory, not sure if participation in ALMP is compulsory, as decision of participation is decided by the caseworker and the unemployed together. (p. 4)</p>	<p>The first part of the programs is mandatory; it includes orientation meeting, testing, job search workshop, and individual assessment interview. (p. 10-13)</p>	<p>Attendance at the restart interview was mandatory, (p. 276)</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>The individuals are informed about ALMP at their first compulsory meeting with a caseworker. (p. 4)</p>	<p>Claimants where sent a letter during the fourth week of unemployment telling them to report to a job service orientation session. (p. 10)</p>	<p>By letter, from the restart office, when individual is approaching an unbroken period of 6 months claiming unemployment benefit, (p. 276)</p>
<p>Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)</p>	<p>Skill assessment: there are two types, skill assessment (a provider helps the individual assess his professional skills, based on testing and simulated work environment) and project assessment (A personal adviser helps the individual analyse her past experience, identify her skills and match them with a new employment project). Job-search support: Personal advisor, who helps define the course of actions, teaches on job-search methods, provides logistic support, proposes job offers or interviews, and contacts directly employers and so on. Project support: Similar to project</p>	<p>Structured Job Search Assistance (SJSA): Begins with an orientation meeting at about week 7 after initial UI benefit claim, then the participants are tested in week 7, they participate in a job search workshop in week 8, participate in an individual assessment meeting in week 8 or 9 and lastly have to make at least two follow up contacts in week 9 to 19. Individualized Job Search Assistance (IJS): Participants attend an orientation meeting in week 7 after the initial UI benefits claim, and then they</p>	<p>Six-monthly meetings between the unemployed individual and a counsellor. During this interview the counsellor assessed the claimant's recent unemployment history and offered advice on benefits, search behaviour, training courses and in some instances initiated direct contact with employers, (p. 276)</p>

	assessment, but with important differences, regular and lasting follow-up, in some cases a placement in the workplace is scheduled. (p. 5)	had to participate in an individual assessment interview in week 7 or 8. The participants further had to attend the mandatory testing, job search workshop and possible additional assessment/counselling interviews. Participants could also receive further services, such as placement assistance. IJSA+: This treatment was identical to IJSA, but included a special effort to enrol interested claimants in training. (p. 10-13)	
Do individuals attend more than one program?	Yes. (p. 13)	No	No, (p. 276)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	NR	Normal UI benefits, the same as control group.	Normal unemployment benefits, (p. 276)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Skill assessment: Typically lasts 1 day. Project assessment: 20 hours on average over a maximum period of 42 days. Job-search support: Up to 3 months. Project support: 3 months. (p. 5)	SJSA Mean in days: District of Columbia: 46 to orientation, 9 from orientation to testing, 2 from testing to workshop, 5 from workshop to assessment. Florida: 49 to orientation, 3 from orientation to testing, 5 from testing to workshop, 8 from workshop to assessment. New Jersey Demonstration: 35 to orientation, 3 from orientation to testing, 8 from testing to workshop, 4 from workshop to assessment. (table III.3, p. 53) ISJA Mean in days: District of Columbia: 46 to orientation, 2 from orientation to assessment. Florida: 49 to orientation, 3 from orientation to assessment. IJSA+ Mean in days: District of Columbia: 46 to orientation, 4 from orientation to assessment. Florida: 49 to orientation, 3	1 day every 6 months of unemployment. (p. 276)

		from orientation to assessment. (table III.4, p. 55) It was further possible to attend training programs, but a mean time for this is not applicable.	
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	If individuals refuse to participate in the mandatory part of the programs, they could be suspended from receiving UI, (p. 10-13)	Loss of unemployment benefits, (p. 276)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	District of Columbia - unemployment rate 1994: 8.2 % (Washington, primary MSA: 4.0). (Table II.1 p. 22) Florida - unemployment rate 1994:6.6 % (state-wide - see table for counties) (Table II.2 p. 24-25).	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers (p. 3)	Administrative registers + survey data, (p. 14-16)	Survey data (p. 277)
Time period covered by the analysis	July 2001 - June 2004 (p. 9)	District of Columbia: Claimant selection occurred between June 1995 and June 1996 (p. XVII), + 10 quarters (table VII.3, p. 144). Florida: Claimant selection occurred between March 1995 and March 1996 (p. XVII), + 12 quarters (table VII.3, p. 144).	16 months, (p. 284, table 2)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Daily (p. 9)	Earnings and employment outcome: quarterly (p.137-)	Monthly (p. 284)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	There is no direct control group as "timing of events" method is applied (p. 11-13)	Control group does not participate Control group received regular services (p. 10)	Individuals in control group were not asked to attend the initial restart interview. Uncertain about possible participation at a later point, (p. 277)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	The casual effect of treatment is defined as a shift in the hazard of the transition toward employment, once treatment has started.	No, the measured effect is not net of lock-in effects - they report effects during and after participation, but net of lock-in.	No

Sample-size	Sample size: 390945 spells, participants: 56784 spells. (p. 28)	District of Columbia: Control=2006, SJSA=2024, IJSA=2018, IJSA+=2009. Florida: Control=2997, SJSA=3009, IJSA=2993, IJSA+=2961. OBS! Sample size lower for 10th quarter for D.C. and 12th quarter for Florida (see table for sample sizes). (Table VII.3 and Table VII.4 p. 144-145)	4552 respondents (286 in control group) (p. 278)
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Author	Eden, Aviram	Firth, Payne (Clive and Joan)	Fitzenberger, Völter
Title	Self-Efficacy Training to Speed Reemployment: Helping People to Help Themselves	Efficacy of programmes for the unemployed: discrete time modelling of duration data from a matched comparison study	Long-run effects of training programs for the unemployed in East Germany
Year	1993	1999	2007
Country	Israel	UK	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of applied psychology	Journal of the royal statistical society	ZEW Discussion Paper
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Unemployed vocational workers, this category of workers includes workers with postsecondary training and workers who have passed qualifying examinations under ministry auspices. Workers officially certified as unemployed are eligible for unemployment benefits, but must present themselves in person at the employment office at least once a week (p. 354)	Long-term unemployed. Claiming 6 months of benefits or more (p. 112-113)	Unemployed between 25-55 years of age (25-50 for RT). The effects are measured separately for males and females. RT: targeted to individuals who already completed a first vocational training and face severe difficulties in finding a new employment within their profession. It might however also be offered to individuals without a first formal training degree if they fulfil additional eligibility criteria. Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST) and Practice Firm (PF): (p. 4-5) To qualify for income maintenance, they must

			have been employed for at least one year or they must be entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment assistance (p. 6)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Median time of unemployment at the beginning of study is 8 weeks. Would expect they had received UB during those weeks (p. 354) The length of unemployment among these 66 at the beginning of the study ranged from 2 to 18 weeks; the median was 8 weeks (p.354).	6 months or more (p. 112)	Not sure if participants receive UI as soon as they are unemployed, but for the PF the median female has been unemployed for 10 months, male for 5 months. Median SPST female has been unemployed for 11 months, male 7,5 months. Median RT female has been unemployed for 8 months, male 6 months. (p. 8-9)
Is the programme compulsory?	No, participation is voluntary (p.354).	NR	NR
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	Letters of invitation to a reemployment workshop were placed in the waiting room of an urban employment office for one workweek in the spring of 1988. The letter described the workshop and invited interested persons to register with any placement officer. (p. 354)	NR	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Training sessions: Video clips showing models successfully performing job-search behaviours, were screened. This was followed by a brief discussion of the behaviour modelled and by role-playing in small groups in which each participant rehearsed the modelled behaviour and got feedback from the others. The vital importance of successfully enacting each behaviour in the workshop as a prerequisite to its successful enactment in an actual job search was accentuated. The encouragement of the trainer and of peers provided verbal persuasion. Each session was concluded with a summary of what had been learned that day. (p. 354)	Employment Training (ET): training and job placements, with over half of participants receiving a formal qualification. Employment Action (EA): Emphasis on work experience rather than training. (p. 112-113)	Practice Firms (PF): Simulated firms, where participants practice every day working activities. They mainly train general skills while provision of new professional skills is of less importance. Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST): intends to improve the starting position for finding a new job by providing additional skills and specific professional knowledge in medium-term courses. It involves refreshing specific skills, e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. Retraining (RT): Consists of the

			provision of a new and comprehensive vocational training according to the regulation of the German apprenticeship system. (p. 4-5)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	NR	Yes, individuals are allowed to be included in sample more than once, if it has more than one transition from employment to unemployment during inflow period. (p. 8)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Regular unemployment benefits. (p. 354)	Unemployment benefits	They receive income maintenance, which is equal to UB. It amounts to 67% of previous net earnings for participants with at least one dependent child and 60% otherwise. Unemployed whose UB expired receive the lower means tested unemployment assistance. (p. 6)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	8 sessions in 2½ weeks. (p.355)	ET: on average they received about 6 months' job training and work experience. EA: NR	PF: The programs usually last for six months and do not provide official certificates. (The duration of PF and SPST depends on individual predispositions and adequate courses provided by the training suppliers) The average training time is: PF: female (6,5 months), male(6,1 months). SPST: female (9,1 months), male(8,8 months). RT: is supported for a period up to 2 years. The average time in training for RT: female(18,7 months), male(17,3 months) (p. 4+9)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	No, participation is voluntary, and participants have to sign up for it themselves (p. 354).	NR	NR

Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	NR	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Survey data (p. 354-355)	Interviews + survey data (p. 112-113)	Administrative registers. (p. 6-7)
Time period covered by the analysis	1988	1993-1995 - with retrospective data back to 1980 (p. 113)	1993-2002 (p. 8)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	NR	Monthly (p. 115)	Quarterly, (p. 7)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Control group not participating, but told they would participate at later stage (p. 354)	Non experimental matching estimation is used.	Counterfactual situation is non-participants, and they will not participate during this analysis, but may participate later.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	No	Yes, (p. 15) They estimate the cumulated effect from Q0 since beginning of treatment and then to Q7, Q15 and Q23, so there is a net-lock-in effect.
Sample-size	88 registered from the beginning - 43 randomly assigned to experimental group and 45 to control group (p. 354)	Treatment sample: 941 Comparison sample: 979. (p. 113)	Sample size: 6135(1550) women and 5911(835) men (Participants in parenthesis)

Author	Frölich, Lechner	Gerfin, Lechner, Steiger	Gorter, Kalb
Title	Combining Matching and Nonparametric IV Estimation: Theory and an Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies	Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? An Econometric analysis of two different schemes	Estimating the Effect of counseling and monitoring the unemployed using a job search model.
Year	2010	2002	1996
Country	Switzerland	Switzerland	Netherlands
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Universität St. Gallen	Universität St. Gallen	The Journal of Human Resources

<p>Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)</p>	<p>The sample is limited to a comparison of local labour markets (which have the same ALMP-structure). Further, several sample selection criteria are applied to restrict the population to individuals who are eligible to take part in ALMP, and for whom no restrictions to their mobility are known or probable. In particular, disabled persons are excluded, as well as foreigners with a working permit of less than a year since there are legal restrictions to their mobility. In addition, persons with low earnings are excluded, because monetary costs of commuting might be an obstacle to taking advantage of job opportunities that are not nearby. We restrict the sample to the prime age group (25-55), and excluded students, apprentices and home workers, and persons registered as part-time employees (p. 21)</p>	<p>The entitlement is conditional on a previous contribution to the unemployed insurance for at least six months within the past two years. After the two years entitlement period expires, receiving a new entitlement period is conditional on being employed for at least 12 months within three years after the end of the previous unemployment spell. (p.4) The authors chose individuals who had an unemployment spell of less than 12 months, and who were between 25 and 55 years (p.14)</p>	<p>Unemployed persons, who are entitled to receive unemployment benefits, (p. 591) To be included in the sample, unemployed persons should satisfy the following two conditions: they must be younger than 57.5 years and willing to obtain (apply for) a permanent position if they were previously employed via a temporary employment agency. People who already know that they will definitely be starting in a new job soon (within a period of three weeks) are also excluded from the sample (p. 596)</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>The first 30 weeks are unconditional on programme participation. Unemployment duration before programme is measured in table 1, p. 15. Mean ~ 220 days.</p>	<p>Less than 60 days, (p. 596) Sample mean of the number of days unemployed before the moment of the first contact is 9.6 days (p. 597)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>After the first 30 weeks, yes (p.3)</p>	<p>(...) and cannot leave the experiment unless they find a job (so attrition from the experiment plays no role whatsoever) (p. 592).</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>They are not informed, but are chosen at random (p. 591-592)</p>
<p>Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Training, employment programmes, and subsidised temporary jobs (p.4)</p>	<p>The difference is, however, to spend more time with each unemployed person in the treatment group than is common in the "traditional" approach. (p. 591) "Counseling and monitoring" is an intensive job search assistance program for the unemployed that should help</p>

			them to find a job as quickly as possible. By spending more time, applications can be more thoroughly discussed and, if necessary, advice can be given concerning the direction of search that seems most promising (p. 591).
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	Focus on the first programme (p. 14)	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	NR	The benefit level in the two periods is the same (before 30 weeks and after 30 weeks of entitlement). (p. 3)	Normal unemployment benefits, (p. 593)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	NR	Employment programmes typically last six months. (p.5) Mean duration of TEMP is roughly 4 months, but there is considerable variation. (p. 6)	Duration from the moment of intake (in days): 69.5 (table 1, p. 598)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	NR	Participants are unaware of participation in program, but one part of the program is spending more time checking the information provided by the participants, and therefore the chance of being discovered when cheating, and accordingly penalized, is greater for participants than non-participants. (p. 591)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	Switzerland was in a recession in the early 1990s. During the recession the unemployment rate rose to 5%. (p.14) Table 2 p. 24 shows industry unemployment rate in per cent.	NR	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative data	Administrative data	Administrative registers + They obtain data by interviewing participants (p. 596)
Time period covered by the analysis	Intake was January 1, 1998. Estimates are based on data from 1998 and 1999 (p.21)	January 1996 - December 1999 (p.12)	1989-

Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	3 and 4 months	Monthly	28 day periods(four weeks), (p. 595)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Participation compared to non-participation	The different programmes are compared to one another, and to a state of nonparticipation in the particular programme.	Control group has to fulfil the same criteria as the treatment group and receive regular services. Will never be included. (p. 596-597)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	NR	Yes, they measure the effect 3, 9, 15 and 21 months after beginning of programme.	No
Sample-size	32,634 (p.21)	18,354 observations/persons (p.14)	722, (p. 597)

Author	Graversen, van Ours	Hujer, Thomsen	Hujer, Thomsen, Zeiss
Title	How to Help Unemployed Find Jobs Quickly: Experimental Evidence from a Mandatory Activation Program	How do the employment effects of job creation schemes differ with respect to the foregoing unemployment duration?	The effects of vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany
Year	2006	2009	2006
Country	Denmark	Germany	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	Labour Economics	Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	To receive benefits, individuals have to have been members of an UI fund for at least 1 year, and they must have been employed for at least 52 weeks within the last three years (p.4-5)	Persons between 25 and 55 years with an employment spell below 2 years and above 1 year, or at least six of the last 12 months. Participants also have to fulfil the eligibility criteria to receive unemployment benefits or assistance. Further estimated effects were estimated separately for women and men and were also split up in east and west Germany (p. 39-40)	Vocational training programmes for individuals without completed professional training can also be offered to individuals with completed professional training but with no work experience in their profession for more than six years. The 'former duration of employment' rule is accomplished if the individuals has contributed at least twelve months of the last three years to the unemployment insurance and fulfils the eligibility rules for unemployment benefits (p.302-303). The authors restrict

			their sample to contain only 20-50 year olds (p.308)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	The treatment group was supposed to participate in a job search program after 5-6 weeks of unemployment, so the unemployed received benefits for 5-6 weeks before beginning the treatment. (p.6)	NR	NR
Is the programme compulsory?	Individuals in the treatment group are confronted with mandatory programmes. (p.3). Further on, individuals below 30 years, and above 60 years have to be activated in an ALMP within 6 months of unemployment (P.5)	No (p. 41)	NR
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	The treatment group were informed by mail within 1,5 weeks of unemployment stating that they were due to take part in a program (p.6)	The caseworker decides to offer a specific occupation in a job creation schemes (JCS) (...). The caseworker chooses the job in consultation with the unemployed person and according to the individual's qualification and interests (p. 39-40).	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Treatment group: job search programs, intensive counselling, and mandatory training programs (short work experience, employment subsidy & training and education). Control group: individuals in the control group typically would have to participate in an activation program after one year of unemployment (p. 6)	JCS: Subsidised work (p. 39)	Vocational training programmes (p.301)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	The individuals in the treatment group could participate in numerous programs (p.6)	No, individuals only attend one program in analysis, unclear afterwards. (p. 40) (...) The effect of a first participation in JCS in the (current) unemployment spell of the individual on employment (p. 40).	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	NR	30-75% of salary during JCS is wage subsidies or loans to the implementing institutions, i.e. service providers or employers. Unclear, but probable that	NR

		received wages are higher than UB and UA. (p. 39)	
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Job-search program typically lasts 2 weeks. Short work experience programs can last up to 4 weeks. (p.8)	The ordinary duration of JCS is 12 months, but exceptions can be made to lengthen the duration (up to 24 months if programmes are of enforced priority or even 36 months if followed by permanent employment). (p. 39)	NR
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	Yes (p. 42)*	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	The unemployment rate was 4,8 % in 2005. (p.4)	NR	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative data (p.6-7)	Administrative registers. (p. 40)	Numerous administrative sources are used (p.308) Administrative sources of the FEA (Federal Employment Administration)
Time period covered by the analysis	Intake is from November 1 2005 - February 28 2006 (p.5). However, the authors follow the unemployed until September 2006 (p.7)	July 2000 to November 2003(p. 49-50)**	4th quarter of 1999 - December 2002 (p.301)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Weekly (p. 7)	Monthly	Monthly
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Treatment is compared to a control group who receives the normal services provided by the Public Employment Service. (p.5) Randomized with respect to birthday!	Control group does not participate. (p. 40)	The timing-of-events model is used (p.301)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	No. lock-in effects are identified, but not net of lock in (p. 45-46)	Yes (315-316). They use time-varying treatment model with different thresholds.
Sample-size	4520 individuals (p.33)	West: T: 5331, C: 593247; East: T: 13410, C: 367789 (Table 2)	13,644 observations (p.308)

Author	Hujer, Zeiss	Hägglund	Jespersen, Much, Skipper
Title	The Effects of Job Creation Schemes on the Unemployment Duration in Eastern Germany	Job-search assistance using the internet: experiences from a Swedish randomised experiment	Costs and benefits of Danish active labour market programmes
Year	2007	2006	2008
Country	Germany	Sweden	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	ZAF	International Journal of Manpower	Labour Economics
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	<p>Unemployed individuals who are eligible and between 25 and 55 years of age (exceptions can be made for under 25 year olds), domestic, not disabled and not affected by health restrains.</p> <p>Generally granted to those who have been unemployed for more than 1 year or at least 6 of the last 12 months prior to programme start.</p> <p>They also have to fulfil the eligibility criteria required for receiving UI or unemployment assistance (UA). A job in a job creation schemes (JCS) is further only offered if the individual cannot be integrated into regular employment</p>	<p>Anyone currently registered as a job seeker was welcome to apply for participation (p.435). The only prerequisite as a participant, besides being registered at the employment office, was to have access to a computer with email and Internet facilities away from the local employment office (p.436)</p>	<p>Individuals who join a UI-fund have to be employed for a certain time period before they earn the right to receive unemployment benefits (p.862) The sample is restricted to UI-fund members between 18-50 years of age, who become unemployed during the first week of 1995 (p.867)</p>

	and does not fulfil the conditions for other ALMP programmes (p. 385)		
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	NR	After 1 year of open unemployment the unemployed were obliged to participate in an ALMP. (p.863)
Is the programme compulsory?	Yes, once assigned by a caseworker, the programme is compulsory for the individual. (p. 385)	No - Although recommended to visit the programme every day, they [the unemployed] had the opportunity to quit at any time without risking reduced UI compensation (p.436)	By January 2001 the unemployed were in principle obliged to participate after one year of unemployment. After the reform in 2002, every unemployed were obliged to participate in an ALMP after each six consecutive months of unemployment. (p.863)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	The individuals are informed of JCS through their caseworker. (p. 385)	NR	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Job Creation Schemes (JCS) provide jobs for unemployed persons facing barriers to employment and aim at stabilising the economic situation of participants and qualify them for later (re-)integration into regular (non-subsidised) employment. (p. 384)	Job-search club activities on the internet (p.435)	Private job training, public job training, classroom training, and residual programmes (p.863)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	NR	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Wage subsidies, in general 30 to 75 % of the worker's salary, exceptions can be made in the direction of a higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%)* (p. 385)	NR	The wage rate of participants in private job training equals the negotiated salary among the regularly employed. In contrast, the participants in public job training are employed in a public institution where a maximum hourly wage rate applies, and the monthly earnings equal the unemployment insurance payments. Participants in classroom training receive a compensation equivalent to that of their UI benefits. Residual programmes are very heterogeneous (p. 864)

Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Normally 12 months, but can be extended for up to 24 and even 36 months, if participation will be followed by a permanent job. (p. 385)	Up to three months (p.437)	Private job training: 22 weeks, public job training: 39 weeks, classroom training 28 weeks, (pp.863-864)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	Approximately one hour's activity each day for three months (p.436) That is what the theoretical elements correspond to.	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Yes, rejection is sanctioned by stopping benefits for up to twelve weeks. In repeated cases, the unemployed individual may lose his/her unemployment benefit entitlement permanently. (p. 385)	No - Although recommended to visit the programme every day, they [the unemployed] had the opportunity to quit at any time without risking reduced UI compensation (p.436)	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	NR	Unemployment rates: 12, 4 % in 1993 and 4,5 % in 2006. A considerable part of this reduction is due to the strong economic expansion throughout the last part of the 1990s. (p.862)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers (p. 388)	Register data (p.441)	Register-based data (p.866)
Time period covered by the analysis	2000-2003 (section 4, p. 387-)	15 May/5 June - 1 December 2002 (p.437)	1995-2005 (p.867)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Monthly (section 4, p. 387-)	Monthly	Employment status: weekly -> Construct the quarterly employment rate (p. 867), Earnings: annual labour earnings (p. 867)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Using timing of events	The treatment group were given the job-search club in addition to their regular services, whereas the other group was directed to the regular services at the unemployment office (p.436)	In the group of non-participants we include all unemployed as of the first week of 1995 that did not terminate their defining unemployment spell with ALMP participation. That is, we allow for cross-overs in the sense that they possibly participate in programmes following later spells of unemployment (p.867)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes (p. 392-395)	NR	Yes - they separate the estimates over time (se fig. 2)

Sample-size	Participants: 628; non-participants 16,847	636 participants (p.437) There were however some no-shows	Private job training: 501, public job training: 1206, classroom training: 1241, residual programmes: 743, and non-participants: 12,327 (p.871)
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Author	Johnson, Klepinger	Kvasnicka	Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller
Title	Evaluation of the Impacts of the Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment	Does Temporary Help Work Provide a Stepping Stone to Regular Employment?	The Impact of Active Labour Market Programmes on the Duration of Unemployment in Switzerland
Year	1991	2008	2008
Country	USA	Germany	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	Working paper	The Economic Journal
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Unemployed individuals receiving UI benefits. Target group was all unemployed individuals who were eligible new UI claimants during the period July 1986 to August 1987, (p. 15) To be eligible for UI benefits, claimants had to submit forms bi-weekly. (exhibit 1, p. 6)	Target group is individuals between the ages of 18-55, who enter unemployment in the period 1994-1996. (p. 10) Eligibility requirements for benefits NR. Temporary Help Service (THS) workers are covered by the public pension and unemployment insurance system and must have health insurance (p. 3). Finally, formal requirements for participation are absent. General "profitable employability", a function of both individual characteristics of the	NR

		unemployed job-seeker and general labour market conditions encountered, is alone decisive for temporary help agencies in the recruitment process (p. 9).	
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	About 4 weeks, (exhibit 1, p. 6)	NR	Around 4 months - see table 1 p. 238
Is the programme compulsory?	NR	Unemployed workers decide on whether or not to seek employment in THS work based on factors that determine job search behaviour in general (...) (p. 9).	After seven months, yes.
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Intensive Services: Integrates work-search-technique assistance early in the unemployment spell with the employability development focus of the New York Search Policy treatment. Individuals who were still unemployed after four weeks were directed to attend a two-day job search workshop. The workshop included training on skills assessment, interview and marketing techniques, telephone canvassing, completing applications, and preparing resumes. Approximately 10 hours of follow-up phone room activity was also provided for claimants to contact prospective employers to set up job interviews. Individuals who were still unemployed after 12 weeks were instructed to come in for a group ERI and an individual follow-up session that emphasized employability development planning. (p. 4-5)	Temporary Help Service (THS): Temporary help work. (p. 2)	Basic training, advanced training, employment programmes, and subsidised jobs (pp.237-238)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	Probably not as Enrolment period is from July 1986 - August 1987, but not specified	Individuals may participate in THS more than one time, but only the first time in the period 1994-1996 is included in analysis. (p. 10)	NR

Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Normal UI benefits(147 \$, (table 1, p. 16)), same as non-participation	Wage. (p. 3-4)	NR
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Two-day job search workshop + 10 hours of follow-up on room activity to contact prospective employers to set up job interviews. (p. 5)	NR	Basic training: Usually 3 weeks. Advanced training: Slightly less than two months. Employment programmes: about five months. (p.238) Mean of ALMP duration in table 1 p. 238.
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	2 days + 10 hours in a month (p. 5)	NR	Training courses typically require weekly hour's equivalent to a part-time job, whereas the time-intensity of employment programmes are equivalent to a full-time job. Subsidised jobs can be either full-time or part-time. (p. 238-239)
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	No	A job seeker is not allowed to refuse participation once he or she is assigned to participate in an ALMP. Refusal to participate results in withholding of benefit payments for a period of 1 to 30 days (p.237)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	The unemployment rate for the area was similar to the state average of 8,6% in 1985 and followed the overall state pattern of steady decline throughout the evaluation period. (p. 10)	Local unemployment rate: 11.7 (Table 1 p. 37)	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers + survey data, (p. 11)	Administrative registers. (p. 7-8)	Administrative data
Time period covered by the analysis	July 1986 - August 1987+ 8 quarters (p. 11+13)	1994-2001 (p. 10)	December 1997 - May 1999 (p.239)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Analysis in table 4, p. 35 is with two-week periods (see p. 34). Analysis with earnings and hours is quarterly and yearly (p. 44)	Monthly (p. 17)	Monthly
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Treatment group B is used as control group (standard work search - see p. 4)	Controls are allowed to participate at a later time, but treated individuals are not allowed to become controls at later time. (p. 14)	The control group will participate at a later stage of their unemployment spell (p.249)

Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	The analysis in table 4, p. 35 is net of lock-in effects as they afterwards try to split these effects (see p. 34-35)	Yes, they measure the average treatment effect over four years from entry into THS (p. 29)	Yes
Sample-size	Treatment group = 2553, Control group = 2871, (table 1, p. 16)	106,383 workers (p. 37, table 1)	7,088 observations (p.238)

Author	Osikominu	Pedersen, Rosholm, Svarer	Prey
Title	Quick Job Entry or Long-Term Human Capital Development? The Dynamic Effects of Alternative Training Schemes	Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Early Meetings and Activation	Evaluation of Training Programs in St. Gallen, Switzerland
Year	2012	2012	2000
Country	Germany	Denmark	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	CESifo Working paper	IZA Discussion paper	Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Individuals who experience a transition from regular unsubsidized employment to unemployment, lasting 3 months or longer in the period July 1999 to December 2001. Individuals further have to be between the ages of 25-53. (p. 19) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not specified.	Individuals becoming unemployed during the period weeks 8-29 in 2008 and who are eligible for UI benefits. Estimation is done separately for men and women. (p. 12)	The following groups of persons have been selected: Those who have never participated in any labour market program between 1/96 and 9/98, and those who have participated in one, and only one, of the evaluated courses with a duration of at least 5 days between 1/98 and 4/98 (p.422)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	Individuals in the treatment group receive a letter during the first week (p. 12)	NR
Is the programme compulsory?	Yes, (p. 16) (...) the fact that in case of noncompliance their generous benefits would be at risk. However, a program assignment is compulsory for the job-seeker and	Yes participation is compulsory, (p. 12)	NR

	noncompliance may entail benefit sanctions and the exclusion from further services. (p. 16).		
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	The individuals randomized into the treatment group receive a letter during their first week of unemployment, explaining the treatment they will be exposed to. (p. 12)	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	The analysis focuses on two kinds of training, long term and short term. Long term training consists of: advanced vocational training and refresher courses on specific professional skills and operational techniques to comprehensive retraining in a new vocational degree. Short term training consists of: job application training, basic computer courses, language courses and short-term internships at a simulate or real workplace. (p. 18)	4 different kinds: A (Group meetings each week) B (Individual meeting w. caseworkers every other week) C (Early activation, after 13 weeks) D (Groups meeting each week + early activation) (Table 1, p. 12)	Three different training courses are investigated: general basic training, language courses in German, and computer courses (p.421)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	8% (2%) of the treated with short-term training (long-term training) participate more than once in the same program. (p. 19)	No	In Switzerland, yes, but in this study only those who either never had participated in a program or those who only participated in one program were chosen (p.422)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Normal UI benefits (90% of the persons in the sample have substantial entitlements to unemployment benefits). (p. 16)	Normal UI benefits, the same as control group. (p. 12)	NR
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Long term training: Advanced vocational training and refresher courses (6-12 months) retraining (2-3 years). Short term training: a couple of days to 12 weeks. (p. 18)	A (13 weeks of weekly meetings) B (13 weeks of meetings every other week) C (Participation in an ALMP for 13 weeks starting from the 14th week of unemployment) D (13 weeks of weekly meetings, then 13 more weeks participation in an ALMP), (p. 12-13)	The general basic training usually last 10 or 11 days. The German language course typically last 10-12 weeks. The computer course last from 10-110 days (p.421)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	A (NR) B (NR) C (25 at least 25 hours a week) D (NR for first 13 weeks, at least	NR

		25 hours a week for remaining 13 weeks). (p. 12-13)	
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Yes the noncompliers benefits might be suspended. (p. 16)	Yes, but not specified what sanctions are.	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	NR	In Switzerland, unemployment was not a major problem until 1992. Unemployment rates were negligible, at 1.08 % in 1991, but then rose to 5.21 % in 1997 - a threatening increase within only five years (p.417)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers, (p. 18)	Administrative registers. (p. 15)	Administrative data (p.421)
Time period covered by the analysis	July 1999 - December 2004, (p. 19)	Week 8 2008 and 132 weeks from then on (p. 16)	January - September 1998 (p.418)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Daily (p. 19)	Weekly (p. 20)	Monthly
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	They use a dummy equal to one if participation in short-term training has started (p. 16)	Control group will not participate during specified period.	Those who participate in the treatment group are matched to the control group who do not participate in an ALMP during 1/96 and 9/98
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	They use a dummy equal to one if participation in short-term training has started (p. 16)	They measure the effect 1-16 weeks after entry to unemployment and 16+ weeks after - that is not a net-lock in effect and even not a lock-in as the second program begins after 13 weeks.	They only measure the effect after the program has ended - see table 2.
Sample-size	Sample size: 45459. 8279 (5580) lead to participation in short-term training (long-term training). (p. 20 + figure 1, p. 13)	Participants: A (304+261) B (376+343) C (393+454) D (247+266) Controls: A (303+310) B (455+371) C (405+428) D (247+248). (Read: (Men+Women) (Table 2, p. 16)	920 individuals (p.428)

Author	Richardson, Berg	Rodríguez-Planas, Jacob	Roland Munch, Skipper
Title	The effect of vocational employment training on the individual transition rate from unemployment to work	Evaluating active labour market programs in Romania	Program Participation, Labor Force Dynamics, and Accepted Wage Rates
Year	2001	2007	2008
Country	Sweden	Romania	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Swedish Economic Policy Review	Unpublished	Advances in Econometrics
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	The program is targeted at unemployed as well as employed individuals running the risk of becoming unemployed. The individuals must be registered at the local job centre and must be actively searching for a job. (p.181) We [the authors] restrict the attention to individuals who were at least 25 and below 55 when entering unemployment (p.196) Concerning UI, it should be mentioned that entitlement also requires registration at the employment office (p. 182)	Participants had to be registered at the local employment office, be aged eighteen or over, have an income less than half of the indexed national minimum wage and be in one of the following two covered groups: 1) employees having worked for at least 6 months for the last 12 months or 2) be a recent graduate from school or university unable to find suitable employment (section III)	Target group is UI recipients between 19 and 66 years of age in the period 1995-2000. Individuals having participated in any program prior to 1995 are excluded. Further only the first program participation for an individual in the period 1995-2000 i used (p. 207) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not stated.
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Realized time in table 1 is 158 days for all spells, 153 days for No AMU and 210 days for with AMU (p. 198)	NR	NR
Is the programme compulsory?	After 100 days, yes for young people less than 25 years of age. (p.183)	No	Yes participation is compulsory, after initial period of unconditional benefits has expired; in 1999 this period was 1 year. (p. 203)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	Usually the employment offices advertise the availability of Employment training program (AMU) courses at the office and in the newspapers. Most of them advertise one or two	NR	NR

	months before the scheduled starting date and they invite those interested to an information meeting. At this meeting, the individuals are informed about the contents of the course and the eligibility rules. The personal caseworkers are usually also available at the meeting. Those who are interested can then apply to the course (p.184)		
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Employment training program, AMU which can be vocational and non-vocational (p.182)	4 types: Training and Retraining(TR), Self-employment assistance(SE), Public employment(PE) and Public employment and relocation services(ER), (Section I)	Private OJT: private sector on-the-job training. Public OJT: Public sector on-the-job training. Ordinary CT: Classroom training, most often vocational. Residual programs: a mixture of training and educational programs directed towards a weaker group of workers. (p. 200-201)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	27 per cent of the 656 spells observed to include AMU participation are also observed to include participation in another type of active labour market program before participating in the AMU program (p. 197).	Participants were excluded from participating in further programs for 24 months after participation in first program.	They are allowed to, but only the first attendance is included, the rest are censored. (p. 207)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	During the training, the participants' income is called a training grant. Those entitled to UI receive a grant equal to their UI benefits level, with a minimum of SEK 240 per day. The other participants receive a grant of SEK 143 per day. (p.183)	Clients could not receive income support payments if they were receiving other types of state financed income support, such as unemployment benefits, when participating in TR or PE. See table 1.	Private OJT: up to 25% higher earnings than UI. Public OJT: up to 25% higher earnings than UI. Ordinary CT: UI benefits. Residual programs: NR. (p. 203-204)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Table 1 tells average time spent in AMU=124 days (SD=120) (p. 198)	TR nine months, SE twelve months on initial contract, PE six months, ER nine months.	Average durations in weeks: Private OJT (22), Public OJT (39), Ordinary CT (28) and Residual programs (56). (table 2, p. 205)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR

Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	The unemployed young people under 25 years of age lose their benefits if they do not participate in ALMPs after 100 days (p.183)	NR	If individuals refuse to participate in ALMP after initial unconditional benefits period, they will not receive any further benefits. (p. 203)
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	Employment rate has risen rapidly from approx. 6% in 1996 to 11,5% in 1999. Since then it has fallen gradually to 9% in 2001. (section II)	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative data (p. 194)	Survey data	Administrative registers. (p. 206-207)
Time period covered by the analysis	January 1, 1993 - June 22, 2000 (p.178)	1998-2002 (section IV)	1995-2000 (p. 207)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Daily (Table 1)	Monthly	Weekly (tables in appendix, p. 232-)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	The authors use the timing of events approach to identify what factors determine if an individual find a job or not (p.178)	For each treatment group member, we selected potential comparison group members based on their propensity scores and their judet. The selection process was done with replacement, so that a potential comparison group member could have been matched to more than one treatment group member.	Control group will participate, as timing of events method is used. (p. 209)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes (p. 207)	No	No
Sample-size	5010 individuals (p.197)	3127 Participants: 1626 Non-participants: 1501. (section IV) SE: 362, ER: 747 (Table 4)	Sample-size: 102411 (p. 207) Program specific sample-size in table 5 (p. 219)

Author	Rosholm, Skipper	Rosholm, Svarer	Røed, Raam
Title	Is Labour Market Training a Curse for the Unemployed? Evidence from a Social Experiment	Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labour Market Programmes	Do labour market programmes speed up the return to work?
Year	2009	2004	2006

Country	Denmark	Denmark	Norway
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of Applied Econometrics	University of Aarhus	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Participants had to be unemployed on the day they applied for training and people stating that they were promised jobs conditional on participation in an AMU course were excluded from the experiment. (p. 342, footnote 8).	The sample is limited to individuals aged between 25 and 59 years (p.11). Further on, all unemployment spells lasting less than four weeks are excluded from the sample, as are all individuals who have received UI benefits within the last 52 weeks (p.12)	All fresh insured (UI) unemployed - UI in Norway is compulsory (p. 544) Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (p. 546)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Table II shows fraction of time unemployed prior to randomisation - 0,52% for all (p.354)	Unemployed can participate in ALMPs' during their first year of unemployment, but scarcely do so. During the second year of unemployment individuals are required to participate in ALMPs' 75 % of the time. (p.9)	NR
Is the programme compulsory?	No, it was necessary to apply for participation and thus participation was not compulsory. (p. 341-342) Looking at the variable list in table 1 it indicates that the case worker is responsible for the application, and the unemployed can feel forced to participate (p. 343)	Yes	The 80-week rule may nevertheless have been of importance because participation in LMP at this point was often required in order to escape the benefit quarantine (p. 547)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	The unemployed receives written information about the offer to participate in a specific programme shortly before the programme starts. (p.9)	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Training courses. (p. 342) 57 % of all training participants in the experiment received training in the area of land transportation (mainly certificates for operating a pick-up truck, truck, crane, bus, etc.). The remaining courses were mainly in the areas of "metal industry courses" and "introductory computer courses". (p. 342)	Private sector employment subsidies, public sector temporary jobs, education/training, and other programmes (p.10)	a) labour market training, b) temporary public employment, c) employment subsidy, d) work practice schemes (p. 545)

Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	NR	Many spells involve participation in more than one type of program (p. 549)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	Unemployed workers can obtain compensation equivalent to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits while in training, but participation in training does not extend eligibility for UI benefits. (p. 341)	NR	While on training, participants maintain their unemployment benefits or receive a training allowance. While in employment programme or work practice, participants typically receive an income support or a wage (p. 545)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	1-7 weeks, on average 2 weeks. (p. 342)	NR	Table 1 shows the average duration of completed programmes - it is around 4 months (p. 546)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	Typically 35-40 hours a week of classroom training. (p. 341)	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	No, participation in ALMP is voluntary/participants do not know they are participating in experiment. (p. 341-342)	Yes - refusal cancels the right to receive UI benefits (p.9)	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	NR	Figure 1: deep recession in the first part of the 1990s. From 1993 to the autumn of 1998, there was a strong recovery, after which a new downturn began (p. 547-548)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Survey data + administrative registers. (p. 342)	The event history is based on administrative registers, which record and govern the payments of public income transfers, as well as the register in which the employment agencies record unemployed's participation in ALMPs (p.10)	Administrative registers (p. 547)
Time period covered by the analysis	1993-1996	January 1, 1998 - June 30, 2002 (p.10)	March 1989-June 2002 (p. 544)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Time spent unemployed: monthly, time spent employed: quarterly, average hourly wage rate: annual (p. 344)	Weekly (p.23)	Monthly (p. 544)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control	Control group does not participate, however due to design; some members of control group are allowed to crossover and get treatment. These	Timing-of-events (p.18)	Timing-of-event

group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	are subsequently left out of the control group. (p. 344)		
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Not net lock-in, but lock in and post.	Yes (p.26)	No - they examine both the on-programme effect and the post-programme effect, but they cannot simply add up the effects. They simulate the effect instead. (p. 560-562)
Sample-size	Treatment group: 423, of who 218 received training Control group: 387, of whom 301 actually were control group and 86 crossovers, who received training. (p. 344) Also available in table II p. 354.	93,289 (p.13) 14% Treated	749,596 individuals, 1,422,280 spells, 8,013,990 monthly unemployment observations (p. 547)

Author	Sacklén	Solie	Steinberg, Monforte
Title	An evaluation of the Swedish trainee replacement schemes	Employment Effects of Retraining the Unemployed	Estimating the Effects of job Search Assistance and Training Programs on the Unemployment Durations of Displaced Workers
Year	2002	1968	1987
Country	Sweden	USA	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working paper	Working paper	Chapter from book
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Target group was unemployed individuals who were registered at a local employment office, and ready to take a new job immediately. They	Unemployed males, no women were accepted into training program (p. 210)	Unemployed, formerly working for one of the two experimental plants, Dana and BASF. (p. 189) The DCC was conceived

	<p>had to be between the ages of 20-59 at the program start and 18 months after it finished. Further the program spell should last at least two weeks and no more than 12 months. All other individuals were not included in the final sample. (p. 9) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not specified.</p> <p>To be qualified for a temporary replacement job, the unemployed person had to be at least 20 years of age. In addition to the formal age restriction, the unemployed individual presumably had to meet certain standards set by the employer/organiser. (p. 3)</p>	Eligibility requirements for UI not specified.	as a program focused specifically on the workers of selected closed plants (p. 190)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	<p>Table A2, p. 30 shows sample means for number of weeks openly unemployed before program start/before being selected to the control group. Sample 1 - participants: 14.57, non-participants: 17.20. Sample 2 - participants: 12.881, non-participants: 16.276. Sample 3 - participants: 16.92, non-participants: 17.82. Sample 4 - participants: 14.47, non-participants: 16.54.</p>	NR	They were notified immediately after the plant closure (p. 190)
Is the programme compulsory?	NR	The participants apply for the program, so it may indicate that it is not compulsory (p. 211)	No (p. 190)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	The participants were selected from among potential candidates by the local employment office. (p. 3)	NR	Each worker on the layoff roster from the two eligible plants was notified of the program by mail, and other vigorous recruitments efforts were made. (p. 190)
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Trainee replacement schemes (TRS): The participants worked as substitutes while the already employed individual received skill enhancing training. (p. 2-3)	ARA training program contains five courses: Welding, Machine tooling, Auto mechanics, Radio-television repair, Cabinet making. (p. 211)	The program began with an orientation and a four hour testing session. This was followed by a four day job-seeking skills workshop. Participants who completed this and showed an interest in retraining were evaluated for placement

			on the basis of their test scores and interviewed. Four types of training were available: high technology in-class training, other custom classroom programs, existing programs offered through local educational institutions and on the job training. (p. 190)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	Yes, sample 1 consists of individuals for whom previous participation in ALMP is possible. (p. 10-11)	NR	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	The substitute was paid according to the collective agreement at the work place where the replacement scheme took place. The employer was allowed to deduct from the payroll tax approximately SEK 450 per day to cover the labour costs associated with employing the substitute. (p. 3)	NR	UI, SUB or TRA (see table 8.1 p. 191)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	The program period was limited to six months, but could be extended to another six months period. (p. 3)	February 19, 1962 to June 8, 1962. (approx. 16 weeks) (p. 210)	High technology class: 47.8 weeks average. Other class-size programs: 28 weeks average. Local educational programs: 29.9 weeks average. On-the-job training: 36.6 weeks average. (p. 191, table 8.2)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	RA	NR

Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	In the early 1990s the Swedish economy experienced a serious slump, and the unemployment figures rose drastically. (p. 1)	RA	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers, (p. 9)	Questionnaire (p. 210)	Survey data + administrative registers. (p. 190)
Time period covered by the analysis	September-December 1994 (p. 9) + 18 months (table 8, p. 22)	June 1, 1961 to June 8, 1964. (p. 215, table 2)	January 1, 1979 to spring of 1982 (p. 190)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Monthly	Measured at points in time after participation.	Weekly (p. 190)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Participate later (p. 6)	Controls: Non-completes (participated, but did not complete), Rejects (applied for training, but were rejected), Non-applicants (did not apply for training). (p. 211)	Control group is two control plants, Lear Siegler and Chrysler Huber, the control group did not participate (p. 191)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes (p. 23-25)	No	No
Sample-size	Samples consists of: Sample 1(Participants = 3499 and Non-participants = 4804), Sample 2(Participants = 2515 and Non-participants = 2114, females only), Sample 3(Participants = 1131 and Non-participants = 2156), Sample 4(Participants = 824 and Non-participants = 1025, females only), (table 2, p. 11)	Participants: completes (85), Nonparticipants: Non-completes (33), Rejects (22), Non-applicants (77). (p. 212, table 1)	Participants: Dana (310) BASF(199) Control: Lear Siegler (271) Chrysler Huber(222). (p. 191, table 8.1)

Author	Van den Berg, van der Klaauw	Vinokur, Price	Völter, Osikominu, Fitzenberger
Title	Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence From a Controlled Social Experiment	Impact of the JOBS Intervention on Unemployed Workers Varying in Risk for Depression	Get Training or wait? Long-Run Employment Effects of Training Programs for the Unemployed in West Germany
Year	2006	1995	2007
Country	Netherlands	USA	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	International Economic Review	American Journal of Community Psychology	ZEW Discussion Paper
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Target group is Type I unemployed workers (individuals who are expected to have sufficient skills to find work)*. Eligibility requirements for UI benefits are that the individual should have had a job for at least 26 of the past 39 weeks; for wage related benefits it is required that the individual must have worked at least 52 days during each of 4 years out of the past 5 calendar years. (p. 897) A worker is entitled to UI if he faces a reduction in his original working hours of at least 5 hours per week, or half of his original working hours if less than 10 hours per week, he should not get paid for this working hour reduction and he should be willing to accept a new job. Individuals receiving UI benefits are therefore not always full-time unemployed (p. 897)	Participants had to be unemployed and looking for a job. Further they could not be on strike, expecting to be recalled for work in the next few months or planning to retire in the next 2 years. They also had to have lost their job and have been unemployed for 13 weeks or under. At last only respondents who showed no particular preference for the treatment program or the control program and who did not have a very high depression score were put in the sample. (p. 44-46) Ineligible for participation because they were new entrants to the labour market, already reemployed, or was just accompanying others in line (p. 44).	Entrants into ALMP in 86/87 and 93/94, who were unemployed at the time. Participants also had to start a spell of transfer payments from the Federal Employment Office, within the first twelve months of unemployment. (p. 11) Effectively, we consider individuals who experience a transition from employment to non-employment and for whom a spell with transfer payments from the Federal Employment Office starts within the first twelve months of non-employment or for whom the training data indicates a program participation before the unemployed individual finds a new job (p. 11)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Up to 3 days, so in practice 0 (p. 899)	If eligible for participation, they should have received UI for entire unemployment period, so up to 13 weeks. (p. 44)	Cohort 86/87: Average(PF): 15,8 average(SPST): 13,3 average(RT): 10,2 Cohort 93/94: average(PF): 11,4 average(SPST): 12,9 average(RT): 8,1 (months, p. 36)
Is the programme compulsory?	Yes, individuals are sanctioned if they refuse to participate after being selected for participation (909-911)	No	No

How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	The individuals attend an intake meeting within 3 days after the start of the payment of the UI benefits. It should be noted that individuals are not informed of their status(treatment/control) (p. 899)	Individuals are informed of the program at four offices of the Michigan Employment Security Commission in south eastern Michigan. They are approached by trained interviewers while waiting at the employment offices. (p. 44)	NR
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Counseling and Monitoring (C&M): In the first meeting the quality of the individuals' application letters and resume are examined, the different channels through which work can be found are discussed and a plan is made about what the individual should do until the next meeting. The follow-up meetings focus on applications to specific job vacancies and employers. during these meetings the plan from the previous meeting is evaluated and a planning for the next period is made (p. 899)	Five 4-hour seminars. They included the application of problem-solving and decision-making group processes, inoculation against setbacks, provision of social support and positive regard from the trainers, and learning and practicing job search skills. (p. 47)	SPST: medium-term courses refreshing specific skills, e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. PF: practice firms mainly train general skills while provision of new professional skills is of less importance. RT: Vocational training. Comprises both theoretical training and practical work experience. (p. 9-10)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	No	No	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	70% of minimum wage or 70% of the wage in the last job, whichever is lower. There are two kinds of UI, the only difference is length of eligibility, 6 months for "short period" benefits and between 6 months and five years for wage related benefits (p. 898)	Regular UI payments plus a 20 \$ bonus if they complete at least 4 out of 5 of the seminars. (p.47)	If participants are eligible, have minimum been employed during at least one year in contributory employment or are entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment assistance, they receive income maintenance, which is at least as high or higher than unemployment benefits. (p. 6-7)
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	6 months (p. 899)	Five days (p. 47)	PF and SPST usually take six to nine months and RT usually takes up to two years. (p. 10)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	1 meeting every 4 weeks (p. 899)	Five 4-hour sessions conducted during the morning hours of a 1-week period. (p. 47)	NR

Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Yes, individuals are sanctioned by reductions in UI benefits. The average reduction is 10% of UI benefits for a period of 2 months (p. 899)	No	Not directly stated but as the authors talk about financial incentives to join a program there is probably no sanctions.
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	NR	NR	The unemployment rate was falling from 9 pct. In 1986 to 6,5 pct. In 1991. It then rose to 11 pct. In 1997. It then again fell from 1997 to 8,5 pct. In 2001. The unemployment rate then rose slightly by 0,5 pct. Points from 2001 to 2002. (figure 1, p. 34)
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers + survey data (p. 911+914)	Survey data	Administrative registers + survey data (p. 7-8)
Time period covered by the analysis	August 24, 1998 to February 8, 1999 + survey after the end of the experiment	February 1991 - 1992 (based on p. 49 and the fact that T3 takes place 6 months after attending ALMP)	1986/87-1996-97 and 1993/94-2001/02 (p. 11)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Weekly (p. 918)	They measure employment status at two follow-up points.	Quarterly, (tables, p. 44-46)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	Control will never participate in the particular programme. Neither participants nor controls are aware of their situation (p. 910-911)	Control group is randomly acquired under the same eligibility requirements as participants. Will not participate. (p. 49)	Unsure if control group participates at later point, but control group does not participate during the inflow of the sample, 86/87 and 93/94.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	No	They estimate the cumulated effect from Q0 since beginning of treatment and then to Q8, Q16 and Q24, so there is a net-lock-in effect.
Sample-size	394; treatment (205) control (189), (p. 912)	T1: 1801 respondents, T2: 1443, T3: 1569 (Figure 1, p. 45)	Participants: Cohort 86/87: PF: 246 SPST: 1093 RT: 375 Cohort 93/94: PF: 325 SPST: 1944 RT: 458 Non participants: Cohort 86/87: 19188 Cohort 93/94: 22324 (table 3, p. 35)

Author	Weber, Hofer	Winterhager, Heinze, Sperman
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Title	Active Job-Search Programs a Promising Tool? A microeconomic Evaluation for Austria	Deregulating job placement in Europe: A microeconomic evaluation of an innovative voucher scheme in Germany
Year	2003	2006
Country	Austria	Germany
Language	English	English
Publication	Economics Series	Labour Economics
Target group (for example age, gender, education, eligibility requirements for benefits)	Individuals between 20 and 50 years of age, who became unemployed during data inflow from March to August in 1999. (p. 10-11) To be eligible for ALMP program participation in Austria a person must be unemployed, or face the risk of becoming unemployed. Since the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs does not specify the eligibility criteria more narrowly, this leaves a great deal of discretion to the program administrators. (p. 5)	We only include eligible individuals in the control group who were unemployed for at least one day in May and June in 2003 and who have never received vouchers. (P. 508) All individuals having been registered as unemployed for more than three months are eligible for vouchers. (p. 506)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	Duration until program entry in days - mean: 122.47 (sd: 124.18) (table 1, p. 21)	3 months (p. 506)
Is the programme compulsory?	Noncompliance with the program regulations or nonparticipation leads to benefit sanctions. (p. 5)	Vouchers are an additional option for unemployed people; they cannot be forced to use them to find a private placement agency (p. 507).
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	Eligible individuals knowing about the vouchers ask for them and receive them / Caseworkers offer the voucher to (selected) individuals based on their subjective judgment. (P. 506)
Type of ALMP (labour market training/education, private sector programs, public sector programs, job search assistance)	Training programs, active job-search programs, other programs. Training programs focus on education and on qualification enhancement of participants. Active job-search program aim at the activation of unemployed individuals at an early stage.	Job placement vouchers. The recipient of a voucher signs a placement contract with a private placement agency. If the agency finds a private sector job for the unemployed person and an employment contract is signed, the Federal

	Introduced in 1999 and 2000 under the name "job-coaching" - designed to lead to immediate transitions into employment, either during the course or shortly afterwards. During the course job application practices were trained. (p. 5)	Employment Agency will redeem the voucher to the private agency (p. 506).
Do individuals attend more than one program?	Only first program spell during inflow is taken into account (p. 11)	The authors concentrate on the first voucher in the unemployment period (p. 507)
Benefit level during ALMP participation (more/less than non-participation)	During training participation, individuals receive compensation which amounts to the level of unemployment benefits. UB is 55% of the net monthly earnings plus allowances for dependent children. (p. 4-5)	NR
Duration of ALMP (days, weeks, months)	Training programs: vary from 4 weeks to one year, Active job-search programs: 6 weeks (p. 4-5)	Vouchers are only valid for a period up to three months. (P. 507)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	Active job-search programs: 3 course days during the first week and 1 course day a week for the remaining weeks (p. 5)	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Noncompliance with the program regulations or nonparticipation leads to benefit sanctions. (p. 5)	NR
Labor market conditions (for example unemployment rate, vacancy rate, labour market tightness)	From 1998-2000 the Austrian economy faced a period of strong economic growth, with comparatively high increases in employment and also vacancies. (p. 17)	NR
Type of data used in study (administrative, questionnaire, other)	Administrative registers (p. 10)	Administrative registers, (p. 507)
Time period covered by the analysis	1999-2001 (p. 11)	May 2003 - June 2004, (p. 514)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on (daily, weekly, monthly, other)	Daily (p. 11)	Monthly (p. 516)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to? (E.g. control group will never participate, control group will participate at a later point in time, other)	There is no direct control group as timing-of-events method is used. (p. 3)	Control group is eligible individuals that aren't participating and are at the earliest allowed to receive a voucher two months later.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes (p. 15)	NR

Sample-size	Empirical analysis of subsample of: 13283, whereof participants are: 2498 (p. 11)	Participants: 30402, Non-participants: 1407754. (table 1, p. 515)
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13.1.2 Descriptive data for studies without effect estimate

Author	Adda, Dias, Meghir, Sianesi	Beenstock	Carling, Richardson
Title	Labour market programmes and labour market outcomes: a study of the Swedish active labour market interventions	Training and the time to find a job in Israel	The relative efficiency of labor market programs: Swedish experience from the 1990's
Year	2007	1996	2004
Country	Sweden	Israel	Sweden
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working Paper	Applied Economics	Labour Economics
Target group	To receive UI: an individual needs to have worked for a minimum of 80 days over 5 calendar months during the previous 12 months. (p.6). This study included males, unskilled, aged 26-30, not-disabled or self-employed (pp.8-9)	To be eligible for unemployment benefit claimants must have paid their earning-related premiums over the previous twelve months. (p.937)	We restrict the analysis to workers who entered a program for their first time, and we follow them until they found employment (p.337). Participation in a program may influence the duration of unemployment insurance benefits or the replacement ratio. In order to be eligible for UI benefits the worker needs be a member of a UI fund for at least 12 months. During this period, the worker must have worked at least 70 hours each month for six months. (p.338) Further on, the authors have excluded non-UI recipients, high- and low-income earners, and foreign citizens (p.350) Some eligibility rules are common to all programs. For example, the worker must be

			registered as unemployed at the local employment office and be in a certain age group. (p. 338)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	Figure 2 p. 941 shows cumulative distribution of unemployment duration prior to course attendance.	Mean values of days of unemployment prior to program are shown in table 2.
Is the programme compulsory?	NR	No: "At time t1 he (the unemployed) decides to enrol in a course..." (p. 937)	Sort of, since registration at employment offices is compulsory if the unemployed are to receive UI, and participate in ALMPs (p.342)
How are the individuals informed about ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Type of ALMP	Subsidises employment: job subsidies & trainee replacement schemes. Training programmes: vocational labour market training, relief work, and work practice schemes (work experience replacement, ALU, and workplace introduction). (p.6)	Table 2 p. 941 shows training programmes.	Self-employment grants (SEMP), subsidized on-the-job training programmes (two types; Subsidized Employment (SUBE) & Trainee Replacement scheme (TRS)), wage and employment subsidies (ALU, RW & API), classroom training services (AMU & CAC) (p.338)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	Roughly 6% of these cases chose to train. Of these, 5.2% participated in two courses and 0.4% in three or more courses during the observation period. (p. 939)	NR

Benefit level during ALMP participation	NR	While attending the course, the trainee continues to draw unemployment benefit without affecting his overall entitlement, provided this amounts to less than a continuous history of benefit payment of a year (p.937)	SEMP: Equivalent to worker's UI benefits. Business may generate additional income. SUBE: Wage and other benefits that comply with the collective agreement. TRS: Wage and other benefits that comply with the collective agreement. API: Equivalent to the worker's UI benefits. RW: Wage and other benefits that comply with the collective agreement. ALU: Equivalent to the worker's UI benefits. AMU: Equivalent to the worker's UI benefits. CAC: Equivalent to the worker's UI benefits. (Table 1)
Duration of ALMP	NR	Varies between 2 and 150 weeks. (Table 2 p. 941)	Mean duration, in days, for the different programmes are SEMP: 211. SUBE: 140. TRS: 116. API: 120. ALU: 138. RW: 148. AMU: 102. CAC: 78 (p.343) Description of programs: SEMP=6 months, CAC=usually 3 months, AMU=from a couple of days to 30 or 40 weeks. (p. 338)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	NR	NR
Labor market conditions	NR	NR	NR

Type of data used in study	Administrative data from four sources (p.7)	Administrative data	Administrative data
Time period covered by the analysis	1996-1998 (p.8)	April 1989 - June 1991 (p.939)	Inflow: January 1995 - December 1997. The authors do however follow them until March 1999. (p.342)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly (p. 59)	Daily (p. 939)	Daily (p. 342)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	Controls are individuals remaining unemployed and without treatment for at least the time it took the treated to enrol into treatment. We match exactly on the period of sample inflow and time to treatment (p.13). The treated is compared to a matched control group.	Training is compared to no-training	Eight different programmes are compared
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	NR	Yes (p. 343)
Sample-size	2249 (table 1)	The data comprise about 230,000 case histories of insured Israelis... (p. 393) - Table 3 includes 222,955 cases.	25,280 individuals (p.337)

Author	Cavaco, Fougère, Pouget	Cockx, Van der Linden, Karaa	Forslund, Johansson, Lindqvist
Title	Estimating the Effect of a Retraining Program for Displaced Workers on Their Transition to Permanent Jobs	Active labour market policies and job tenure	Employment subsidies - A fast lane from unemployment to work?
Year	2005	1998	2004
Country	France	Belgium	Sweden

Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	Oxford Economic Papers	IFAU Working paper
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Laid off workers up to 57 years old, having at least 2 years of seniority in the firm. (p. 6)	Unemployed individuals hired from the pool of unemployed (including welfare recipients). Human resources managers were asked to randomly choose 5 recruitments that occurred in 1991 or 1992(of which 3 should be of the target group if possible). Target group consists of workers who either had been trained during their previous unemployment spell, or for whom the employer obtained a wage subsidy, or who belonged to the hard core of unemployed. Training: Na. Subsidised on-the-job training: (CEF: targets young low-skilled unemployed. FPI: NR, participants are selected by the firms). Pure wage subsidies: Are often targeted on specific disadvantaged groups defined on the basis of criteria such as age, skill and unemployment duration. (p. 689-691)	Target group was individuals who had been registered as unemployed at the employment office for a continuous period of at least 365 days, individuals also had to be between the ages of 25 to 63 years. (p. 20) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not specified.
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	It consisted in providing an immediate and individual support to the displaced workers for a period of six months beginning just after the dismissal. (p. 6)	NR	At least 365 days, (p. 20)
Is the programme compulsory?	Participation was voluntary. (p. 6)	NR	NR

<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>One common characteristic of all layoffs for economic reasons is that employers are required to propose the option of participating in a retraining scheme (partially employer funded) to all employees who will be displaced. (p. 6)</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>The authors mention it is a process involving caseworkers, the unemployed and the firm. (p. 6)</p>
<p>Type of ALMP</p>	<p>They assessed the employee's professional records and then, proposed appropriate actions including job-seeking sessions, stressing self-employment opportunities, on-the-job assessment and extra training (computer, accounting, management, languages, etc...). (p. 6)</p>	<p>Training: Subsidised on-the-job training: (CEF: Training programme closely related to the job, but not organized by the firm. FPI: Training on the job, implementation controlled by the Employment Agency). Pure wage subsidies: Six different kinds, differences include things like type of contract (fixed-term or not), category of eligible unemployed, and firms and the wage subsidy level. (p. 689-690)</p>	<p>Employment subsidy(ES): Subsidized hiring of unemployed individuals, (p. 5-6)</p>
<p>Do individuals attend more than one program?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>It is possible to have more than one spell of unemployment of at least 365 days without interruption during the time the ES programme has been going on. Thus, an individual can be eligible for the programme more than once. The unit of observation is chosen to be every time a person becomes eligible for the ES programme. In the analysis we use information on each individual's total number of spells and days in unemployment before becoming eligible for the ES. For those who are eligible more than once the total</p>

			number of days and spells is aggregated each time they become eligible. Thus, the data include only persons who have been eligible for the ES programme on at least one occasion (p. 20-21)
Benefit level during ALMP participation	During the first two months of the program, the worker received a specific allowance representing 83% of his or her previous wage. This percentage fell down to 70% during the four following months. (p. 6)	Training: Subsidised on-the-job training: (CEF: Wage, social contributions are only collected on the part of the wage which exceeds minimum wages. FPI: Unemployment benefits, plus an increasing share of the difference between the normal wage and the unemployment benefit (by the firm). No social insurance contributions are paid). Pure wage subsidies: Are paid on a quarterly or monthly basis. Payment level ranging from 10% to 50% of the wage cost. (p. 689-690)	Not specified, but subsidy was General employment subsidy(50% of total wage cost) Extended employment subsidy(75% of total wage cost, for the first 6 months, then 25% for the next 18 months). (p. 5-6)
Duration of ALMP	6 months, (p. 6)	Training: Subsidised on-the-job training: (CEF: Ranging from 1-3 years. FPI: Typically six months). Pure wage subsidies: Between 12-24 months. (p. 689-690)	General employment subsidy(up to 6 months, can be extended to 12 months) Extended employment subsidy(up to 6 + 18 months), (p. 5-6)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	Training: Subsidised on-the-job training: (CEF: 240 hours per year. FPI: Na) Pure wage subsidies: NR. (p. 689)	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	No, participation is voluntary (p. 6)	NR	NR
Labor market conditions	High structural unemployment (OECD, 1994 and 1996). (p. 2)	Unemployment rate in 1992: 7,9% (p. 689)	NR
Type of data used in study	Survey data, (p. 7)	Survey data. (p. 690)	Administrative registers, (p. 19)

Time period covered by the analysis	April 1995 - May 1998, (p. 7)	1991 - March 1993. (p. 690-691)	January 1 1998 to October 1 2002, (p. 20-21)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	NR	Monthly	Results show monthly outcomes, (p. 27-)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	The control group is only composed of individuals potentially entitled to join the program, which means that they respect the following imposed criteria used when applying to the program: They are under 57 years old; they are displaced and have at least two years of seniority in their previous firm. (p. 7-8)	Hard core of unemployed, this third group of workers has some features of a comparison group (p. 691)	The authors apply two different methods, 1) matching, 2) IV estimation using budget constraints as instrument for variation in program participation.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	No	They do measure the net of lock-in effect in the text (see p. 29).
Sample-size	Participants: 1010 Non-participants: 902. (p. 21)	Sample size: 864 (summary table 2, p. 692)	3,2% of 631358(19951), (p. 22) Matching is based on 7651 treated individuals (p. 22)

Author	Fredriksson, Johansson	Gerfin Lechner	Hanna, Turney
Title	Employment, mobility, and active labor market programs	A Microeconomic Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy in Switzerland	The Economic Impact of the Nevada Claimant Employment Program
Year	2003	2002	1990
Country	Sweden	Switzerland	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working paper	The Economic Journal	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper

<p>Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits</p>	<p>Target group was restricted to unemployed individuals aged 25 to 50 years in 1993 and individuals suffering from a work related handicap and individuals who participated in a vocational rehabilitation program were excluded. Further Temporary employment, job change and part-time unemployment where not considered spells of unemployment. (p. 16) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not specified.</p>	<p>Entitlement is conditional on having contributed to the unemployment insurance for at least 6 months in the previous two years. After the entitlement period has expired, a new entitlement period is conditional on being employed for at least another 12 months within three years after the previous unemployment spell (p.857) We applied a series of sample selection rules to the data. The most important selection criteria are that we consider only individuals unemployed on Dec 31, 1997, for no more than twelve months who have not participated in any major programme in 1997 and who are between 25 and 55 years old. Furthermore, given our concentration on the first major programme we need to exclude those who participated in a major programme before. In addition given the variety of options for young (schooling) and older unemployed (early retirement) we decided to exclude these from our analysis. (p. 862)</p>	<p>To be eligible a claimant had to be no more than four weeks into his/her benefit year. Additionally, all interstate claimants or claimants with any pending nonmonetary issues were not eligible. (p. 82) Eligibility requirements for UI benefits not specified.</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>30 weeks of unconditional benefits (but in practice these rules have not been strictly enforced) (p. 857) Table 1 p. 861 shows unemployment duration before programme participation.</p>	<p>Up to four weeks, (p. 82)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Yes (p. 857)</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Claimants where assigned to the ALMP at their local Employment Security Department office. (p. 82)</p>

Type of ALMP	Job-creation program (JC): Provide at temporary employment in the home region. Training programs (TR): Offer re-training. (p. 3) Job-creation program are essentially measures that provide temporary employment in the home region. Training programs, on the other hand, offer re-training and, presumably, individuals acquire qualifications that are in general demand on the labour market. (p. 3)	1) Training courses, 2) employment programmes, 3) temporary employment with wage subsidy. (p. 8). Analysed separately as 1) Nonparticipation, 2) Basic courses, 3) Language courses, 4) Computer courses, 5) Further vocational courses, 6) Other training, 7) Employment programme (private and public), 8) Temporary wage subsidy.	CEP: The concept behind the CEP program was simply to provide normal ES and UI services (...) by a team that had adequate time to deal with claimants. Quality, not quantity, was the hallmark of the project. So difference between Treatment and Control is the team who administers the treatment, not the actual treatment. (p. 82)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	Possibly, but only the first program participation after unemployment entry is included. (p. 17)	In practice yes, but these individuals are excluded from the analysis (p. 862)	NR
Benefit level during ALMP participation	NR	While in employment programme, an unemployed person receives a wage which can be larger than the unemployment benefit. However, in practice, this would be an exception. (p. 858) The amount of benefits is the same for the active as well as passive ones (footnote 6)	Normal UI benefits.
Duration of ALMP	Table 1, p. 18 shows descriptive statistics. Mean days in TP=178, mean days in JC=53.	Training courses: varies between one day and several months, employment programmes: usually last for six months (p. 858) (see table 1 for duration means)	The training period was not to exceed six months in duration. (p. 83)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	NR	NR
Labor market conditions	The time period we are considering was a rather extreme period on the Swedish labour market. Unemployment rose dramatically over just a few years in the beginning of the 1990s. (p. 35)	Unemployment rate: 1997: 5,2%, 1999: 2,8 % (p. 856)	NR
Type of data used in study	Administrative registers, (p. 16)	Administrative registers (p. 862)	Administrative registers

Time period covered by the analysis	1993-1997, (p. 17)	1988-1997 (p. 862)	July 17 1988 - June 30 1989. (p. 81 + 85)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Daily data are available, but they are aggregated to monthly intervals for empirical analysis. (p. 19-20)	Daily(p. 862)	Weekly (p. 88)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	Matching is used	Participation is compared to nonparticipation and every programme is compared to the other programmes.	Control group does not participate. (...) and the control group individuals who received regular ES and UI services. (p. 82)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No net-effect. However, they mention the lock-in effect in the text on p. 31.	No	No
Sample-size	Participants: JC = 1857, TP = 1063. Non-participants: NT = 8142. (table 2, p. 21)	19,307 observations (p. 862)	Test group = 1424, Test group without trainees = 1309. Control group = 1538, (p. 88)

Author	Klepinger, Johnson, Joesch, Benus	Lechner, Wiehler	Lechner, Wiehler
Title	Evaluation of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstration	Does the Order and Timing of Active Labor Market Programs Matter?	Kids or Courses? Gender Differences in the Effects of Active Labour Market Policies
Year	1997	2007	2007
Country	USA	Austria	Austria
Language	English	English	English
Publication		IZA Discussion Paper	SCALA discussion paper

<p>Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits</p>	<p>To meet the early intervention objectives of the demonstration and to avoid confounding the effects of old and new work search policies, the demonstration was limited to new UI claimants who filed an initial claim for a new benefit year during 1994; individuals filing attached per partial claims were excluded.</p> <p>New claimants who did not have a work search requirement were also excluded. Thus, interstate claimants, claimants in the Work Share program, claimants who are required to find work through a union hiring hall, claimants on temporary layoff subject to recall by their employer, those on temporary layoff who expected recall within ten weeks and those in approved agency-training programs were excluded. (p. 11) In Maryland, to be eligible to receive UI benefits at the time of the demonstration, claimants were required to search for work and to report two employer contacts made per week on their continued claims form. (Executive Summary, first segment)</p>	<p>Persons who switch from employment to unemployment for the first time between 2000 and 2002. They also have to be unemployed without a recall guarantee. They have to be between 25 and 50 years of age. Lastly the last duration of employment has to be longer than 2 months. (p. 11)</p>	<p>Unemployed individuals between the ages of 25-50 years. With a long labour market history before entry into unemployment. Further, participants are all individuals who take part in a program between 2000 and before the end of 2002, and who have not had an employment spell in between inflow and participation. The study does not take into account if the participants are UI recipients or if they are UA recipients. (p. 13-14) To receive unemployment benefit payments the unemployed have to be registered at the Public Employment Service, be eligible and willing to work, and have a predefined record of employment with unemployment insurance contributions. The pre-unemployment employment requirement is a cumulated unemployment insurance contribution period of 52 weeks within the last 24 months for the first draw on benefits (p. 6).</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>Over 70% of claimants who attended a workshop did so during the third, fourth or fifth week after filing for benefits. (p. 6)</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Time in unemployment before (hyp.) program entry (in months) - range: 3.1 for non-participation to 7.8 for socioeconomic. Enterprises (p. 17)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>Yes, (p. 6)</p>	<p>No (p. 4)</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>The individuals are randomized in to ALMP participation if they are eligible for participation.</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Participants are either allocated by the public employment service or find a program on their own. (p. 7)</p>

Type of ALMP	<p>Job Search Workshop: The job search workshop consisted of three parts. The first part: Instruction in assessing employment options, setting realistic job goals, and identifying employment resources. The second part: Instruction in how to prepare resumes and job applications and practicing contacts and personal interviews. The third part: Helping claimants plan their own job search strategy. (p. 6)</p>	<p>Orientation measures, training measures, subsidized employment and others. Training measures comprise a variety of programs from active job search to different forms of qualification partially combined with on-the-job-training elements. (p. 5)</p>	<p>Socioeconomic. Enterprises + Non-profit sector projects: Offer a quasi-realistic work environment, are restricted to one year and are sometimes accompanied by socio-pedagogical treatment. Active job search: aims at improving job acquisition skills. Job coaching: a combination of counselling, qualification and on the job training. Qualification measures: further training and various forms of vocational training. Course subsidies: participants find their own program and apply for course subsidies (p. 7-8)</p>
Do individuals attend more than one program?	No	Individuals may attend up to 3 programs in the analysis. (p. 11-10)	Table 3 shows program history with the variable "last program of the same kind" - thereby the participants might have participated in another program (p. 17)
Benefit level during ALMP participation	Normal UI benefits (p. 6)	Normal unemployment level during ALMP, 20 weeks of unemployment benefits thereafter unemployment assistance, which has to be re-approved every 12 months. (p. 4-5)	NR
Duration of ALMP	4 days (p. 6)	NR	NR
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	4 days for a total of 16 hours (p. 6)	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Claimants were instructed that failure to report for and complete the workshop could result in loss of UI benefits for that and subsequent weeks. (p. 6)	NR	NR

Labor market conditions	NR	The unemployment rate goes up from around 4,9% in 2000 to 5,9% in 2002, and stays at that level for the rest of the period. (p. 4)	NR
Type of data used in study	Administrative registers, (p. 13-14)	Administrative registers. (p. 7)	Administrative registers (p. 9)
Time period covered by the analysis	January 1994 + 1 year (p. 4) + 4 quarters (table 5, p. 35)	2000-2005(p. 10)	1985-2005 (p. 10)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly, (fx table 2, p. 24) In the analysis using hazard rates the outcome is measured bi-weekly (p. 29)	Trimesters, a trimester is equal to 4 months. (p. 11)	2 week intervals (p. 10)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	Control group does not participate, (p. 6-7)	There is no actual control group, but the program sequences are held against each other (p. 19-21)	Control group is all individuals who moved from employment to unemployment and have not been allocated to a program between 2000 and 2002, or took up an employment before being allocated to a program. (p. 14)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No, the measured effect is not net of lock-in effects. They suggest that there are lock-in effects, but there is no mention of net of lock-in. (p. 29)	No	No (section 5, p. 22)
Sample-size	23758 eligible individuals enrolled in the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstration. Individuals were randomly allocated to the different interventions. (p. 12). 30% of claimants assigned to the Job Search Workshop attended it. (p. 16)	345044	Participants: Socio econ. Enterprises: 693 observations, Non-profit sector projects: 650, Active job search: 19316, Job coaching: 453, Qualification measures: 18233, Course subsidies: 10150. Non-participants: 105342 (p. 17)

Author	Lechner, Wunsch	Lechner, Wunsch, Miquel	O'Leary
Title	Active Labour Market Policy in East Germany: Waiting for the Economy to Take Off	Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany	A net impact analysis of active labour programmes in Hungary
Year	2009	2011	1997
Country	Germany	Germany	Hungary
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Economics of Transition	Journal of the European Economic Association	Economics of Transition
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	<p>We require that all individuals were employed at least once before programme participation and that they received unemployment benefits or assistance in the month before the programme start. (p. 672) Further individuals had to be between 25-49 years of age. Unemployed people who were trainees, home workers, apprentices, or whose intensity in their last employment before programme participation was below half of the usual full-time working hours were excluded. (p. 672) People who have contributed to the UI for at least 12 months within the 3 years preceding a spell of unemployment are eligible for unemployment benefits (UB). German UI does not cover self-employed. (p. 666)</p>	<p>Individuals becoming unemployed during the period January 1992 to June 1994. There is further an age restriction; target group is individuals between the ages of 20 to 55 years old. Also excluded are any unemployed individuals who were trainees, home workers, or apprentices or whose last employment was less intensive than half of the usual number of hours for full-time work. (p. 750-751) Eligibility requirements for benefits are not specified. In Germany, eligibility to participate in training programs requires the potential participant to qualify for or receive unemployment insurance payments. Moreover, he or she must have either a professional degree from the German apprenticeship (or higher education system) or a minimum amount of work experience. (p. 758).</p>	<p>Unemployed Hungarians, who registered as unemployed in June 1991, persons who entered retraining in the second half of 1991 and persons who participated in public service employment in September 1991. (p. 454-455) Excluded those who had participated in either retraining or PSE before. (p. 456) Furthermore, they restrict their sample of retrainees to those who have left retraining (p. 458).</p>

<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>Participants have to have received UB or UA in the month before the start of the program in which they participate (as well as in the month of potential programme start for non-participants). So participants have to minimum have received UB or UA for a month. (p. 672)</p>	<p>Time to participation in months within relevant UE spell - mean ranges from 4 to 6 months (table 5 p. 755).</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>Yes, (p. 666)</p>	<p>The authors describe the process as the unemployed decides to participate or not (p. 758).</p>	<p>Retraining: In practice no, but according to the law, the unemployed may be obliged to enter retraining. (p. 462) PSE: The unemployed are obliged to accept a PSE job, if it conforms to their education and skills. (p. 467)</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Usually the caseworker proposes participation in training to improve a client's employment prospects, though sometimes the unemployed also proposes a program (p. 758).</p>	<p>Retraining: Unemployed persons interested in retraining are usually first informed about the availability of courses at the local employment centre, although announcements are frequently also made in local newspapers. (p. 462) PSE: It is local employment centres that refer unemployed persons to PSE. (p. 467)</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">Type of ALMP</p>	<p>SCM(Acquisition of specific knowledge and skills), JSA (Assessment of jobseekers ability and willingness to search for job and to work, basic job search assistance), ST(Minor adjustment of skills), JRT Combined off-the-job training in a specific field of profession), GT-9M(General update, adjustment end extension of knowledge and skills, mainly off the job, planned duration =<9 months), GT-9M+(GT-9M > 9 months), DC(Vocational training that awards a formal professional degree and that corresponds to regular vocational training in the German apprenticeship system), JCS (Subsidised non-market jobs which are in the interest of the public) and SAM (subsidised non-market jobs in economically weak regions), (table 3, p. 669) Only JRT, GT-9M, GT-9m+, DC and SAM is usable in the review, see table 5 p. 674.</p>	<p>Further training: Split up into short training and long training, both of which concern further training in the currently held profession. Retraining: Training to obtain a new professional degree in a field other than the currently held profession. Practice firms: further training that stimulates a job in a specific field of profession. (table 2, p. 747 + 748)</p>	<p>Retraining and public service employment (PSE), (p. 453). Only retraining usable in the review according to table 2 p. 457.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Do individuals attend more than one program?</p>	<p>No, if individuals have multiple entries into unemployment during the sample inflow, only the first one is considered. (p. 671-672)</p>	<p>Study evaluates first program within an unemployment spell and measures outcomes beginning with the first period after this first program start. (p. 752), further info in table 4, p. 752.</p>	<p>After the program many participate in other or further programs (see table 3 p. 458).</p>

<p>Benefit level during ALMP participation</p>	<p>1998-2002: TM(receipt of UB or UA if eligible, UB claim reduced by the program duration)', FVT(Receipt of MA if eligible, UB claims stays constant; entitlement qualification period extended by up to 2 years)', JCS/SAM(Regular salary, no benefits; counts as insured employment)'. 2003-2004: TM('), FVT(', change: UB claim reduced by half of the program duration), JCS/SAM(', change: no longer counts as insured employment)". Since 2005: TM('), FVT(Receipt of UB or UA if eligible, UB claim reduced by half of the programme duration), JCS/SAM("), (table 4, p. 670) Only JRT, GT-9M, GT-9m+, DC and SAM is usable in the review, see table 5 p. 674.</p>	<p>Participants receive maintenance allowance, which before 1994 had a higher replacement rate than the one of the unemployment benefits. After 1994 the maintenance allowance is of the same amount as unemployment benefits (p. 746)</p>	<p>Retraining: They receive a training subsidy instead of unemployment compensation, unsure about the size. (p. 463) PSE: Normal unemployment compensation, (p. 467)</p>
<p>Duration of ALMP</p>	<p>Mean planned duration(days): SCM(57), JSA(45), ST(48), JRT(172), GT-9M(174), GT-9M+(349), DC(694), JCS(275) and SAM(331), (table 3, p. 669) Only JRT, GT-9M, GT-9m+, DC and SAM is usable in the review, see table 5 p. 674.</p>	<p>Further training: Short training (up to 6 months) Long training (over 6 months). Retraining: up to 3 years, 21 months on average. Practice firms: the mean duration of the sample is 6 months. (p. 747-748)</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>

Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	The UB payment is conditional on actively searching for a job, regular attendance at public employment service, and participation in ALMP measures (p. 666-667).	Individuals who refuse participation risk suspension of benefits. (p. 758)	Retraining: Generally no sanctions, it is not specified what happens if the law of compulsory participation is used. (p. 462) PSE: Individuals that refuse a PSE job suitable for them, can be denied eligibility for unemployment compensation, (p.467)
Labor market conditions	Unemployment rate: 1999(19 %), 2001(19), 2003(20) and 2005(19), (p. 666)	Unemployment rate: 1991(6,2%), 1993(8,0%), 1995(9,1%), 1997(10,8%), 1999(9,6%), 2001(8,0%) and 2003(9,3%). (table 1, p. 746)	NR
Type of data used in study	Administrative registers (p. 671)	Administrative register + questionnaires (p. 748) Questionnaires are filled in by the labour officer for statistical purposes.	Survey data, (p. 454)
Time period covered by the analysis	2000-2005 (p. 671-672)	1992 to 2002 (data available from 1975-2002), (p. 748-750)	1992-1993 (p. 454)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Half-monthly (p. 680)	Administrative data are based on daily info, questionnaires on monthly info. (table 3, p. 749) Merged dataset is based on monthly information (note to table 3, p. 749).	They analyse the outcome from the survey.

<p>Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?</p>	<p>We define participants as those unemployed who participate at least once in a programme in the three years from the inflow into our sample. Accordingly, non-participants are all persons who do not enter a programme in this period (Between January 2000 - the first half of December 2002). (p. 672)</p>	<p>Control group is defined as individuals who do not start a program within the first 12 months of unemployment. (p. 751)</p>	<p>Comparison group members who registered as unemployed in June 1991 and had not participated in ALP by November 1992, (p. 464(Retraining) and 468(PSE))</p>
<p>Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>Yes (p. 774)</p>	<p>No, the unemployed participated in the program in the second half of 1991 and had completed training course by the survey date in November 1993 (p. 462).</p>
<p>Sample-size</p>	<p>SCM(429), JSA(1066), ST(549), JRT(313), GT-9M(605), GT-9M+(533), DC(176), JCS(587), SAM(463) and Non participants(4024), (table 5, p. 674) Only JRT, GT-9M, GT-9m+, DC and SAM is usable in the review, see table 5 p. 674.</p>	<p>Practice firm (259 observation) Short training (482) Long training (385) Retraining (387) Other (263) Non-participants (15687). (table A.1, p. 775)</p>	<p>445 retraining participants, 393 PSE workers and 589 non participants in comparison group (p. 460)</p>

Author	O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk, Lázár	Raaum, Torp, Zhang	Shirom, Vinokur, Price
Title	The net impact of active labour programmes in Hungary and Poland	Business cycles and the impact of labour market programmes	Self-Efficacy as a Moderator of the Effects of Job-Search Workshops on Re-Employment: A Field Experiment
Year	1998	2002	2008
Country	Hungary, Poland	Norway	Israel
Language	English	English	English
Publication	International Labour Review	Memorandum	Journal of applied Social Psychology
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	<p>Samples were drawn from among persons registered as unemployed. Participants were randomly selected from those completing their participation in the programmes during the second quarter of 1996. (p. 330-331) The main passive labour program in Hungary is unemployment compensation (UC), which is available for a limited period to unemployed workers with sufficient recent work experience (p. 325).</p>	<p>Labour Market Training is available for all job seekers. Due to limited capacity of most courses, during periods with many unemployed the administrative staffs has to be more selective. Courses directed at expressed needs of labour among employers were given priority, as were unemployed expected to be able to fill manifest vacancies. Unemployed individuals can only obtain eligibility to UB by having earnings from an ordinary job and from a temporary employment programme (until 1997), but not by participating in a training programme as LMT. (p. 15-16) Further restrictions are made so the study only looks at participants between the ages of 25-50. (p. 17)</p>	<p>The target group were individuals who were not new entrants to the labour market within 5 months of their discharge from compulsory military service, pregnant women who were due to deliver within 3 months and persons who did not know Hebrew well enough to answer the research questionnaires. Further individuals had to have been unemployed for over 10 weeks and not have a preference for inclusion in either control or treatment state. (p. 1785). Eligibility for UI requires individuals to be unemployed and must present at the unemployment office at least once a week. (p. 1783) Only persons who expressed no preference were randomly assigned to the experimental and control groups (p. 1785).</p>

<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Participants had to be unemployed for over 10 weeks to participate (p. 1785) As a result, participants in the job-search workshops had been unemployed for an average of 6.52 months (p. 1783)</p>
<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>No, (p. 15)</p>	<p>No, individuals who preferred one condition over another were not included in programme. (p. 1785)</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>The recruitment to LMT is partly a self-selection process and partly an administrative selection process. This could indicate that individuals partly find information themselves and partly are informed through the public employment service. (p. 15)</p>	<p>Individuals took a pre-test questionnaire when they routinely came to register with the local branches of the Employment Service. After this individuals are randomized into either treatment or control group. (p. 1783) Respondents were told about two programs that were being offered by the Employment Service on how to look for jobs (p. 1785). Those who were assigned to the experimental condition received an invitation to participate in the job-search workshop. (p. 1785)</p>

Type of ALMP	Self-employment assistance. (p. 327)	Labour market training: The aim is to maintain and improve the skills of the unemployed and thereby to enhance their employability. The program is organised as off the job courses. This means that vocational training is the dominant form. (p. 15)	Exercises in identifying and conveying one's job-relevant skills, using social networks to obtain job leads, contacting potential employers, preparing job applications and résumés, and successfully going through a job interview. (1785-1786)
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	NR	No
Benefit level during ALMP participation	Unemployment compensation, which may be paid for six months longer than the regular 12 months. UC had a wage replacement rate of between 50-70 per cent, depending on the length of benefit receipt period. (326-327)	If eligible for UB, individuals can choose between UB, which is 62,4% of previous earnings or a flat rated training allowance which is lower than UB, most choose UB. If individuals are not eligible for UB they still can receive the training allowance. (p. 15)	Normal UI benefits + further 10 \$ for completed questionnaires (+15 \$ on receipt of their completed questionnaires, if the respondents didn't return the questionnaires within 4 weeks) dollars in local currency. (1786)
Duration of ALMP	Up to 18 months. (p. 327)	Most of the courses are short, 5 to 20 weeks. In some cases there are basic courses and follow-up courses within the same subject, with total duration of one year (or even more). (p. 15)	Five full day sessions which were conducted over a 1-week period. (p. 1785)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	Five full days for one week. (p. 1785)
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	Yes, unemployed persons who refuse to accept offers of training may lose their unemployment insurance benefit. This sanction is however, rarely carried out. (p. 15)	No

Labor market conditions	Hungary: Unemployment rate rose from a negligible level in 1990 to a peak of 13,4 % in 1993. In 1998 the unemployment rate was slightly below 10 %, largely because of inactivity and the labour force shrank by more than a million workers. (p. 324)	The unemployment rate peaked in 1993 at 5,5%, increasing from 1,5% in 1987 and sliding back to 3,3% in 1997 and 2,4% in 1998. (p. 14)	The workshops were offered only in those areas of the country that were pre-defined by the Employment Service as being areas of high unemployment, in which the unemployment rate exceeded 10 %. (p. 1783)
Type of data used in study	Survey data (p. 330-331)	Administrative registers, (p. 16)	Survey data, (p. 1786)
Time period covered by the analysis	Surveys conducted from March to April 1997 - unemployed workers completed their programs during the second quarter of 1996. Comparison group from the inflow during the second quarter of 1995 (p. 331).	1991-1996	Up until 6-month post-test after the intervention (p. 1784-1875)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly - for earnings and UC collected. On the time of survey data or ever since the program (p. 333-334)	Annual earnings (p. 16)	They use the follow-up survey to measure whether the participants were employed or not.
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	Control group was randomly selected using birthdates from inflow to register in the ten counties during the second quarter of 1995. Comparison group did not participate (p. 330-331).	Matching estimation method is used. Comparison group is selected from non-participants. The comparison group is selected among those still unemployed (and not participating in another program or left the unemployment register (p. 17-18)	Control group will not participate during specified period, NR if controls will participate at later stage.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	No	As the study only considers earnings, lock-in effect is not relevant.	No
Sample-size	Participants in self-employment (Hungary): 1044. Comparison group (Hungary): 3214 (p. 331, table 2)	Table 1 on page 19 for sample sizes.	Participants: 442 Control: 217. (p. 1784)

Author	Sianesi	Steiger	Stephan, Pahnke
Title	Differential effects of active labour market programs for the unemployed	Is less more? A look at nonparticipation in Swiss active labour market programmes	The Relative Effectiveness of Selected Active Labour Market Programmes and the Common Support Problem
Year	2008	2004	2008
Country	Sweden	Switzerland	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Labour Economics		IZA Discussion Paper
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Daily compensation was 80 % of the previous wage. To be eligible to UI an unemployed person registered at an employment office and actively searching for a job must have been working for at least five months during the last 12 months preceding the current unemployment spell (p.376) We focus on adults (aged over 25) who are entitled to unemployment benefits. (p. 376). We further restrict our sample to adult individuals who became unemployed for their first time in that year and were entitled to either UI or KAS (p. 377).	Sample selection criteria are stated in table B-1, p. 33. Among these are age group restrictions, disability restriction, student restriction etc. Individuals had to have had a contribution time of at least 6 months, to be eligible for UI benefits, and the maximum duration of UI benefits was 2 years. (p. 2)	The sample analysed here covers individuals of age 25 to 59, who were unemployed for no longer than one year in March 2003. (p. 13)
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	Duration of current unemployment spell at beginning of first programme: 245.2 days (table 4-1, p. 16)	NR

<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>Once receiving UI, an offer of "suitable" work - or of a labour market program - must be accepted; refusal to accept a job/program might lead to expulsion from compensation (the "work test") (p. 376).</p>	<p>Yes, (p. 3)</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Caseworkers counsel the unemployed and decide about participation in active labour market programmes. (p. 3)</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>Type of ALMP</p>	<p>Six different programs are investigated: labour market training, workplace introduction, work experience placement, public relief work, trainee replacement, and job subsidies (p.372)</p>	<p>8 different programme groups: (1) Personality and other basic courses: Courses who help persons to position themselves and their needs in the labour market + courses for basic qualifications. (2) Language courses: Courses in foreign language for persons with good knowledge of the corresponding Swiss language, or German/French courses for persons with another mother tongue. (3) Basic computer courses: E.g. Word courses, beginners courses, internet courses etc. (4) Higher vocational training: Higher level than an actual vocational education in Switzerland; include computer courses on an advanced level for specialists, commercial and technical courses. (5) Lower vocational training: Include commercial, technical, hotel/restaurant industry, nursing and cleaning courses. (6) Other training: Includes laboratory firms, internship, self-employment courses. (7) Employment programmes single</p>	<p>Our (the authors') analysis is restricted to three of the largest programmes: we analyse variants of further vocational training, short training programmes and job creation schemes. [...] Further important programmes are in particular wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and contracting-out to private agencies (p.2)</p>

		workplace: Participants work in the public administration, in another public service or in a non-profit organisation, together with either "normally" employed persons. (8) Employment programmes collective workplace: Participants work in facilities specially designed for unemployed persons. (p. 14-15)	
Do individuals attend more than one program?	NR	No (table B-1, p. 33)	Participants in the programmes investigated might take part in another programme later (p.10)
Benefit level during ALMP participation	Whilst on a program, participants either earn the stipulated wage and other benefits on their "temporary" workplace, or the equivalent of the unemployment benefit they would have drawn as openly unemployed (p. 373).	NR	Further vocational training: participants receive a subsistence allowance that usually equals the unemployment compensation. Short training courses: participants continue to receive unemployment compensation. Job creation schemes: a lump sum payment is granted, the amount of which varies with the qualification required. (p. 2-4)
Duration of ALMP	Most programs have a maximum duration of six months, though participants stay an average of four-five months (p.373) Appendix A shows median program duration.	The duration of programmes varies substantially: full-time courses may not last longer than two months, whereas employment programmes normally are assigned for time periods as long as 6 months. (p. 3)	Short training programmes: two to eight weeks. Job creation programmes are limited to 12 months (p.4)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Refusal to accept a job/program might lead to expulsion from compensation (p.376)	Non-attendance by the unemployed is sanctioned by benefit cancellation. (p. 3)	NR

Labor market conditions	Unemployment was less than 3 % in 1989 and 1990, 9 % in 1992, 13,5 % in 1994, and 13 % until 1997 (p.377)	NR	Unemployment reached its maximum with on average 4.9 million unemployed persons in 2005. Since 2005 unemployment has declined substantially, to 3.2 million registered unemployed persons in August 2008 (p.2)
Type of data used in study	Administrative data	Administrative data (p. 12)	Administrative data
Time period covered by the analysis	1994 - November 1999 (p.377)	January 1998 - December 1999, (p. 12)	Intake was in March 2003, and the analysis ran for 3.5 years after programme start. (p.1)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	NR	Monthly, (p. 12)	Daily (p. 15)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	The different programs are compared to one another (p.371) And the programs are compared to longer job-search as openly unemployed.	Matching is used, control group does not participate.	Participants are compared to those who are not chosen for the treatment now, but will eventually participate in a programme, e.g. they will participate at a later point in time (pp.13-14)
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes, they do take the lock-in effect into account and measure the effect as an average over the 5-year horizon since program start.	No	The authors do say something about it (p. 23) but the results do not give a clear picture of the net-effect.
Sample-size	30,800 (p.377)	26,753, (table B-1, p. 33). (No course(32%), Personality course(5%), Language course(9%), Basic computer course(8%), Vocational training high level(2%), Vocational training low level(3%), Other training(2%), Employment programme single workplace(7%), Employment programme collective workplace(7%) and Temporary wage subsidy(25%) (table C-1, p. 34)	Observations are mentioned in table a.1 on p.30

Author	Torp	Vuori, Silvonon, Vinokur, Price	Vuori, Vesalainen
Title	The impact of training on employment: Assessing a Norwegian labour market programme.	The Työhön Job Search Program in Finland: Benefits for the Unemployed With Risk of Depression or Discouragement	Labour market interventions as predictors of re-employment, job seeking activity and psychological distress among the unemployed
Year	1994	2002	1999
Country	Norway	Finland	Finland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Scand. J. of Economics	Journal of Occupational Health Psychology	Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Participants were randomly selected among participants (in the LMT) during the spring of 1989 (previously unemployed). (p. 537)	Respondents varied in age from 18 to 61 years. In Finland, to avoid labelling individuals as high risk, there are usually no strong eligibility criteria for programs. (p. 6) Unemployed. To become participants, respondents had to agree to the randomization procedure of the study and to turn in the baseline assessment questionnaire. (p. 8)	Unemployed persons who had been unemployed for less than one year, but were considered to be at risk of becoming long-term unemployed (over one year). Those who were older than 54 years of age, were dropped from the study group because they were entitled to unemployment benefits up until retirement. (p. 527) A previous work history of six months and union membership guarantee earnings-related allowances up to 60-70 % of one's previous income for 500 days (p. 525).
Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation	NR	At the time of recruitment, the median duration of unemployment was 5 months (p. 8)	Up to one year. (p. 527)
Is the programme compulsory?	Not compulsory as there are non-participants (p. 537)	No, as the unemployed were asked if they wanted to participate	NR

<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Most of the respondents were recruited on the basis of invitations by mail and phone and by direct contacts in four employment offices in south-western Finland. We [the authors] recruited all others in presentation of the program in employment offices. (p.8)</p>	<p>They are recruited in five employment offices in southern, central and northern Finland (p. 527).</p>
<p>Type of ALMP</p>	<p>Vocational training is dominant and a wide range of subjects and crafts are covered. (p. 532)</p>	<p>In summary, the MPRC Job Search Program and its Finnish version, the Työhön Program, were both designed to increase job-search self-efficacy, motivation, and skills and to provide inoculation against setbacks during the job-search process. (p. 7) Workshop to enhance following job-search skills: a) recognizing and communicating one's marketable skills, b) identifying and using one's social network to find job openings, c) contacting promising employers, d) drawing up a job application and resume, and e) preparing for successful job interviews. (p. 9)</p>	<p>Guidance course, lasting typically between 6 and 7 hours a day for 10-15 days, for a total of between 60 and 100 hours. (p. 528) Vocational training, lasting about half a year - general (e.g. language) training or basic or advanced vocational training. (p. 528) Subsidized employment, lasting 6 months - in either the public or private sector, financed mainly by the government (p. 528)</p>
<p>Do individuals attend more than one program?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>Yes, they can participate in all three kinds of programs (p. 528)</p>

Benefit level during ALMP participation	All participants get a training allowance. Those who are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits may opt to collect them - as they amount to more than the allowance, (p. 532)	NR	A previous work history of six months and union membership guarantee earnings-related allowances up to 60-70% of one's previous income for 500 days...In the finish system, participation in labour market training secures the previous income level as well. (p. 525)
Duration of ALMP	Most of the courses are short, from 5 to 20 weeks. Some last for a whole year (more than 40 weeks), (p. 532)	One week (p.9)	Guidance courses: 10-15 days. Vocational training: about half a year. Subsidized employment: 6 months. (p. 528)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	Five four-hour sessions from Monday to Friday. (p.9)	Guidance courses: 6-7 hours for 10-15 days, in total between 60 and 100 hours, (p. 528)
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	NR	NR	NR
Labor market conditions	Unemployment rate rose from 1,5% in 1987 to 5,5% in 1993, (p. 531)	In Finland, for example, the unemployment rate was almost as high as 20 % (p.5)	NR
Type of data used in study	Administrative registers + survey data, (p. 538)	Questionnaire (p.9)	Survey data (p. 527-528)
Time period covered by the analysis	Spring 1989 - May 1990, (p. 539)	6 months (p.10)	1993-1994, (p. 527)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weeks, (p.544)	Follow-up 2 weeks after and 6 months after treatment (p. 11)	Dummy variable describing whether the individual is employed at time 2.

<p>Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?</p>	<p>Control group is random unemployed individuals who do not participate in time period covered by the analysis.</p>	<p>The treatment group were invited to participate in a workshop, and the control group received the same information but only in writing (p.9) The control group were given a literature package, which corresponded to the basic themes in job-search training and included four guides (...) (p. 10)</p>	<p>Non-participants had dummy-variables=0 (p. 528)</p>
<p>Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?</p>	<p>No, as the participants was part of the program during spring 1989 and the response period was from June 1989 to May 1990 (.532+538)</p>	<p>No</p>	<p>No</p>
<p>Sample-size</p>	<p>Participants: 3018 Non-participants: 3388. (table 1, p. 540)</p>	<p>1261 individuals (p.9) were randomized. 2-week post-test: 1,111 individuals, 6-month post-test: 1,225 individuals (p. 10)</p>	<p>T1: 559 persons, T2: 401 (p. 527-528)</p>

Author	Wunsch, Lechner	Zhang
Title	What did all the money do? On the general ineffectiveness of recent west German labour market programmes	Identifying treatment effects of active labour market programmes for Norwegian adults
Year	2008	2003
Country	Germany	Norway
Language	English	English
Publication	Kyklos	University of Oslo

<p>Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits</p>	<p>Our initial sample consists of the inflow into unemployment from insured employment or inactivity between January 2000 and the first half of December 2002. Focusing on the prime-age part of the West German population and to avoid most influences coming from retirement, early retirement and primary education, we impose an age restriction (25-49 years). Moreover, concentrating on the main body of the labour force we exclude unemployed who were trainees, home workers, apprentices or without previous employment, as well as unemployed with an intensity of the last employment before programme participation below half of the usual full-time working hours. Participants further had to have received UB or UA directly before programme start, and also have a vocational degree or at least three years of work experience. (p. 142) In Germany, unemployment insurance covers all employees. Persons who have contributed for at least 12 months within the 3 years before becoming unemployed are eligible for unemployment benefits (UB), which they receive only if they register with the public employment service (PES).</p>	<p>In this analysis we focus on the core of the labour force, i.e. adult male and female job seekers, aged 25-50, not temporarily laid off, who have been full time employed for at least 12 months prior to entering the registers as unemployed. All of them are entitled to unemployment benefits. (p.8)</p>
<p>Duration of benefit period prior to ALMP participation</p>	<p>Table 3 p. 144 includes a variable named "Time to treatment (months)" – 4-8 months</p>	<p>NR</p>

<p>Is the programme compulsory?</p>	<p>Yes. Actual payment of UB is conditional on active job search, regular show-up at the PES and participation in labour market programmes. (p. 138)</p>	<p>Although strict enforcement rules of cut-off were rarely applied, benefit claimants have often been required to participate in some programmes in order to maintain the benefit entitlement during or after the quarantine period (p.6)</p>
<p>How are the individuals informed about ALMP?</p>	<p>NR</p>	<p>NR</p>
<p>Type of ALMP</p>	<p>SCM (Acquisition of specific knowledge and skills), JSA (Assessment of jobseekers ability and willingness to search for job and to work, basic job search assistance), ST(Minor adjustment of skills), JRT Combined off-the-job training in a specific field of profession), GT6(General update, adjustment end extension of knowledge and skills; mainly off the job, planned duration =<6 months), GT6+(GT6 > 6 months), DC(Vocational training that awards a formal professional degree and that corresponds to regular vocational training in the German apprenticeship system), EP (Subsidised non-market jobs). (table 2, p. 140) Only GT-6M, GT-6M+ and DC usable in the review.</p>	<p>Labor market training programmes (i), temporary employment in public sectors (ii), and wage subsidy (iii) (pp.6-7)</p>
<p>Do individuals attend more than one program?</p>	<p>No. Since we observe outcomes only up to mid-2005, we only evaluate the first participation of a person in a programme if it occurred within the 18-month window and before 2003. (p.143)</p>	<p>NR</p>

Benefit level during ALMP participation	Normal UB or UA, though in a special form as maintenance allowance. (p. 138)	NR
Duration of ALMP	Mean planned duration (days): SCM (62), JSA (56), ST (56), JRT (186), GT6 (122), GT6+ (292), DC (690), EP (313) (table 2, p. 140). Only GT-6M, GT-6M+ and DC usable in the review.	(i) On average 1-5 months. (p.6)
How many hours a week/month do individuals participate in ALMP?	NR	NR
Are there any sanctions if an individual refuses to participate in a program?	Yes. In case of noncompliance with benefit conditions, sanctions, i.e. reductions in or suspensions of benefits, can be imposed. (p. 138)	If the unemployed fails to meet certain criteria for active job search after the exhaustion of the first benefit period, the benefit is cut-off for a quarantine period (p.6)
Labor market conditions	Unemployment rate was 8% in 2000 and 10% in 2005 (p. 137).	NR
Type of data used in study	Administrative registers (p. 141)	Administrative data
Time period covered by the analysis	2000-2005, (p. 141)	January 1990 - December 2000 (p.8)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Half-monthly (p. 150)	Monthly(p. 8)
Which counterfactual situation is participation compared to?	Non-participants are all persons who do not enter a programme in this period. For them we also require that they receive UB or UA at simulated programme start. (p. 143)	Three different programmes are compared to one another.
Is the measured effect net of lock-in effects?	Yes	Yes (p. 29-33)

Sample-size	EP(211), SCM(846), JSA(960), ST(657), GT6(551), GT6+(772), DC(415), JRT(558), (p. 144). Only GT-6M, GT-6M+ and DC usable in the review.	115557 individuals with 126034 unemployment spells. (table 1, p. 12)
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13.1.3 Numeric data for studies with effect estimate

Author	Agell	Ahmad, Svarer	Baumgartner, Caliendo
Title	Swedish Labor Market Programs: Efficiency and Timing	The Effect of Sanctions and Active Labour Market Programmes on the Exit Rate From Unemployment	Turning unemployment into self-employment: Effectiveness of two start-up programmes
Year	1995	2009	2008
Country	Sweden	Denmark	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Swedish Economic Policy Review	Aarhus University	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Type of outcome data	Duration model (Cox)	Time-of-event	Matching and diff-in-diff
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate, table 5, p. 89	Multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate, table 2+3, p. 17-18	Average treatment effect over time, figure 2 p. 364. Cumulated effects in months, table 5, secondary outcome in table 6
Time Point (s)	-	Locking-in effect + post program effect	Effect since start of the programme. Used figure, 20 month as duration is 6 months.
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative + questionnaire
Method of estimation	Cox proportional hazard rate	Multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate	-

<p style="text-align: center;">Statistics</p>	<p>Exit to permanent job (hazard ratio (SE)): Labor market training: -0,935(0,147), replacement schemes: -1,097 (0,205), relief work: -1,449 (0,189), job introduction: -1,384 (0,170)</p>	<p>Exit out of unemployment (assumed to be employment) - MEN, LOCKING-IN EFFECT: Private-sector employment subsidy: 0,216 (0,04), public sector employment subsidy: - 0,246 (0,06), education: -0,185 (0,03), other programs: 0,113 (0,04). MEN/POST PROGRAM: private sector employment subsidy: 0,444 (0,05), public sector employment subsidy: -0,145 (0,06), education: 0,023 (0,02), other programs: -0,369 (0,02). WOMEN/LOCK-IN EFFECT: private sector employment subsidy: 0,246 (0,05), public sector employment subsidy: -0,247 (0,04), education: -0,497 (0,03), other programs: - 0,123 (0,05). WOMEN/POST PROGRAM: private sector employment subsidy: 0,386 (0,06), public sector employment subsidy: 0,126 (0,05), education: -0,010 (0,02), other programs: -0,378 (0,02).</p>	<p>Employed or self-employed (in months) - Men in SUS: 14,66 (se: 0,474), Women in SUS: 16,87 (se:0,496), Men in BA: 10,17 (se:0,382), Women in BA: 14,76 (se:0,505)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Notes</p>		<p>Average of men and women. 4 out of 4 programmes used</p>	<p>Only used BA as SUS is not restricted to UI recipients. Outcome B. Used figure, 20 month as duration is 6 months. Average of men and women</p>

Author	Behaghel, Crépon, Gurgand	Benmarker, Skans, Vikman	Black, Smith, Berger, Noel
Title	Private and public provision of counselling to job-seekers: Evidence from a large controlled experiment	Workfare for the old and long-term unemployed	Is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves? Evidence from random assignment in the UI system
Year	2012	2012	2003
Country	France	Sweden	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	IFAU Working Paper	The American Economic Review
Type of outcome data	Linear probability model estimated by 2SLS	Log hazard rates	Fixed effects regression + matching (experiment). Duration model.
Outcome	Coefficients, table 6, p. 50	Proportional hazard rates, table B1 p. 33	Hazard rates, figure 7 p. 1322
Time Point (s)	Within 3, 6, 9, 12 months of randomization	Current program (in program now) + lagged program (has been in program)	?
Source	Administrative registers + questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	-	-

Statistics	Exit to employment. Private program effect - 3 months: 0,016 (0,014), 6 months: 0,042 (0,017), 9 months: 0,058 (0,020), 12 months: 0,056 (0,020). Public program (inflow with UB) - 3 months: 0,090 (0,025), 6 months: 0,091 (0,029), 9 months: 0,102 (0,028), 12 months: 0,073 (0,029)	Exit to job. Current program: -0,178 (0,024), lagged program: 0,048 (0,040)	Figure 7 for primary outcome with 95%-CI
Notes	Average of two programmes at 12 months, they are both job search assistance	1 out of 1 used	

Author	Bloom	Caliendo, Künn	Caliendo, Künn, Schmidl
Title	Back to Work: Testing Reemployment Services for Displaced Workers	Getting back into the labor market: The effects of start-up subsidies for unemployed females	Fighting youth unemployment: The effects of active labor market policies
Year	1990	2012	2011
Country	USA	Germany	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Book	IZA Discussion Paper	IZA Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	RCT	Matching with propensity scores	Inverse probability weighting with propensity score
Outcome	Mean weeks employed and per cent employed	Table 5, p. 30	Table 5, p. 37

Time Point (s)	3 and 4 quarters after randomization + survey week (p. 127)	56 months after start-up and cumulated effects from month 1 to 56	30 and 60 months following program entry (p. 16)
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers + questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	-	-
Statistics	<p>Employment experience. Mean weeks worked 3rd quarter: TEC/HCC, I: 10,2, I/II: 9,2, Control: 8,9, SEE I/II: 7,5, Control: 6,8, SER/JOBS I/II: 8,6, Control: 7,9. Mean weeks worked 4th quarter: TEC/HCC, I: 10,5, I/II: 9,9, Control: 9,8, SEE I/II: 8,4, Control: 8,2, SER/JOBS I/II: 8,0, Control: 9,1. Per cent employed, 3rd or 4th quarter: TEC/HCC, I: 93, I/II: 85, Control: 84, SEE I/II: 80, Control: 74, SER/JOBS I/II: 84, Control: 88. Per cent employed, survey week: TEC/HCC, I: 82, I/II: 74, Control: 75, SEE I/II: 66, Control: 67, SER/JOBS I/II: 71, Control: 74.</p>	<p>Effect after 56 months. SUS WG: 25,5 (30,5), SUS EG: 37,8 (5,7), BA WG: 23,2 (3,9), BA EG: 33,1 (4,7). Total cumulated effect. SUS WG: 26,9 (1,4), SUS EG: 29,8 (2,7), BA WG: 20,6 (1,7), BA EG: 25,9 (2,1)</p>	<p>Regular employment probability. East Germany - JS30: 1,49 (0,25), JS60: 3,81 (0,54), STT30: 1,27 (0,31), STT60: 3,65 (0,57), JWS30: 3,10 (0,31), JWS60: 9,09 (0,62), WS30: 3,53 (0,49), WS60: 8,49 (1,02), JCS30: -1,47 (0,25), JCS60: -2,38 (0,56), FT30: 0,27 (0,44), FT60: 2,86 (0,98), PT30: -1,64 (0,20), PT60: -3,43 (0,43). West Germany - JS30: 1,37 (0,22), JS60: 2,85 (0,42), STT30: 0,98 (0,23), STT60: 2,75 (0,45), JWS30: 4,16 (0,38), JWS60: 8,53 (0,71), WS30: 2,42 (0,47), WS60: 4,92 (0,86), JCS30: -1,38 (0,30), JCS60: -1,63 (0,64), FT30: 1,23 (0,44), FT60: 4,47 (0,83), PT30: -2,14 (0,20), PT60: -3,09 (0,42)</p>

Notes	Average of 2 programmes as they are of same type. Risk difference calculated.	Used only East and BA as West is used from Baumgartner, Caliendo (2008)	Not used JWS and PT. Used Job search (JS), Train (STT and FT) Pub Priv empl (JCS and WS). Used 24 months as duration is 1-3 and 6-12 months. Used table B5. East and West separately used
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Author	Caplan, Vinokur, Price, van Ryn	Cockx	Anderson, Corson, Decker (data extracted from Corson, Haimson (1996))
Title	Job seeking, reemployment, and mental health: A randomized field experiment in coping with job loss	Vocational training of unemployed workers in Belgium	The New Jersey insurance reemployment demonstration project: Six-year follow-up and summary report
Year	1989	2003	1996
Country	USA	Belgium	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of Applied Psychology	IZA Discussion Paper	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper
Type of outcome data	Means and SD's from experiment	Linear regression model estimated with minimum chi-square	Probability of working
Outcome	Table 2 p. 764	Table 2 p. 20	Table B.6 p. 115
Time Point (s)	4 weeks after the intervention + 4 months after the intervention	Before participation, during participation and post participation	Quarters (1-4) and year (1-6) since beginning of treatment

Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	-	
Statistics	% reemployed - T2 , T: 33 (0,47), C: 26 (0,44), T3 , T:59 (0,49), C:51 (0,50).	Out of unemployment - before participation: -0,242 (1,681), during participation: -0,070 (0,014), post participation: 0,104 (0,006)	Probability of working defined as having reported earnings in the quarter (Only within state employment). Q1: JSA: 50%, JSA plus Training: 50%, JSA plus Bonus: 53%, control: 49%. Q2: JSA: 59%, JSA plus Training: 57%, JSA plus Bonus: 59%, control: 57%. Q3: JSA: 64%, JSA plus Training: 63%, JSA plus Bonus: 63%, control: 63%. Q4: JSA: 63%, JSA plus Training: 62%, JSA plus Bonus: 62%, control: 63%.
Notes	The total numbers are calculated. Outcome measured 1 month and 4 months post. Results almost identical. Calculated hazard ratio.		Hazard calculated using Q1 data. Treatment begins in week 5 and duration is very short. Average of 3 search programmes (JSAs)

Author	Crépon, Dejemeppe, Gurgans	Decker, Olsen, Freeman	Dolton, O'Neill
Title	Counselling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?	Assisting unemployment insurance claims: The long-term impacts of the job search assistance demonstration	The Restart effect and the return to full-time stable employment
Year	2005	2000	1996
Country	France	USA	UK
Language	English	English	English
Publication	PSE Working Paper	Mathematica Policy Resarch	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A
Type of outcome data	Time-of-event	Probability of working	Duration model
Outcome	Table 4	Table 7.3 and 7.4 p. 144-145	Cox proportional Hazard rates in Table 1 p. 284
Time Point (s)	-	Quarters (1-12) since beginning of treatment	-
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative + questionnaire
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rates		-

<p style="text-align: center;">Statistics</p>	<p>To employment. Skill assessment: 0,241 (0,074), Project assessment: -0,103 (0,067), Job-search support: 0,547 (0,031), Project support: -0,131 (0,053)</p>	<p>Probability of working defined as having reported earnings in the quarter (not including self-employment, federal jobs, military service, domestic or agricultural employment), Q1: DC/Florida SJSA T: 42.9%/50.9% of 2024/3009 C: 40.7%/49.5% of 2006/2997; DC/Florida IJSA T: 42.2%/50.2% of 2018/2993 C: 40.7%/49.5% of 2006/2997; DC/FLORIDA IJSA+ T:42.3%/49.5% of 2009/2961 C: 40.7%/49.5% of 2006/2997</p>	<p>Exit to any job: dummy for control group: -0,219 (0,089). Exit to stable job (lasting at least 3 months): dummy for control group: -0,117 (0,151)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Notes</p>	<p>The 4 programmes are averaged to one (job search assistance)</p>	<p>Hazard calculated using Q1 data. Treatment begins in week 7-8 and duration is very short. Average of 3 search programmes (JSAs). Used DC and F separately</p>	<p>Used exit to any job: dummy for control group, changed sign</p>

Author	Eden, Aviram	Firth, Payne, Payne	Fitzenberger, Völter
Title	Self-efficacy training to speed reemployment: Helping people to help themselves	Efficacy of programmes for the unemployed: discrete time modelling of duration data from a matched comparison study	Long-run effects of training programs for the unemployed in East Germany
Year	1993	1999	2007
Country	Israel	UK	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of Applied Psychology	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A	ZEW Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	RCT with proportion of participants who is reemployed or unemployed	Matching	Matching - outcome data as average effect over quarters
Outcome	Table 4 p. 357	Table 2 p. 117	Figure 1-6 + table 6 p. 33
Time Point (s)	2 months after the workshop	While in treatment and after treatment	Q4-Q23 after treatment start + Q8-Q23 after treatment start.
Source	Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	-	-

<p style="text-align: center;">Statistics</p>	<p>Numbers of reemployed and unemployed. High GSE: reemployed treatment group=10, unemployed treatment group=6, reemployed control=14, unemployed control=3. Low GSE: reemployed treatment group=10, unemployed treatment group=6, reemployed control=4, unemployed control=13.</p>	<p>Is on employment training (ET): 0,61 (0,14). Is on employment action (EA): -0,31 (0,27). Has been on ET: 0,66 (0,18). Has been on EA: -0,20 (0,35)</p>	<p>Employment effects for women. Q4-Q23 - PF1: 0,085 (0,085), PF2: 0,074 (0,040), PF3: 0,041 (0,056), SPST1: 0,075 (0,018), SPST2: 0,049 (0,017), SPST3: 0,068 (0,024), RT1: -0,008 (0,041), RT2: -0,032 (0,043), SPST3: 0,097 (0,049). Q8-Q23 - PF1: 0,078 (0,088), PF2: 0,071 (0,044), PF3: 0,057 (0,061), SPST1: 0,095 (0,020), SPST2: 0,074 (0,019), SPST3: 0,092 (0,025), RT1: 0,067 (0,049), RT2: 0,034 (0,048), RT3: 0,164 (0,055). Employment effects for men. Q4-Q23 - PF1: 0,060 (0,048), SPST1: 0,114 (0,026), SPST2: 0,050 (0,035), SPST3: 0,044 (0,028), RT1: 0,026 (0,037), RT2: -0,014 (0,037), RT3: -0,056 (0,073), Q8-Q23 PF1: 0,066 (0,052), SPST1: 0,131 (0,027), SPST2: 0,079 (0,036), SPST3: 0,074 (0,030), RT1: 0,120 (0,040), RT2: 0,056 (0,042), RT3: -0,020 (0,077).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Notes</p>	<p>Outcome measured 2 months post, hazard ratio calculated</p>	<p>Logistic model. Used hazard ratio</p>	<p>Two types of 2 programmes: Public employment programmes (PF) and Training (SPST and RT, averaged). Average of men/women and stratum. Used Q4-23 for PF and SPST and Q8-23 for RT</p>

Author	Frölich, Lechner	Gerfin, Lechner, Steiger	Gorter, Kalb
Title	Combining Matching and Nonparametric IV Estimation: Theory and an Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies	Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? An Econometric analysis of two different schemes	Estimating the effect of counselling and monitoring the unemployed using a job search model
Year	2010	2002	1996
Country	Switzerland	Switzerland	Netherlands
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Universität St. Gallen	Universität St. Gallen	The Journal of Human Resources
Type of outcome data	IV + matching	Matching	Duration model with randomization
Outcome	Table 3+4 p. 32-33	Table 4 p. 23	Hazard rates, table 2 p. 601
Time Point (s)	After program participation	3, 9, 15 and 21 months after the beginning of the program	Op to one year after the program finished
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative data	Administrative registers + questionnaire
Method of estimation	-	-	-

Statistics	<p>Treatment window 3 months - compliers. Employment 1999: 0,155 (0,108), employment 2003: 0,210 (0,113), employment 2006: 0,120 (0,121), employment 1999-2006: 0,163 (0,108). Treatment window 4 months - compliers. Employment 1999: 0,102 (0,111), employment 2003: 0,270 (0,114), employment 2006: 0,218 (0,117), employment 1999-2006: 0,179 (0,110).</p>	<p>Employed for at least 3 months with average earnings of more than 90 % of previous earnings (in %). Subsidised temporary job vs. nonparticipation - after 3 months: -2 (0,9), 9 months: 3 (1,1), 15 months: 8 (1,2), 21 months: 8 (1,5). Employment program vs. nonparticipation - 3 months: -9 (1,1), 9 months: -4 (1,5), 15 months: 1 (1,8), 21 months: 1 (2,6).</p>	<p>Job finding rate. Previous temporary job: -0,50 (0,20), previous permanent job: 0,11 (0,09)</p>
Notes		<p>Effect measure start in the month the programme begins. Effect is risk difference. Used 21 months=15 months post programme as programme duration is 6 months. 2 out of 2 programmes used</p>	<p>Average of 2 former jobs</p>

Author	Graversen, van Ours	Hujer, Thomsen	Hujer, Thomsen, Zeiss
Title	How to Help Unemployed Find Jobs Quickly: Experimental Evidence from a Mandatory Activation Program	How do the employment effects of job creation schemes differ with respect to the foregoing unemployment duration?	The effects of vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany
Year	2006	2010	2006
Country	Denmark	Germany	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	Labour Economics	Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv
Type of outcome data	Duration model	Matching	Time-of-event
Outcome	Mixed proportional hazard rate, table 3, p. 28	Table 3 + table 4 p. 45-46	Bivariate mixed proportional hazard rates, table 3 p. 316
Time Point (s)	During, after and net effect	6, 12, 18,24 and 30 months after programme start	3 months, 6 months, 12 months after program start

Source	Administrative data	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rate	-	Bivariate mixed proportional hazard rate
Statistics	<p>Average effect: 0,26 (0,04), During Job Search program: 0,18 (0,10), during training program: -0,56 (0,12), after job search program: 0,36 (0,06), after training program: 0,27 (0,14), Net effect - Job search program: 0,32 (0,06), training program: -0,30 (0,10)</p>	<p>Employment effects. WEST GERMANY MEN. <i>Quarter 1</i>, 6 months after start: -0,208 (0,009), 12 months after: -0,115 (0,014), 18 months after: -0,154 (0,015), 24 months after: -0,090 (0,016), 30 months after: -0,063 (0,016). <i>Quarter 2</i>, 6: -0,186 (0,011), 12: -0,079 (0,018), 18: -0,062 (0,019), 24: -0,012 (0,020), 30: -0,023 (0,020). <i>Quarter 3</i>, 6: -0,153 (0,013), 12: -0,110 (0,017), 18: -0,055 (0,019), 24: -0,050 (0,019), 30: -0,002 (0,021). <i>Quarter 4</i>, 6: -0,137 (0,010), 12: -0,079 (0,016), 18: -0,091 (0,017), 24: -0,038 (0,019), 30: -0,010 (0,020). <i>Quarter 5</i>, 6: -0,158 (0,008), 12: -0,023 (0,016), 18: 0,003 (0,018), 24: 0,049 (0,018), 30: 0,075 (0,019). <i>Quarter 6</i>, 6: -0,135 (0,014), 12: -0,052 (0,022), 18: -0,059 (0,023), 24: -0,017 (0,025), 30: 0,017 (0,025). <i>Quarter 7</i>, 6: -0,058 (0,017), 12: 0,008 (0,022), 18: 0,015 (0,022), 24: 0,019 (0,024), 30: 0,046 (0,025). <i>Quarter 8</i>, 6: -0,137 (0,014), 12: -0,044 (0,025), 18: 0,029 (0,028), 24: 0,073 (0,030), 30: 0,059 (0,030). WEST GERMANY WOMEN. <i>Quarter 1</i>, 6: -0,288 (0,010), 12: -0,156 (0,023), 18: -0,185 (0,024), 24: -0,060 (0,027), 30: -0,026 (0,028). <i>Quarter 2</i>, 6: -0,258 (0,015), 12: -0,075 (0,029), 18: -0,075 (0,030), 24: 0,025 (0,032), 30: 0,058 (0,032). <i>Quarter 3</i>, 6: -0,213 (0,012), 12: -0,070 (0,026), 18: -0,085 (0,026), 24: -0,078</p>	<p>From program start to 3 months: -2,194 (t-value: -13,07), from program start to 6 months: -1,931 (t-value: -14,34), from program start to 12 months: -1,683 (t-value: -13,01). From program start+ 3 months to infinity: -1,397 (t-value: -10,08), from program start+6 months to infinity: -1,079 (t-value: -7,38), from program start+12 months to infinity: -1,396 (t-value: -6,59).</p>

		<p>(0,028), 30: -0,019 (0,029). <i>Quarter 4</i>, 6: -0,214 (0,012), 12: -0,043 (0,024), 18: 0,034 (0,026), 24: 0,052 (0,027), 30: 0,043 (0,027). <i>Quarter 5</i>, 6: -0,221 (0,012), 12: -0,088 (0,023), 18: -0,064 (0,023), 24: 0,094 (0,026), 30: 0,119 (0,026). <i>Quarter 6</i>, 6: -0,196 (0,025), 12: -0,080 (0,037), 18: -0,080 (0,039), 24: -0,029 (0,041), 30: -0,014 (0,041). <i>Quarter 7</i>, 6: -0,183 (0,017), 12: -0,077 (0,032), 18: -0,070 (0,036), 24: -0,007 (0,040), 30: 0,000 (0,040). <i>Quarter 8</i>, 6: -0,232 (0,024), 12: -0,096 (0,039), 18: -0,096 (0,041), 24: -0,016 (0,044), 30: -0,008 (0,045). EAST GERMANY MEN. <i>Quarter 1</i>, 6: -0,111 (0,008), 12: -0,087 (0,011), 18: -0,095 (0,011), 24: -0,046 (0,013), 30: -0,055 (0,013). <i>Quarter 2</i>, 6: -0,103 (0,010), 12: -0,065 (0,012), 18: -0,078 (0,012), 24: -0,032 (0,014), 30: -0,033 (0,014). <i>Quarter 3</i>, 6: -0,084 (0,008), 12: -0,058 (0,011), 18: -0,075 (0,011), 24: -0,071 (0,013), 30: -0,050 (0,013). <i>Quarter 4</i>, 6: -0,082 (0,007), 12: -0,027 (0,010), 18: -0,034 (0,011), 24: -0,011 (0,011), 30: -0,020 (0,012). <i>Quarter 5</i>, 6: -0,105 (0,006), 12: -0,057 (0,009), 18: -0,065 (0,010), 24: -0,020 (0,011), 30: 0,010 (0,012). <i>Quarter 6</i>, 6: -0,120 (0,007), 12: -0,062 (0,012), 18: -0,033 (0,013), 24: -0,003 (0,013), 30: -0,003 (0,014). <i>Quarter 7</i>, 6: -0,117 (0,008), 12: -0,104 (0,011), 18: -0,060 (0,012), 24: -0,036 (0,013), 30: -0,006 (0,014). <i>Quarter 8</i>, 6: -0,114 (0,008), 12: -0,094 (0,011), 18: -0,069 (0,012), 24: -0,047 (0,013), 30: -0,019 (0,016). EAST GERMANY WOMEN. <i>Quarter 1</i>, 6: -0,108</p>	
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		(0,007), 12: -0,059 (0,010), 18: -0,058 (0,012), 24: -0,048 (0,013), 30: -0,034 (0,013). <i>Quarter 2</i> , 6: -0,117 (0,007), 12: -0,081 (0,011), 18: -0,095 (0,013), 24: -0,066 (0,014), 30: -0,058 (0,015). <i>Quarter 3</i> , 6: -0,098 (0,007), 12: -0,029 (0,012), 18: -0,026 (0,013), 24: -0,032 (0,015), 30: -0,019 (0,016). <i>Quarter 4</i> , 6: -0,123 (0,006), 12: -0,061 (0,010), 18: -0,081 (0,011), 24: -0,080 (0,012), 30: -0,064 (0,013). <i>Quarter 5</i> , 6: -0,138 (0,005), 12: -0,057 (0,010), 18: -0,052 (0,010), 24: -0,014 (0,011), 30: 0,023 (0,012). <i>Quarter 6</i> , 6: -0,183(0,007), 12: -0,123 (0,011), 18: -0,070 (0,013), 24: -0,034 (0,015), 30: -0,030 (0,015). <i>Quarter 7</i> , 6: -0,181 (0,005), 12: -0,125 (0,010), 18: -0,090 (0,012), 24: -0,057 (0,013), 30: -0,060 (0,014). <i>Quarter 8</i> , 6: -0,158 (0,008), 12: -0,077 (0,013), 18: -0,037 (0,014), 24: -0,009 (0,016), 30: 0,002 (0,016).	
Notes	Used post 2 out of 2 programmes	Average of 8 stratum and men/women. East and West used separate. Used 24 month as duration is 12 months	1 out of 1 used

Author	Hujer, Zeiss	Hägglund	Jespersen, Much, Skipper
Title	The effects of job creation schemes on the unemployment duration in Eastern Germany	Job-search assistance using the internet: experiences from a Swedish randomised experiment	Costs and benefits of Danish active labour market programmes
Year	2007	2006	2008
Country	Germany	Sweden	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	ZAF	International Journal of Manpower	Labour Economics
Type of outcome data	Time-of-event	Probit regression	Average treatment effect on the treated, matching
Outcome	Table 2+4+5	Probit estimates, adjusted, table IV, p. 446	Average employment effects, figure 2, p. 874
Time Point (s)	After programme has finished + cumulated (during programme+after-programme)	6 months follow-up, divided into months - July, August, September, October, November, December	Every quarter from 1995q1 to 2005q1
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rates	Probit regression with adjustment for differences in observed characteristics.	ATET with matching
Statistics	After programme effect: -0,2168 (t-value:-2,51), net lock-in: -0,2822 (t-value: -3,92)	July: 0,033 (0,021), August: 0,026 (0,026), September: -0,006 (0,031), October: 0,010 (0,036), November: -0,007 (0,038), December: -0,013 (0,039).	Figure 2 with CI, need to calculate from the graphs.
Notes	1 out of 1 used (JCS)	Used unadjusted effects, average of 6 months	Used figure. Used 97.1 as duration is ½-1 year. Used 4 out of 4 programmes

Author	Johnsson, Klepinger	Kvasnicka	Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller
Title	Evaluation of the impacts of the Washington alternative work search experiment	Does temporary help work provide a stepping stone to regular employment?	The Impact of Active Labour Market Programmes on the Duration of Unemployment in Switzerland
Year	1991	2008	2008
Country	USA	Germany	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	NBER Working Paper	The Economic Journal
Type of outcome data	RCT, duration model	Matching with propensity score	Matching and time-of-event
Outcome	Table 4 p. 35	Table 5 p. 29	Graphs for matching estimator with CI - figure 3. Proportional hazard rates table 2, multivariate mixed proportional hazard rates table 3.
Time Point (s)	One estimate of HR in week 0-29	Average over 48 months post entry	0-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, 9+ months and a constant treatment effect (net-effect)
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation		-	Proportional hazard rates and mixed proportional hazard rates

<p style="text-align: center;">Statistics</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Hazard rate (exit UI) in week 0-29 (SE): Treatment A: -0.351 (0.033); Treatment C: -0.001 (0.032); Treatment D: 0.075 (0.03)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Regular employment (in %-point + CI-intervals). Unemployment entry month 1-12: 2,0 (-1,3;5,3), 1st month: 5,3 (-4,1;14,7), 3rd month: 3,2 (-5,3;11,8), 6th month: 0,7 (-7,8;9,2), 9th month: 7,4 (-11,0;25,7), 12th month: 3,2 (-19,0;25,4).</p>	<p>Transitions to regular jobs - multivariate mixed proportional hazard model, effect on log hazard rate (z-values in parentheses). 0-2 months after program start - Basic training: -0,306 (-6,060), Advanced Training: -0,392 (-3,077), Employment Programme: -0,912 (-7,412), Subsidised Jobs: -0,074 (-1,771). 3-5 months after program start - Basic training: -0,279 (-4,391), Advanced Training: -0,050 (-0,381), Employment programme: 0,229 (-1,887), Subsidised jobs: 0,035 (0,661). 6-8 months after program start - Basic training: -0,233 (-2,696), Advanced training: 0,064 (0,356), Employment programme: -0,035 (-0,225), Subsidies Jobs: 0,053 (0,688). 9+ months after program start - Basic training: -0,060 (-0,572), Advanced training: -0,028 (-0,122), Employment programme: -0,154 (-0,750), Subsidised jobs: 0,063 (0,624). Net-effect - Basic training: -0,285 (-6,759), Advanced training: -0,203 (-2,353), Employment programme: -0,557 (-6,890), Subsidised jobs: -0,036 (-0,975).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Notes</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Only D used</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">1 out of 1 used</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Used 3 out of 4, not used subsidised jobs</p>

Author	Osikominu	Pedersen, Rosholm, Svarer	Prey
Title	Quick job entry or long-term human capital development? The dynamic effects of alternative training schemes	Experimental evidence on the effects of early meetings and activation	Evaluation of Training Programs in St. Gallen, Switzerland
Year	2012	2012	2000
Country	Germany	Denmark	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	CESifo Working Paper	IZA Discussion Paper	Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik
Type of outcome data	Duration model	Duration model	Matching, probit estimation
Outcome	Table F1 Appendix F	Table 3 p. 30	Coefficients and t-values, table 2, p. 429
Time Point (s)		1-16 weeks of unemployment, 17+ weeks of unemployment	After participation
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rates	-	Probit estimation
Statistics	Employment - short-term training: 0,057 (0,123), long-term training: 0,544 (0,072)	From unemployment to employment. Exp. A - men 1-16 weeks: -0,066 (0,127), men 17+ weeks: -0,016 (0,117), women 1-16 weeks: -0,004 (0,136), women 17+ weeks: 0,080 (0,122). Exp. B - men 1-16 weeks: 0,017 (0,108), men 17+ weeks: 0,050 (0,104), women 1-16 weeks: 0,192 (0,116), women 17+ weeks: 0,090 (0,129). Exp. C - men 1-16 weeks: 0,143 (0,103), men 17+ weeks: -0,039 (0,095), women 1-16 weeks: 0,036 (0,109), women 17+ weeks: -0,224 (0,112). Exp. D - men 1-16 weeks: -0,029 (0,140), men 17+ weeks: -0,029 (0,139), women 1-16 weeks: 0,217 (0,125), -0,040 (0,139).	Gen. Basic courses - 1 month since program ended: -0,868 (t: -5,75), 2 months ago: -0,481 (t: -3,74), 3 months ago: -0,366 (t: -2,99), 4 months ago: -0,349 (t: -2,90), 5 months ago: -0,345 (t: -2,87), 6 months ago: -0,225 (t: -1,72), 7 months ago: -0,241 (t: -1,65), 8 months ago: -0,363 (t: -1,72). Language courses - 1 month since program ended: 0,995 (t: 0,74), 2 months ago: 1,683 (t: 1,70), 3 months ago: 2,303 (t: 2,87), 4 months ago: 3,029 (t: 3,36), 5 months ago: 3,759 (t: 3,10), 6 months ago: 4,500 (t: 3,08). Computer courses - 1 month since program ended: -1251 (t: -3,99), 2 months

			ago: -0,995 (t: -3,87), 3 months ago: -0,718 (t: -3,01), 4 months ago: -0,638 (t: -2,74), 5 months ago: -0,593 (t: -2,50), 6 months ago: -0,565 (t: -2,15), 7 months ago: -0,702 (t: -2,25), 8 months ago: -0,153 (t: -0,29).
Notes	Use only net effect from earnings model. 2 out of 2 programmers(courses and vocational training)	A and B averaged and C and D averaged. Used 17+ weeks	

Author	Richardson, Berg	Rodriguez-Planas, Jacob	Roland, Munch, Skipper
Title	The effect of vocational employment training on the individual transition rate from unemployment to work	Evaluating active labor market programs in Romania	Program participation, labor force dynamics, and accepted wage rates
Year	2001	2007	2008
Country	Sweden	Romania	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Swedish Economic Policy Review	-	Advances in Econometrics
Type of outcome data	Time-of-event	Average treatment effect, matching	Time-of-event
Outcome	Mixed proportional hazard rate, table 2 + table 4 + table 6	Percentage points, table 10 p. 34	Table 4 p. 217
Time Point (s)	After participation + net effect	After participation - 2 years after + in the period 2000-2001	During and after participation

Source	Administrative registers	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rate	-	Mixed proportional hazard rates
Statistics	<p>Exit to work - post-program effect: 0,83 (0,10), post program effect ≤ 28 days: 1,24 (0,13), post-program effect >28 days: 0,29 (0,13), net-effect: 0,11 (0,11)</p>	<p>Employed - SE: 6,14 (-0,44;12,29), ER: 8,45 (3,19;13,90). Earnings (monthly in thousand lei) - SE: 37,58 (-13,25;80,12), ER: 56,86 (10,49;109,51). Employed for at least 6 months (during 2000-2001) - SE: 8,38 (2,29;14,13), ER: 6,22 (2,35;13,52). Employed for at least 12 months (during 2000-2001) - SE: 7,97 (-0,20;14,40), ER: 7,65 (2,11;13,73). Earnings (during 2000-2001) - SE: 43,08 (-9,48;87,58), ER: 87,32 (56,99;130,21)</p>	<p>From unemployment to employment. MEN private OJT - during: 0,900 (0,073), after: 0,724 (0,025), MEN public OJT - during: 0,319 (0,024), after: 0,737 (0,020), MEN ordinary CT - during: 0,508 (0,018), after: 1,126 (0,025), MEN residual programs - during: 0,289 (0,018), after: 0,657 (0,019). WOMEN private OJT - during: 1,144 (0,116), after: 0,830 (0,032), WOMEN public OJT - during: 0,338 (0,019), after: 0,858 (0,018), WOMEN ordinary CT - during: 0,485 (0,016), after: 1,497 (0,030), WOMEN residual program - during: 0,303 (0,020), after: 0,765 (0,021). AGE<25 private OJT - during: 1,017 (0,183), after: 0,793 (0,042), AGE<25 public OJT - during: 0,285 (0,044), after: 0,877 (0,052), AGE<25 ordinary CT - during: 0,327 (0,021), after: 0,883 (0,046), AGE<25 residual program - during: 0,418 (0,047), after: 0,816 (0,030). AGE 25-29 private OJT - during: 1,487 (0,239), after: 0,912 (0,052), AGE 25-29 public OJT - during: 0,457 (0,058), after: 0,829 (0,037), AGE 25-29 ordinary CT - during: 0,248 (0,013), after: 0,954 (0,034), AGE 25-29 residual programs - during: 0,314 (0,036), after: 0,722 (0,040). AGE 30-39 private OJT - during: 1,361 (0,167), after: 0,865 (0,047), AGE 30-39 public OJT -</p>

		<p>during: 0,523 (0,045), after: 0,924 (0,031), AGE 30-39 ordinary CT - during: 0,295 (0,013), after: 1,006 (0,027), AGE 30-39 residual program - during: 0,385 (0,036), after: 0,772 (0,034). AGE 40-49 private OJT - during: 1,260 (0,197), after: 0,696 (0,056), AGE 40-49 public OJT - during: 0,550 (0,053), after: 0,868 (0,036), AGE 40-49 ordinary CT - during: 0,334 (0,019), after: 0,967 (0,031), AGE 40-49 residual programs - during: 0,449 (0,048), after: 0,943 (0,050). AGE>49 private OJT - during: 1,499 (0,251), after: 0,871 (0,121), AGE>49 public OJT - during: 0,390 (0,045), after: 1,035 (0,055), AGE>49 ordinary CT - during: 0,614 (0,045), after: 1,375 (0,063), AGE>49 residual programs - during: 0,509 (0,074), after: 0,843 (0,089). Basic schooling private OJT - during: 1,662 (0,157), after: 0,930 (0,045), Basic schooling public OJT - during: 0,495 (0,034), after: 0,927 (0,026), Basic schooling ordinary CT - during: 0,369 (0,014), after: 0,968 (0,024), Basic schooling residual programs- during: 0,459 (0,033), after: 0,804 (0,027). High school private OJT - during: 1,631 (0,909), after: 0,929 (0,094), High school public OJT - during: 0,480 (0,120), after: 0,880 (0,087), High school ordinary CT - during: 0,244 (0,021), after: 1,042 (0,064), High school residual programs - during: 0,330 (0,059), after: 0,757 (0,057). Vocational private OJT - during: 1,534 (0,151), after: 0,832 (0,040), Vocational</p>
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			<p>public OJT - during: 0,464 (0,035), after: 0,903 (0,030), Vocational ordinary CT - during: 0,323 (0,013), after: 1,009 (0,026), Vocational residual programs - during: 0,411 (0,034), after: 0,845 (0,034). College+ private OJT - during: 1,545 (0,385), after: 0,966 (0,120), College+ public OJT - during: 0,516 (0,079), after: 0,980 (0,055), College+ ordinary CT - during: 0,285 (0,018), after: 1,007 (0,040), College+ residual programs - during: 0,368 (0,054), after: 0,892 (0,072).</p>
Notes	1 of 1 programmes used; the time spent in training (in non-AMU programs as well as in AMU) does thus not contribute to the unemployment duration, and the time spent in other training programs does not contribute to the duration until AMU. Note that this also means that time spent in non-AMU programs after AMU does not contribute to the unemployment duration.	Used 2 out of 2 programmes. Used 24 month post	Only post, 4 out of 4 programmes used

Author	Rosholm, Skipper	Rosholm, Svarer	Røed, Raaum
Title	Is labour market training a curse for the unemployed? Evidence from a social experiment	Estimating the Threat Effect of Active Labour Market Programmes	Do labour market programmes speed up the return to work?
Year	2009	2004	2006
Country	Denmark	Denmark	Norway
Language	English	English	English

Publication	Journal of Applied Econometrics	University of Aarhus	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
Type of outcome data	Experimental impact estimates, LATE and matching (ATET)	Time-of-event + dependent hazard rates model	Time-of-event
Outcome	Table V p. 359 (2nd + 3rd column)	Mixed proportional hazard rate, table 2, p. 26	Mixed proportional hazard model + competing risks
Time Point (s)	Time spent unemployed: May, June, July, August, September, October, November, and December 1994. Time spent employed: Q3 1994 - Q4 1996. Hourly wage: 1995, 1996	Threat effect, locking in effect, post-programme effect.	First-month post-programme effect + on-programme effect
Source	Administrative + questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	Mixed proportional hazard rate	Mixed proportional hazard rate + competing risks
Statistics	Quarterly employment rate. 1 (ITT) - Q3 1994: -0,011 (0,032), Q4 1994: -0,001 (0,032), Q1 1995: 0,013 (0,033), Q2 1995: -0,000 (0,032), Q3 1995: -0,025 (0,032), Q4 1995: -0,046 (0,032), Q1 1996: -0,075 (0,033), Q2 1996: -0,044 (0,032), Q3 1996: -0,052 (0,032), Q4 1996: -0,052 (0,032). 2 (LATE) - Q3 1994: -0,036 (0,110), Q4 1994: -0,027 (0,111), Q1 1995: 0,044 (0,111), Q2 1995: -0,000 (0,110), Q3 1995: -0,086 (0,109), Q4 1995: -0,157 (0,109), Q1 1996: -0,256 (0,111), Q2 1996: -0,149 (0,110), Q3 1996: -0,177 (0,110), Q4 1996: -0,177 (0,109).	LOCKING-IN EFFECTS - private sector empl. Subs.: -0,2035 (0,0769), public sector temporary jobs: -0,5733 (0,1048), other programme: 0,0282 (0,0873), education/training: -0,6845 (0,0323). POST-PROGRAMME - private sector empl. Subs.: 0,5288 (0,0883), public sector temporary jobs: 0,1309 (0,1138), other programmes: -0,0203 (0,0889), education/training: 0,2708 (0,0301).	FIRST MONTH POST-PROGRAMME - Men , 16-29 years: 0,211 (0,151), 30-50 years: 0,403 (0,135), 51-60 years: 0,276 (0,092), Immigrant men: 0,458 (0,269). Women , 16-29 years: 0,467 (0,120), 30-50 years: 0,510 (0,140), 51-60 years: 0,416 (0,178), Immigrant women: 0,674 (0,336). ON-PROGRAMME - Men , 16-29 years: -0,350 (0,224), 30-50 years: -0,027 (0,213), 51-60 years: -0,076 (0,164), Immigrant men: 0,050 (0,331). Women , 16-29 years: -0,336 (0,211), 30-50 years: -0,278 (0,253), 51-60 years: -0,326 (0,255), Immigrant women: -0,086 (0,312)
Notes	Courses (kat 1) ultimo July 1994. Used Q3 1995.	Used results without threat effect as this model is not identified	

Author	Sacklén	Solie	Steinberg, Monforte
Title	An evaluation of the Swedish trainee replacement schemes	Employment effects of retraining the unemployed	Estimating the effects of job search assistance and training programs on the unemployment durations of displaced workers
Year	2002	1968	1987
Country	Sweden	USA	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working Paper	Industrial & Labor Relations Review	<i>Chapter from book</i>
Type of outcome data	Bivariate probit at design stage but univariate probit at analysis stage	Multiple regression coefficients	Duration model
Outcome	Table 9 p. 23	Table 5 p. 219	Table 8.6 p. 200
Time Point (s)	3,6,12 and 18 months from program end	After program participation	After treatment
Source	Administrative registers	Questionnaire	Questionnaire
Method of estimation		-	-
Statistics	Employment probability difference (CI) sample 1: 3 months 12,86 (7,9-18); 6 months 11,23 (5,9-16,7), 12 months 6,5 (1,2-12); 18 months 9,64 (3,9-15,4)	Weeks employed (dummy variable compared to completers) - rejects: -7,85 (8,53), non-completers: -12,49 (7,14), non-applicants: -12,99 (6,63)	Probability of employment (t-statistics in parenthesis) - BASF vs. Lear: 0,56 (3,31), BASF vs. Chrysler: 0,4 (2,21), Dana vs. Lear: 0,25 (1,73)
Notes	12 months used		

Author	van den Berg, van der Klaauw	Vinokur, Price, Schul	Völter, Osikominu, Fitzenberger
Title	Counselling and monitoring of unemployed workers: theory and evidence from a controlled social experiment	Impact of the JOBS intervention on unemployed workers varying in risk for depression	Get training or wait? Long-run employment effects of training programs for the unemployed in West Germany
Year	2006	1995	2007
Country	Netherlands	USA	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	International Economic Review	American Journal of Community Psychology	ZEW Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	Duration model	Logistic regression, proportion + SD	Matching with propensity scores
Outcome	Hazard rate, table 5 p. 918	Table III p. 61	Table 7+8+9 p. 44-47
Time Point (s)	Before or when the experiment ends (p. 912)	2 and 6 months after the week of the intervention	Cumulated differences: 8, 16 and 24 quarters since the beginning of the treatment. Average treatment effects: 1st, 2nd, 3rd and year 4 onwards.
Source	Administrative data + Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rate	-	-
Statistics	0,06 (0,15)	2 month post-test, combined criteria. LR Exp: 0,34 (0,48), LR Control: 0,27 (0,44), HR Exp: 0,35 (0,47), HR Control: 0,29 (0,45). 2 month post-test single criteria. LR Exp: 0,40 (0,49), LR Control: 0,35 (0,48), HR Exp: 0,44 (0,50), HR Control: 0,35 (0,84). 6 month post-test, combined criteria. LR Exp: 0,59 (0,49), LR Control: 0,62 (0,49), R Exp: 0,56 (0,50), HR Control: 0,46 (0,50). 6	Employment rates - cumulated differences, training vs. waiting. 8 quarters cohort 86/87 - PF stratum1: -0,159 (0,382), PF stratum2: 0,164 (0,316), PF stratum3: 0,276 (0,304), SPST stratum1: 0,174 (0,118), SPST stratum2: 0,631 (0,173), SPST stratum3: 0,702 (0,173), RT stratum1: -1,353 (0,169), RT stratum2: -0,678 (0,252), RT stratum3: -0,347

		<p>month post-test, single criteria. LR Exp: 0,63 (0,48, LR Control: 0,67 (0,47), HR Exp: 0,62 (0,49), HR Control: 0,54 (0,50)</p>	<p>(0,216). 16 quarters cohort 86/87 - PF stratum1: 0,586 (0,706), PF stratum2: 1,150 (0,653), PF stratum3: 0,748 (0,685), SPST stratum1: 1,420 (0,241), SPST stratum2: 1,920 (0,353), SPST stratum3: 2,725 (0,406), RT stratum1: -0,150 (0,326), RT stratum2: 1,069 (0,501), RT stratum3: 1,673 (0,533). 24 quarters cohort 86/87 - PF stratum1: 1,817 (1,018), PF stratum2: 1,971 (1,009), PF stratum3: 1,280 (1,115), SPST stratum1: 2,524 (0,373), SPST stratum2: 2,766 (0,536), SPST stratum3: 4,221 (0,649), RT stratum1: 0,921 (0,511), RT stratum2: 2,842 (0,761), RT stratum3: 3,017 (0,808). 8 quarters cohort 93/94 - PF stratum1: -0,001 (0,293), PF stratum2: 0,340 (0,235), PF stratum3: 0,544 (0,276), SPST stratum1: -0,012 (0,113), SPST stratum2: 0,378 (0,130), SPST stratum3: 0,439 (0,097), RT stratum1: -1,982 (0,149), RT stratum2: -1,218 (0,192), RT stratum3: -0,878 (0,260). 16 quarters cohort 93/94 - PF stratum1: 0,317 (0,606), PF stratum2: 1,566 (0,499), PF stratum3: 1,590 (0,600), SPST stratum1: 1,201 (0,235), SPST stratum2: 1,745 (0,266), SPST stratum3: 1,495 (0,217), RT stratum1: -1,552 (0,340), RT stratum2: -0,059 (0,395), RT stratum3: -0,152 (0,563). 24 quarters cohort 93/94 - PF stratum1: 0,876 (0,924), PF stratum2: 2,862 (0,744), PF stratum3: 2,540 (0,899), SPST stratum1: 2,375 (0,348), SPST stratum2: 3,070 (0,421), SPST stratum3: 2,544 (0,338), RT</p>
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			stratum1: -1,061 (0,535), RT stratum2: 1,352 (0,649), RT stratum3: 1,258 (0,904).
Notes	1 out of 1 used	Used single criteria and average of 2 risk exposure groups. Calculated hazard ratio 2 months post	Average effects in table 8. Used 2 year for PF and SPST and 3 year for RT. PF (simulated firms=public employment) used separate and SPST and RT is averaged (as training)

Author	Weber, Hofer	Winterhager, Heinze, Spermann
Title	Active job-search programs a promising tool? A microeconomic evaluation for Austria	Deregulating job placement in Europe: A microeconomic evaluation of an innovative voucher scheme in Germany
Year	2003	2006
Country	Austria	Germany
Language	English	English
Publication	Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna	Labour Economics
Type of outcome data	Time-of-event	Matching with propensity scores
Outcome	Table 3+5+6+7	Table 3 p. 516

Time Point (s)	Combined effect of lock-in and after treatment effect + 0-30 days + 31-60 days + more than 60 days + after treatment (time in program where the individual is not actively searching is subtracted from the unemployment duration)	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 months after issue of voucher
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Mixed proportional hazard rates	-
Statistics	<p>Combined effect. Training: -0,126 (0,049), Active job search: 0,515 (0,041), Other program: -0,032 (0,037). Lock-in effect. Training 0-30 days: -0,921 (0,163), Training 31-60 days: -0,368 (0,127), Training +60 days: 0,294 (0,055), Active job search 0-30 days: 0,219 (0,085), Active job search 31-60 days: 0,452 (0,091), Active job search +60 days: 0,443 (0,053), Other programs 0-30 days: -0,566 (0,093), Other programs 31-60 days: -0,164 (0,083), Other programs +60 days: 0,307 (0,042). After program effect. Training: 0,717 (0,048), Active job search: 1,008 (0,050), Other program: 0,918 (0,037).</p>	<p>In regular employment - difference in percent between recipients and matched controls (SE) - 1 months after: 2,90 (0,22), 2 months after: 4,89 (0,28), 3 months after: 6,05 (0,31), 4 months after: 6,49 (0,33), 6 months after: 6,69 (0,35), 8 months after: 5,74 (0,35), 10 months after: 5,83 (0,36), 12 months after: 6,49 (0,37)</p>
Notes	Used 2 out of 3 programmes	Used 12 months which is the highest. Duration is 3 months

13.1.4 Numeric data/reason for not in the data synthesis for studies without effect estimate

Author	Adda, Dias, Meghir, Sianesi	Beenstock	Carling, Richardson	Cavaco, Fougère, Pouget
Title	Labour market programmes and labour market outcomes: a study of the Swedish active labour market interventions	Training and the time to find a job in Israel	The relative efficiency of labor market programs: Swedish experience from the 1990's	Estimating the effect of a retraining program for displaced workers on their transition to permanent jobs
Year	2007	1996	2004	2005
Country	Sweden	Israel	Sweden	France
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working Paper	Applied Economics	Labour Economics	IZA Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	Matching	-	-	Duration model with competing risks (Tobit model)
Outcome	Figures 3 and 4	-	-	Table 2 p. 18
Time Point (s)	-	-	-	After program participation
Source	Administrative data	-	-	Administrative + questionnaire
Method of estimation	-	-	-	-
Note	Figures without confidence intervals	No SE's or CI's in the figure	Not possible to calculate standard error	Not possible to calculate standard error

Author	Cockx, van der Linden, Karaa	Forslund, Johansson, Lindqvist	Fredriksson, Johansson	Gerfin Lechner
Title	Active labour market policies and job tenure	Employment subsidies – A fast lane from unemployment to work?	Employment, mobility, and active labor market programs	A Microeconomic Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy in Switzerland
Year	1998	2004	2003	2002
Country	Belgium	Sweden	Sweden	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	Oxford Economic Papers	IFAU Working Paper	IFAU Working Paper	The Economic Journal
Type of outcome data	Duration model	Matching and IV	Matching	Matching
Outcome	Table 3 p. 699 + table 5 p. 701	Figure 6 p. 31	Figure 5 p. 30	Mean outcomes in percentage points, table 4, p. 871
Time Point (s)	Secondary outcome: time in employment after the program	Monthly, 1-50 after programme start	Monthly, 1-60 after programme start	1 year after start + end of March 1999
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative data
Method of estimation	-			-
Note	Only secondary outcome	Figures of difference in survival rate with CI (too faint to be read)	Figures of difference in survival rate with CI (too faint to be read)	Not possible to calculate standard error

Author	Hanna, Turney	Klepinger, Johnson, Joesch, Benus	Lechner, Wiehler	Lechner, Wiehler
Title	The economic impact of the Nevada claimant employment program	Evaluation of the Maryland unemployment insurance work search demonstration Final report	Does the order and timing of active labor market programs matter?	Kids or courses? Gender differences in the effects of active labour market policies
Year	1990	1997	2007	2007
Country	USA	USA	Austria	Austria
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	NR	IZA Discussion Paper	University of St. Gallen
Type of outcome data	Duration	Logistic regression	The estimator that is used to compute the effects of all pair-wise comparisons of sequences of interest is the inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator	Matching with propensity scores
Outcome	Table p. 88	Table 5 p. 35	Figure 2, 3 and 4 p. 21-23	Figure 2 p. 23
Time Point (s)	Not reported! Only average potential duration is 23.5 weeks	Quarters 1-4 since beginning of treatment	Trimesters - from the first trimester in the second year after the initial entry into unemployment to the third trimester 5 years after.	1-36 months after program start
Source	Unclear. All data were from regular ES/UI reporting systems or from input provided by the CEP staff	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation			-	-
Note	No usable data	Not possible to calculate standard error	Only figures without standard deviations or CI - the authors mention an internet appendix but we haven't been able to locate it.	No SE's or CI's in the figure

Author	Lechner, Wunsch	Lechner, Wunsch, Miquel	O'Leary	O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk, Lázár
Title	Active labour market policy in East Germany: Waiting for the economy to take off	Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany	A net impact analysis of active labour programmes in Hungary	The net impact of active labour programmes in Hungary and Poland
Year	2009	2011	1997	1998
Country	Germany	Germany	Hungary	Hungary
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	Economics of Transition	Journal of the European Economic Association	Economics of Transition	International Labour Review
Type of outcome data	Matching with propensity scores	Matching with propensity scores	Matching (means) and regression adjusted (OLS-estimates)	Matching
Outcome	Table C.1 p. 700-701	Table 6 p. 763	Table 5 (matching) + table 6 (regression adjusted)	Table 4 p. 335
Time Point (s)	After 6 months and after 2.5 years	8 years after program start	After program has finished	After program (p. 331)
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Questionnaire	Questionnaire
Method of estimation	-	-	-	-
Note	No usable data	Not possible to calculate standard error	Not possible to calculate standard error	Not possible to calculate standard error

Author	Raaum, Torp, Zhang	Shirom, Vinokur, Price	Sianesi	Steiger
Title	Business cycles and the impact of labour market programmes	Self-efficacy as a moderator of the effects of job-search workshops on re-employment: a field experiment	Differential effects of active labour market programs for the unemployed	Is less more? A look at nonparticipation in Swiss active labour market programmes
Year	2002	2008	2008	2004
Country	Norway	Israel	Sweden	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	University of Oslo	Journal of Applied Social Psychology	Labour Economics	Unpublished
Type of outcome data	Matching with propensity scores	Logistic regression	Matching	Matching
Outcome	Table 3 p. 29	Table 3 + 4 p. 1793+1795	Figure 1 (graph with CI), Table 2 (% points)	Table 5.3 (it is headed table but is a figure)
Time Point (s)	First year effect, second year effect, third year effect	After treatment	They measure the average effect over the 5-years horizon from program start.	Monthly, 1-23 after programme start
Source	Administrative registers	6-month post-test (questionnaire)	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Average effects of training on the treated	-	-	
Note	The study only reports effects on earnings	No variation reported	Bootstrapped <i>asymmetric</i> CI implying it is not possible to calculate SEs	Figures without CI

Author	Stephan, Pahnke	Torp	Vuori, Silvonen, Vinokur, Price	Vuori, Vesalainen
Title	The Relative Effectiveness of Selected Active Labour Market Programmes and the Common Support Problem	The impact of training on employment: Assessing a Norwegian labour market programme	The Työhön Job Search Program in Finland: Benefits for the Unemployed With Risk of Depression or Discouragement	Labour market interventions as predictors of re-employment, job seeking activity and psychological distress among the unemployed
Year	2008	1994	2002	1999
Country	Germany	Norway	Finland	Finland
Language	English	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	Scandinavian Journal of Economics	Journal of Occupational Health Psychology	Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology
Type of outcome data	Matching	Tobit regression estimates	Regression	Logistic regression
Outcome	Table 5 (only relative effects)	Table 2 p. 542	Logistic effect estimates and OLS effect estimates, table 3.	Table 3 p. 532
Time Point (s)	-	-	6 months after pre-test.	Follow-up one year after first survey
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative + questionnaire	Questionnaire	Questionnaire
Method of estimation	-	-	Logistic regression for employment and stable job. Standardised linear regression for wage.	-
Note	Not possible to calculate standard error	No usable data	Not possible to calculate standard error	Not possible to calculate standard error

Author	Wunsch, Lechner	Zhang
Title	What did all the money do? On the general ineffectiveness of recent West German labour market programmes	Identifying treatment effects of active labour market programmes for Norwegian adults
Year	2008	2003
Country	Germany	Norway
Language	English	English
Publication	KYKLOS	University of Oslo
Type of outcome data	Matching with propensity scores	Non-parametric competing risks hazard rate model
Outcome	Figure 2 p. 152 + table 4 p. 153	Hazard rates + CI in figure 4 +5.
Time Point (s)	Months after program start in the figure - cumulated effects in the table	While in treatment and after treatment. 1, 3, 6, 9, (13) months after start and after completion of program.
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	Mixed proportional hazard rate
Note	Not possible to calculate standard error	Figure 4 + 5, need to calculate from the figures. Figures too slurred

13.1.5 Numeric data for studies with effect estimate and used for secondary outcome analysis

Author	Caplan, Vinokur, Price, van Ryn	Cockx, van der Linden, Karaa	Crépon, Dejemeppe, Gurgans
Title	Job seeking, reemployment, and mental health: A randomized field experiment in coping with job loss	Active labour market policies and job tenure	Counselling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?
Year	1989	1998	2005
Country	USA	Belgium	France
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of Applied Psychology	Oxford Economic Papers	PSE Working Paper
Type of outcome data	Means and SD's from experiment	Duration model	Time-of-event
Outcome	Table 2 p. 764	Table 3 p. 699 + table 5 p. 701	Table 4
Time Point (s)	4 weeks after the intervention + 4 months after the intervention	Secondary outcome: time in employment after the program	After treatment
Source	Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	-	Mixed proportional hazard rate	Mixed proportional hazard rates
Statistics	Monthly earnings (in local currency) at T3 (4 months after the intervention) (for those reemployed). T: 1467 (857) N=244; C: 1407 (1128) N=109	Wage subsidy: 0.40 (0.38), On-the-job training: 0.75 (0.41), Classroom training: 0.22 (0.31)	To unemployment. Skill assessment: -0.667 (0.082), Project assessment: -0.879 (0.067), Job-search support: -0.804 (0.053), Project support: -0.688 (0.059)
Pages & notes	1432 is follow-up to this randomized experiment	The results reported here are from the model with discrete mixing distribution because this is what the authors refer to as the preferred model.	The results reported here are with unobserved heterogeneity. The authors also report heterogeneous treatment effects in table 7.

Author	Dolton, O'Neill	Graversen, van Ours	Shirom, Vinokur, Price
Title	The Restart effect and the return to full-time stable employment	How to Help Unemployed Find Jobs Quickly: Experimental Evidence from a Mandatory Activation Program	Self-efficacy as a moderator of the effects of job-search workshops on re-employment: a field experiment
Year	1996	2006	2008
Country	UK	Denmark	Israel
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A	IZA Discussion Paper	Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Type of outcome data	Bivariate unemployment re-employment regression	Duration model	Multiple regression
Outcome	Table 2 p. 395 in Dolton & O'Neil (2002)	Mixed proportional hazard rate, table 5, p. 177 in Graversen, B. K. & Van Ours, J. C. (2011).	Table 4 p. 1795
Time Point (s)	-	After treatment	After treatment
Source	Administrative + questionnaire	Administrative data	6-month post-test (questionnaire)
Method of estimation	-	Mixed proportional hazard rate	-
Statistics	Effect on duration -0,03 (0,08). Months	HR -0,02 (0,05);	Regression coefficient of duration 0,02 (0,32). Months
Pages & notes		These estimates are with unobserved heterogeneity	

13.1.6 Numeric data for studies without effect estimate and used for secondary outcome analysis

Author	Adda, Dias, Meghir, Sianesi	Baumgartner, Caliendo	Black, Smith, Berger, Noel
Title	Labour market programmes and labour market outcomes: a study of the Swedish active labour market interventions	Turning unemployment into self-employment: Effectiveness of two start-up programmes	Is the threat of reemployment services more effective than the services themselves? Evidence from random assignment in the UI system
Year	2007	2008	2003
Country	Sweden	Germany	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IFAU Working Paper	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	The American Economic Review
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings	Monthly income from self-employment/regular employment	Earnings in the year after the start of the UI claim
Note	Simulated effect	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Do not separate income on employed/not employed

Author	Bloom	Caliendo, Künn	Corson, Haimson
Title	Back to Work: Testing Reemployment Services for Displaced Workers	Getting back into the labor market: The effects of start-up subsidies for unemployed females	The New Jersey insurance reemployment demonstration project: Six-year follow-up and summary report
Year	1990	2012	1996
Country	USA	Germany	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Book	IZA Discussion Paper	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper
Type of secondary outcome	Weekly earnings one year after random assignment	Monthly working income	Earnings
Note	No variation reported	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only

Author	Decker, Olsen, Freeman	Firth, Payne, Payne	Frölich, Lechner
Title	Assisting unemployment insurance claims: The long-term impacts of the job search assistance demonstration	Efficacy of programmes for the unemployed: discrete time modelling of duration data from a matched comparison study	Combining Matching and Nonparametric IV Estimation: Theory and an Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies
Year	2000	1999	2010
Country	USA	UK	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Mathematica Policy Research	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A	Universität St. Gallen
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings and wage rate	Earnings reported in Payne et al. , 1996	Earnings reported in Frölich & Lechner, 2006
Note	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only

Author	Gerfin, Lechner, Steiger	Jespersen, Much, Skipper	Johnsson, Klepinger
Title	Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? An Econometric analysis of two different schemes	Costs and benefits of Danish active labour market programmes	Evaluation of the impacts of the Washington alternative work search experiment
Year	2002	2008	1991
Country	Switzerland	Denmark	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Universität St. Gallen	Labour Economics	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings	Annual earnings	Earnings

Note	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Do not separate income on employed/not employed
Author	Klepinger, Johnson, Joesch, Benus	Lechner, Wunsch	O'Leary
Title	Evaluation of the Maryland unemployment insurance work search demonstration Final report	Active labour market policy in East Germany: Waiting for the economy to take off	A net impact analysis of active labour programmes in Hungary
Year	1997	2009	1997
Country	USA	Germany	Hungary
Language	English	English	English
Publication	?	Economics of Transition	Economics of Transition
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings	Earnings	Earnings on normal job
Note	No variation reported	No variation reported	No variation reported

Author	O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk, Lázár	Osikominu	Rodriguez-Planas, Jacob
Title	The net impact of active labour programmes in Hungary and Poland	Quick job entry or long-term human capital development? The dynamic effects of alternative training schemes	Evaluating active labor market programs in Romania
Year	1998	2012	2007
Country	Hungary	Germany	Romania
Language	English	English	English
Publication	International Labour Review	CESifo Working Paper	-
Type of secondary outcome	Average monthly earnings on the survey date	Earnings	Average monthly earning
Note	No variation reported	Simulated means and no variation reported	Effect size and SE in local currency only

Author	Roland, Munch, Skipper	Rosholm, Skipper	Raaum, Torp, Zhang
Title	Program participation, labor force dynamics, and accepted wage rates	Is labour market training a curse for the unemployed? Evidence from a social experiment	Business cycles and the impact of labour market programmes
Year	2008	2009	2002
Country	Denmark	Denmark	Norway
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Advances in Econometrics	Journal of Applied Econometrics	University of Oslo
Type of secondary outcome	Effect on hourly wage rate	Hourly wage rate	Average effects of training on annual earnings
Note	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only	Effect size and SE in local currency only

Author	Steiger	Vinokur, Price, Schul	Vuori, Silvonon, Vinokur, Price
Title	Is less more? A look at nonparticipation in Swiss active labour market programmes	Impact of the JOBS intervention on unemployed workers varying in risk for depression	The Työhön Job Search Program in Finland: Benefits for the Unemployed With Risk of Depression or Discouragement
Year	2004	1995	2002
Country	Switzerland	USA	Finland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Unpublished	American Journal of Community Psychology	Journal of Occupational Health Psychology
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings	Monthly income	Job stability Wage rate
Note	No variation reported	Do not separate income on employed/not employed	No variation reported

Author	Wunsch, Lechner
Title	What did all the money do? On the general ineffectiveness of recent West German labour market programmes
Year	2008
Country	Germany
Language	English
Publication	KYKLOS
Type of secondary outcome	Earnings
Note	No variation reported

13.2 RISK OF BIAS

13.2.1 Risk of bias for studies used in data synthesis for primary outcome

Author	Agell	Ahmad, Svarer	Anderson, Corson, Decker
Year	1995	2009	1991
Country	Sweden	Denmark	USA
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Swedish Economic Policy Review	Aarhus University	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	The records for eligible participants were placed in random order and the assignment made according to a fixed schedule that assigned the first claimant to one treatment, the second to another and so on up to a fixed number per site per week (further adjustment made over time) (p. 54 in Corson 1989)
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1	2

Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Sample selection, otherwise no mentioning of missing data	Employment based on reporting earnings in a quarter (only within state and not including uncovered earnings (p. 11). Apparently no missing data.
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Sensitivity analysis performed (the impact of considering sanctions)	Report effects adjusted for a number of covariates (p. 14)
Free of other bias (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	5	3	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	No discussion of method used. Only statement that maybe the variables do not take account of the selection effect and states that the: "result should be interpreted with cautions" (page 93). Also discussion of the impact on the interpretation of the results that apparently programmes are typical used to renew benefit eligibility	No discussion of the appropriateness of the method used concerning ALMP, only concerning sanctions	-
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	No	-

Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	No (- unemployment duration) but more is added Censoring level: table 4	All relevant confounders taken into account + more Censoring level: Men: 0.238, Women: 0.34 (p. 25)	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Regression	Timing-of-event	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Cox proportional hazard	Multivariate mixed proportional hazard	-

Author	Baumgartner, Caliendo	Behaghel, Crépon, Gurgand	Benmarker, Skans, Vikman
Year	2008	2012	2012
Country	Germany	France	Sweden
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	IZA Discussion Paper	IFAU Working Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	Unclear	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	The caseworker ran an application on an Extranet to randomly assign to T/C. Unbalanced assignment probabilities; very high probabilities of assignment to treatment 2 (the private program, up to 85%) and much lower probabilities of assignment to treatment 1 (the public program, down to 6%) and to control (down to 9%) (p. 9)	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	Unclear	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	4	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and a mix of administrative and survey data	Outcome is objective and a mix of administrative and survey data.	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	Unclear	4	1

Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Administrative data and survey data (do not mention response rate): randomly draw participants from each programme that became self-employed in the third quarter of 2003. Comparison group restricted to those who were unemployed in the third quarter of 2003, eligible for participation in either of the two programmes, but did not join a programme in this quarter. Used a crude propensity score matching approach to select comparison (gender, region, age, previous unemployment duration, qualification and nationality). Only 13 individuals are dropped overall due to common support	Administrative data, except in about 50% of cases, there is no way to know from the administrative records whether the job-seeker had found a job or not. A short phone interview on a subsample of workers whose destination at the exit from unemployment was unknown from the administrative source. Missing data per cent is not reported.	Sample selection (p. 9)
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	Unclear
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Tested the sensitivity of results with respect to unobserved heterogeneity using difference-in-difference matching estimator + more strict impositions of the common support requirement (footnote 10) + matching quality	Analyses selection, cream skimming and "ITT"	Show regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of the effect of the reform on the characteristics of the unemployed. Not relevant for the participation effect
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	2	-	2

Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discuss the conditional independence assumptions (CIA) on page 358 (fine discussion)	-	Added covariates without discussion.
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	P. 358: Only variables that influence the participation decision and the outcome variable simultaneously should be included in the matching procedure. Hence, economic theory, a sound knowledge of previous research and information about the institutional setting should guide the researcher in specifying the model	-	No
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added	Inflow is recently unemployed	Yes and more is added Censoring level: 18-19 % (table 2, p. 13)
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Matching		RD. Reform changed rules (of max duration of passive benefits) for workers aged 55 and 56. Controls are slightly older and younger. Only identifies the threat effect. The program participation effect is handled by covariates.
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Propensity score (logit), kernel matching, use 'leave-one-out' cross validation to choose the bandwidth.	2SLS using random assignment as instrument. The randomised allocation to treatment and control was used as an instrument. Only local average treatment effects (LATE) are normally identified when applying the instrument variable method. A special case is that with one-side non-compliance. Suppose that those assigned to the control group cannot receive the active treatment (but those assigned to the active treatment can decline to take it). In that case only two compliance types remain: compliers and always-takers. Monotonicity is automatically satisfied. The average effect for compliers is now equal to the average effect	Stratified (on age) Cox proportional hazard rate

		for the treated, since any one receiving the treatment is by definition a complier.	
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Author	Black, Smith, Berger, Noel	Bloom	Caliendo, Künn
Year	2003	1990	2012
Country	USA	USA	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	The American Economic Review	Book	IZA Discussion Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Low	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Eligible applicants were listed on a random assignment log (collected every week by evaluation contractor), the evaluation contractor assigned names on this log to T/C using a random number table (p. 29)	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Low	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Eligible applicants were listed on a random assignment log (collected every week by evaluation contractor), the evaluation contractor assigned names on this log to T/C using a random number table (p. 29). Conducted off site premises (p. 35)	-
Blinding (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	4	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Administrative records and brief survey with retrospective questions concerning weeks employed two quarters prior to interview (conducted 1 year after randomisation) (p. 51) We use the survey sample results only	Outcome is objective and a mix of administrative and survey data.

Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	2	4
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	SER/JOBS site 13% no shows (p. 36). TEC/HCC appr. 35% but ITT analysis Response rate 74% (no difference between T/C but other systematic diff. Between T/C, see Analysis in App. 3.1	We restrict our analysis to individuals who participated in every interview (3). Footnote 13 p. 10: On average, we observe 46% of all participants and 40% of all non-participants for the entire period of 56 months. Participants and nonparticipants are similarly affected by selection, due to panel attrition. No loss to common support
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	TOT analysis and subgroup analysis performed	Provide an extensive sensitivity analysis . Test the robustness of results with respect to unobserved differences between participants and non-participants
Free of other bias (Judgement)	5	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	The effect is reported as the impact on the hazard rate, but as the authors note in footnote 19 (p. 1321): "Technically, these data are not true hazards because we do not observe whether the weeks of benefit receipt are consecutive. Rather, they represent counts of the number of weeks within the benefit year that a claimant receives payments."	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Yes	Unclear

A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Reference Bloom et al. 1984 (p. 6)	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Yes	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Reference Bloom et al. 1984 (p. 6)	-
Confounding (Judgement)	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	-	1
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Discuss CIA on p. 14
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.		-	Economic theory, a sound knowledge of previous research, and information about the institutional setting
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-	-	Yes and more is added
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-	-	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-	-	Propensity score (probit),. Kernel-matching by using an Epanechnikov Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.06

Author	Caliendo, Künn, Schmidt	Caplan, Vinokur, Price, van Ryn	Cockx
Year	2011	1989	2003
Country	Germany	USA	Belgium
Language	English	English	English
Publication	IZA Discussion Paper	Journal of Applied Psychology	IZA Discussion Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	Unclear	Not judged due to confounding score of 5

Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	Unclear	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	4	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is a combination of an objective (working more than 20 hours a week) and a subjective (working enough) measure and is self-reported	-
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	4	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection p. 9 and appendix. Impute missing data decreasing the share of monthly missings from initially 25.7% to 2.1% (p. 11) (Documents the filling procedure in the appendix). Very few lost to common support	Among those assigned to the experimental condition 59% failed to show up (OBS probably a mistake, should have been 49%). Participants were defined as subjects who completed at least 6 of the 8 sessions (73 completed less than 6 sessions) Response rates around 90 except control at T3 (67%) (p. 761) OBS 14% omitted from reemployment analysis because they could not be classified (p. 763)	-
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	3	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Test the sensitivity with respect to large values of the propensity scores as they receive disproportionately large weights in the construction of the counterfactual and with respect to the choice of the common support and potential outliers, further program participation and dynamic Evaluation Approach	Impossible to figure out the N's	-

Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Not judged due to confounding score of 5
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1	-	5
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discuss CIA on p. 7 (Good discussion) and discuss timing of participation on p. 8-9	-	Self-selection and program administrator selection discussed on p. 3. Proposition 1 (which is quite crucial) is not discussed. The model is based on individuals calculating the return but it is assumed that the workers draw a return from a distribution each period (necessary to obtain heterogeneity in returns, but how it can then be maintained that workers can calculate their lifetime return, if it is to be based on expectations there will be no heterogeneity).
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	The ALMP evaluation literature	-	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added Censoring: NR	-	-

Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Inverse probability weighting with propensity score	-	The variation in π is not exogenous to the transition rate out of unemployment, even if π is. For, π will be smaller the more effective the programme is. However, π is a good predictor of π and suggests using it as an instrument for π .
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Inverse probability weighting with propensity score (stratified on duration)	-	The MCS method requires the data to be grouped in homogeneous cells. We define these cells by crossing four criteria: the elapsed unemployment duration, the sub-region, the eligibility criterion to unemployment benefits ('old' or 'young') and the training status

Author	Crépon, Dejemeppe, Gurgans	Decker, Olsen, Freeman
Year	2005	2000
Country	France	USA
Language	English	English
Publication	PSE Working Paper	Mathematica Policy Resarch
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	Unclear
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Randomly assigned, BUT: Page 196 and 16 in summary: Claimants who were eligible for the demonstration but denied services (the control group) had longer average UI spells and were more likely to exhaust their benefits than claimants who were ineligible for the demonstration
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	Unclear
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3

Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	3	2
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection p. 9 and: some unemployed (about 20%) do not send their monthly form at some point so that they are known to exit but the destination is unobserved. Therefore, estimation must be limited to individuals with known exit	Employment based on reporting earnings in a quarter (only within state and not including self-employment, federal jobs, military service, domestic or agricultural employment). Less than 1% missing data (calculated from table 2.3 p.30). Around 80% in DC and 65% in Florida received some treatment (p. 42-47) Employment was the primary reason for not attending (p. 64-65)
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	2
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis with respect to unobserved heterogeneity	Tested regression adjusted impacts. They were almost identical to the unadjusted and not reported (p. 13 footnote 5)
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	4	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discusses assumptions on p. 10 (mostly technical with a bit of justification). Concerning HR into treatment: we observe peaks related	-

	to compulsory interviews at 0, 6 and 12 months. (p. 15) Argue this is not a problem because likelihood of entry is positive at all dates	
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added Censoring level: 21 % (table 2)	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Timing-of-event	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (3 months)	-

Author	Dolton, O'Neill	Eden, Aviram	Firth, Payne, Payne
Year	1996	1993	1999
Country	UK	Israel	UK
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A	Journal of Applied Psychology	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Low	Unclear	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Individuals eligible for a restart interview (6 months unemployment) were selected for the sample from the inflow lists on the basis of the last three digits of their national insurance (NI) numbers. An NI digit sequence known to result in a random 5% sample was used to construct our data. In this sample a control	-	-

	group of 582 people was randomly chosen, again by means of previously specified NI digit sequence		
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Low	Unclear	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	Unclear	4
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Informed by letter after 6 months of unemployment and participation is mandatory. Outcome is objective + survey data. The programme is TAU so the control group did not receive a letter	Outcome is reemployment, probably from a questionnaire (definition not reported)	Retrospective questions back to 1980. Left treatment in Jan. 1993, interviewed in May 1993 and spring 1994 (and spring 1995)
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	3	3	4
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	8925 randomised. 5200 (58%) individuals completed the first survey (6 months) of which 4552 (51%) reported valid data (286 (49%) were members of the control group) and 3242 the second survey (12 months). Approximately half of the non-responses resulted from an inability to contact the individual because of invalid address records or death, whereas the other half refused to take part in the survey. Estimates of a probit equation determining survey participation suggest that the decision to participate was independent of control group status	Missing data: T:26%, C: 24%. Attrition discussed (p. 354)	Interviews 1674 treated in 1993 and second interviews with 1245 in 1994. 1140 comparisons interviewed. Attrition in both samples meant of course some departure from the closeness of the original match, and so a rematching exercise was conducted, in which members of the achieved comparison sample were dropped if a good match could not be found for them in the achieved round two treatment sample. Analysis, cases were dropped if the sequence of dates in the work histories was incomplete or inconsistent. Together with rematching, this reduced the numbers available for analysis to 941 in the treatment sample and 979 in the comparison sample. 76% and 86%. 3rd interview in 1995, response 55% and 40%

Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis concerning the assumptions about censoring (379)	-	Sensitivity analysis with respect to unobserved heterogeneity
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	-	-	1
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Discussion of the matching factors on p. 2 in 8477 (WP) and discussion of other covariates and analysis of participation on p. 9-15
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	-	-	Yes, theory and analysis of participation
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-	-	Yes and more is added Censoring level: NR
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-	-	Matched samples and discrete time modelling approach
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-	-	Matching was done on the basis of sex, age, local geographical area and prior unemployment (starting date and

			duration). One-to-one matching was used for sex, sampling point and unemployment dates, and marginal matching was used for age. Random effect (Logistic-normal) model including a number of covariates.
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Author	Fitzenberger, Völter	Frölich, Lechner	Gerfin, Lechner, Steiger
Year	2007	2010	2002
Country	Germany	Switzerland	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Publication	ZEW Discussion Paper	Universität St. Gallen	Universität St. Gallen
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	1	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection p. 7. No loss to common support	Sample selection, otherwise no mentioning of missing data	Sample selection, otherwise no mentioning of missing data. Common support discard 3.5 %
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	2	1	1

Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis with respect to sample of controls p. 18 "effects for females are reduced to some extent" (do not report the results). Very detailed reporting on the matching procedure and quality	Sensitivity analysis performed	Sensitivity analysis with respect to sample selection is performed
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	2	1	1
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discuss the (Dynamic)CIA on page 13 (short discussion, mostly referring to Sianesi (analysing Sweden))	Only requires conditional unconfoundedness of the instrument, discussion of the appropriateness of this assumption	-
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	Our selection of these control variables is based on earlier studies by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2005) and Frölich and Lechner (2010). (p. 22). Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Gerfin, Lechner, and Steiger (2005) argue at length why in the Swiss institutional setting, it is plausible that these data sources contain all variables jointly related to treatment and potential outcomes (p. 25)	Discussion of confounding factors on page 18
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	No (-ethnicity) and more is added	Yes and more is added	Yes and more is added

Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Matching	The study uses both IV and matching (and a combination of these two methods).	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Propensity score (probit). Apply a bivariate extension of standard propensity matching techniques.	Propensity score (binary probit) and nonparametric ridge regression	Propensity score (multinomial probit, as they have 4 states) and matching with replacement

Author	Gorter, Kalb	Graversen, van Ours	Hujer, Thomsen
Year	1996	2006	2010
Country	Netherlands	Denmark	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	The Journal of Human Resources	IZA Discussion Paper	Labour Economics
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Unclear	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	By birthdate	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Unclear	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)		The sequence generation was known by caseworkers	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Participants not informed that they took part in an experiment. Outcome is objective and from adm. Registers except search intensity and channels are from an interview (every 4th week during a year)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	3	2	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Requires full search history (reduces sample from 1631 to 743 (45% left)) and duration	27 wrongly assigned were deleted. 37 deleted due to moving abroad or dying. 553 deleted for not receiving UI. 43 deleted as they were not	Sample selection (Appendix A), otherwise no mentioning of missing data. Lost to

	between assignment and take up date less than 60 days reduces to 722 (44% left).	eligible (unemployed because of bad weather or work sharing arrangements. In all 13% were deleted	common support low, except quarter 5-8 for East Germany
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	3	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Performs check for unobserved heterogeneity p. 607. There is significant unobserved heterogeneity but "effects on duration.....seem to be unaffected" (results not reported)	-	Test the sensitivity of results with respect to unobserved heterogeneity by calculating the lower and upper bounds for different values of unobserved selection bias of a test statistic that tests the null hypothesis of no treatment effect + matching quality
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	-	-	2
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Discuss the (Dynamic)CIA on page 41 (fine discussion)
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	-	-	No
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-	-	Yes and more is added

Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-	RCT	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-	-	Propensity score (probit) measured at time u. Single nearest-neighbour matching without replacement

Author	Hujer, Thomsen, Zeiss	Hujer, Zeiss	Hägglund
Year	2006	2007	2006
Country	Germany	Germany	Sweden
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv	ZAF	International Journal of Manpower
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	High	Unclear
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	High	Unclear
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	The applicants were informed by email whether or not they were to be admitted to the experimental programme. Outcome is objective and from adm. registers.
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	2	2
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection, otherwise no mentioning of missing data	Sample selection p. 388. Deleted some due to errors in the data (no numbers)	Comparing participants and no-shows among those offered services (From 5521: 181 got treatment and 162 did not show up (but included in the analysis)), reveals a

			non-random selection into participation. In our sample, 10 per cent in the experiment and 10 per cent in the control group were deregistered and coded "cause unknown" (attriters). This indicates that the employment officer lost contact with the unemployed. Since the attrition is not systematically related to either of the groups, the attriters are not excluded from the sample. (Footnote 11).
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis with respect to distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is performed.	In baseline model the time spent in a JCS does not contribute to the unemployment duration. Addressed in sensitivity analysis and also unobserved heterogeneity.	TOT analysis included.
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1	4	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discussion of appropriateness of model assumptions on page 305-306. Page 312: In order to assess the problem of selectivity with respect to programme participation, we compare the estimation results of the model with and without unobserved heterogeneity.	No discussion of assumptions, only (p. 387): Information on the moment when individuals are informed about a future treatment is not available for the empirical analysis and we rule out anticipatory effects of JCS	-

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No, but on page 310: Unfortunately, despite the mentioned differences in the observable characteristics, there may be further unobservable determinants of the selection process that should be considered in the analysis.	No, only (p. 391): Although the available data provides a relatively extensive set of observable characteristics some possible important determinants for both transition rates are not available. For example, information on former unemployment or employment periods as well as information on the motivation of the individuals is not considered. However, in the empirical analysis these unconsidered determinants are captured by the unobserved heterogeneity term.	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	No (- labour market condition) but more is added Censoring level: 27.7% (p. 309)	No (-LMC) but more is added Censoring level: NR	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Timing-of-event	Timing-of-event	Randomization
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (0-3 months, 3-9 months, 9-18 months and more than 18 months)	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (3 months)	Covariates included in the analysis.

Author	Jespersen, Munch, Skipper	Johnson, Klepinger	Kvasnicka
Year	2008	1991	2008
Country	Denmark	USA	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Labour Economics	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	NBER Working Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	Low	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Based on the last digit of the social security account number. Stopped assigning to treatment A in May. For the remainder of the period (Full period is July 86-August 87) they were assigned to treatment D)	-

Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	Unclear	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	3	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection, otherwise no missing data, except around 2% loss to common support requirement	Employment based on reporting earnings in a quarter (only within state and not including self-employment, federal jobs, military service, domestic or agricultural employment). Around 40% (of those invited, union members and those on standby were not invited, also WS invitation in week 4 is controlled for) attended the work shop.	Data discussion p. 7 ff. Sample selection p. 10. 1 person is left due to common support
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	2	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis performed on the cost benefit analysis which is their main focus	Report only adjusted estimates	Report detailed matching quality and subgroup analysis (entry time by duration)
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1	-	1

Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discuss whether they have enough information for CIA to hold (p. 871-872)	-	Discuss (dynamic) CIA at p. 19 ff. Good discussion
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	Yes, section 4.2	-	Discuss (dynamic) CIA and mechanisms that determines treatment assignment and future outcomes at p. 19 ff.
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added	-	Yes and more is added Censoring level: 0.4 % in 2011 (table 1)
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Matching	-	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Propensity score	-	Nearest-neighbour propensity score matching without replacement, but within caliper. Stratified on duration

Author	Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller	Osikominu	Pedersen, Rosholm, Svarer
Year	2008	2012	2012
Country	Switzerland	Germany	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	The Economic Journal	CESifo Working Paper	IZA Discussion Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Date of birth.
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	The sequence generation was known by case workers. No information was given to the unemployed workers on the selection rule.
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3

Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers. The unemployed is not informed that she is participating in a randomized experiment, but rather that she has been chosen to participate in a pilot study.
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	3	Unclear
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection (p. 239, obs. No mentioning of the 2,143 workers whose employability was rated to be very poor and were excluded in 6577), otherwise no mentioning of missing data	Sample selection p. 18. About 7% of the long-term training spells and 25% of the short-term training spells have missing or implausible planned end dates.	5411 individuals registered as unemployed in one of the 11 jobcentres which were part of the experiments, between week 8 and week 29 of 2008.
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	4	4
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis with respect to baseline hazard, distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and a time-of-entry effect in the causal effect of training programmes are performed. (+ the comparison to the matching estimator)	No sensitivity analysis	Include covariates in model but do not mention which and results for covariates are not reported.
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Probably as they mention "degree of compliance to the experimental protocol," on p. 16, but no reference
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1	1	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Arguments as 6577 p. 241	Discuss the empirical Support of the Conditional No-Anticipation and Independence Assumptions	-

		on p. 15 ff. State that their plausibility depends on the richness of our data and our ability to explicitly control for potentially time-varying confounders that jointly determine outcome and treatment times and exploit that the allocation of training programs is driven by the short-term supply of training slots as well as private information of the caseworker (as they still need some random variation in timing of treatment even after controlling for "everything").	
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	No	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	All relevant confounders taken into account + more Censoring level: see table 3 p. 253	Yes and more is added	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Timing-of-event	Introduce a novel dynamic potential outcome framework based on the theory of continuous-time counting. Extend the timing-of-events approach processes (basically adds conditioning on observables)	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (0–2 months, 3–5 months, 6–8 months, 9–11 months and 12 and more months)	Piecewise constant exponential model for the hazard rates. For the index functions, we use flexible, linear in parameters specifications to model the dependence on observed covariates $x(t)$ and lagged duration τ . We use piecewise constant specifications to model the dependence on elapsed duration t and time dependence of training impacts during unemployment (p. 20)	Mixed proportional with piecewise constant hazard rate. We control for various explanatory variables and estimate the models separately for men and women,

Author	Prey	Richardson, Berg	Rodriguez-Planas, Jacob
Year	2000	2001	2007
Country	Switzerland	Sweden	Romania
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Schweiz. Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik	Swedish Economic Policy Review	-
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	4
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective but from survey with retrospective questions
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	1	4
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Apparently there are no missing data	Sample selection (p. 195) Errors in coding: Obvious typing errors are corrected, whereas otherwise we right-censor the duration variables at the moment at which such an error occurs	Of the 5,735 individuals contacted for interviewing, about 70 per cent responded. As is common in these types of studies, response rate was slightly higher for participants (72 per cent) than for non-participants (68 per cent). Sample selection described on page 9. We restricted our sample to have all data available (missing is 21% and 23%). Lost to common support is 1.4%
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	1

Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Reports results using naive control group (not matched)	Sensitivity analysis performed. Assumption of setting the clock at halt during programme participation. Unobserved heterogeneity.	Several sensitivity analyses. Unadjusted and regression adjusted results and matching with no use of any pre-variables
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	4	1	4
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Thorough discussion of the assignment to treatment and empirical evaluation of the selection process in accordance with the evidence on assignment. Cite work showing that find that employment agency identifiers have significant effects, and that these dominate the effects of characteristics of the unemployed individual (p. 186). Ok convincing discussion of model applicability to the current problem p. 190 ff.	Discuss the CIA on page 12 ff, argue that others do as bad as them concerning missing important variables. Summarizing, the available data include much, but not all, information on factors, which affect the selection and the outcomes. The crucial question—that is left to the reader to decide—is whether there is sufficient information to justify the conditional independence assumption. However, we believe that our data frequently provides variables that contain some of this needed key information, and is at least qualitatively equal (if not superior) to data used in other evaluations of ALMPs in transition economies (p. 13)

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	No	P. 12: Our approach for meeting the CIA was to include in the matching process: (1) characteristics influencing the decision to participate in ALMP, (2) baseline values of the outcomes of interest, (3) variables influencing the outcomes of interest, and (4) variables reflecting local labour market conditions, and regional differences in program implementation or local offices' placement policies.
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	All relevant confounders taken into account + more	All relevant confounders taken into account + more Censoring level: 0.43, table 1	No (- ethnicity and duration) but more is added of which several measure the same in different ways
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Matching, propensity score	Timing-of-event	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Further probit regression using further covariates	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (56 days). We take the unit of time to be one day (56 days is a long period then?)	Propensity score (probit) and kernel based matching (propensity score radius= 1% and county with replacement. Select comparison group for each program separately)

Author	Roland, Munch, Skipper	Rosholm, Skipper	Rosholm, Svarer
Year	2008	2009	2004
Country	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Advances in Econometrics	Journal of Applied Econometrics	University of Aarhus
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High	Unclear	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High	Unclear	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Participants were not informed about being part of the experiment and outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1	4	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection (p. 206)	938 randomised, 17 lost due to missing identification numbers, 111 lost due to non-response. 52% no-shows and 22% cross-over from control. Apply IV and matching	Sample selection (p.11)
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	4
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Subgroup analysis and sensitivity with respect to specifications (p. 226)	They apply 7 different matching estimators and use both experimental and matching techniques to analysis.	No mentioning of sensitivity analysis
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear

A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1	Not relevant	3
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	P. 210 argues for CIA in relation to program participation given observables and unobservables i.e. they argue that self-selection into programs are taken into account (not required when using this method). Discuss no-anticipation on p. 215-16, good discussion.	Some discussion page 355. But they match within T/C groups where selection indeed has taken place. We do not use the matching or IV estimates	No discussion of the appropriateness of the method used for identifying the threat effect, only an interpretation in technical terms of why combining the two methods is okay, p. 22. We judge that no effect is identified in the model including the threat effect. Therefore, the assessment concerns the model without the threat effect.
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	Discussed p. 208	Some discussion page 355.	No
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added Censoring level: NR	Yes and more is added	No (- labour market condition and gender (+ probably not but they do not mention gender only in footnote 13) but more is added Censoring level: NR
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Timing-of-event	Randomisation, matching and IV	Combines the timing-of-events model with a model for detecting dependencies in competing risk models (dependent hazard rates model, developed by Lillard (1993))
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (1,2,3,4,5,6,8,12,18,30 months)	Propensity score (probit), use a least squares 'leave one out' validation mechanism to choose among seven different matching estimators	Mixed proportional hazard rate, piecewise constant baselines (14, 24, 40, 44, 48, 52, 56, 60, 96, 112, 156 weeks)The perceived risk of programme participation is calculated as the average

			hazard rate into programmes over the next 13 weeks, and is included in the hazard rate out of unemployment.
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Author	Røed, Raaum	Sacklén	Shirom, Vinokur, Price
Year	2006	2002	2008
Country	Norway	Sweden	Israel
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	IFAU Working Paper	Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	High	Low
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	Computerized randomization procedure
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	High	Low
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	P. 1783: The investigators had full control over randomization of participants to the experimental and control groups
Blinding (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	p. 1785: One program was described as a 5-day (Sunday through Thursday) all-day seminar series (i.e., experimental condition group), while the other was described as a self-guided booklet program (i.e., control condition group). To ensure equal motivation to enter either group, only persons who expressed no preference were randomly assigned to the experimental and control groups. Outcome based on questionnaire: work 10 hours or more per week to be classified as re-

			employed and duration measured in months
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	3	2
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Sample selection p. 9 ff. Retains 58% of treated due to missing data and 48% controls	Response rate at T1 66% and T2 63%. No systematic differences (p. 1790) No shows 45% but responded to questionnaire.
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	3	2
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Do not report the correlation of error terms in the model with constant treatment effect. Report program results for the bivariate model only and employment results for the univariate only (although log likelihood for the bivariate model?). Reports the probability of having a job by the end of the response period in the absence of replacement schemes.	No TOT analysis
Free of other bias (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear	Yes
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	P. 1781: The objective was derived from the findings of several past field experiments
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	5	2	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Essential assumptions underlying the timing of events approach are that the unobserved covariates have the same proportional effects on the hazard rates throughout a spell, and that the entry cohort distribution of these	Discuss selection bias including selection on unobservable p. 5 ff. State their exclusion variable is a natural candidate, p. 12. However restrict the correlation between errors to zero	-

	covariates have remained constant over the estimation period. Given the relatively large changes that have occurred in the composition of programme types over time, we find these assumptions to be more adequate the more aggregated is the labour market programme state space (p. 548)	because it 'mostly' is insignificant (Not at 12 months though), i.e. rely on univariate models.	
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No	Discussed p. 12	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	All relevant confounders taken into account + more. Censoring: 1) transition to disability or loss of benefits - 0.10-0.19, 2) end of "observation window" - 0.01-06 (p. 546)	Yes and more is added	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Timing-of-event	Bivariate probit model of employment and program participation. The weight of replacement schemes in the municipality's supply of ALMPs is used as exclusion variable (included in participation)	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Combined competing risks and single risk mixed proportional hazard. Neither impose prior restrictions on the pattern of duration dependence nor on the number of mass-points in the simultaneous distribution of unobserved heterogeneity	Univariate probit model	-

Author	Solie	Steinberg, Monforte	van den Berg, van der Klaauw
Year	1968	?	2006
Country	USA	USA	Netherlands
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Industrial & Labor Relations Review	<i>Chapter from book</i>	International Economic Review
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Low
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	An independent agency then decides based on a series of random numbers, which were realized in SPSS before the start of the experiment, whether this unemployed worker is selected in the treatment group or the control group (p. 910)
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Low
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	At this stage the independent agency only knows the unique ID number of the individual.
Blinding (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)		-	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers. Participants were not informed about the experiment beforehand.
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)		-	Assignment is compulsory, so there is no noncompliance with the actual assignment. Because we have administrative data, the empirical analyses do not suffer from selective nonresponse or attrition from the database (p. 910)
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	1

Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)			Several sensitivity analyses, p. 919
Free of other bias (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	2
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	At the local UI agency in City 2, the experiment was not performed exactly as prescribed. At the first intake meeting not all the eligibility criteria for receiving counseling and monitoring (C&M) were checked. In particular, some Type II unemployed workers entered the experiment. The Type II unemployed workers who were selected into the treatment group were identified as being a Type II unemployed worker at the intake meeting of C&M and were excluded from the experiment. However, if such an individual was selected into the control group, it was not noted that the UI recipient should not have participated in the experiment. We therefore rechecked the individuals in the control group in City 2 on the criteria for being Type I. This resulted in exclusion of a part of the control group from the data. However, it cannot be completely ruled out that there are still a few Type II unemployed workers left in the control group. Because on average Type II unemployed workers have worse Labor market skills and therefore have longer expected spells of unemployment (see Subsection 2.1), the estimated effect of C&M on the exit rate to work might be slightly upwardly biased.
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear

A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Not judged due to confounding score of 5	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	5	5	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Argue that the fact that the regression coefficients for the 3 control groups are not significantly different suggests that the 8 covariates are adequate to control for non-training differences (p. 218, footnote 11). Very large imbalances in covariates	2 plants with treatment and 2 without. Control for race (B/W), married, education, occupation, tenure, general work experience, entitlement and replacement ratio (unemployment rate which however is equal for all). Compares only two plants at a time	-
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	No		-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	No (- ethnicity, duration and censoring) but more is added	-	Censoring level: 42 % (p. 912)
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design stage)	Multiple regression	-	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Multiple regression	Proportional hazard rate	Use covariates at analysis stage.

Author	Vinokur, Price, Schul	Völter, Osikominu, Fitzenberger	Weber, Hofer
Year	1995	2007	2003
Country	USA	Germany	Austria
Language	English	English	English
Publication	American Journal of Community Psychology	ZEW Discussion Paper	Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Low	High	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Computerized randomization procedure (p. 47)	-	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Unclear	High	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Blinding (Judgement)	4	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Potential participants were told about the two programs and only those who expressed no preference were randomised. Outcome is self-reported, working more than 20 h per week	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	3	1	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	54% of the treated participated. Missing data at 2 months FU is 20% and 16% at 6 months FU. Discussed at p. 54 (some significant differences). ITT analysis.	Sample selection (page 14), otherwise no mentioning of missing data. Lost to common support is probably 0 (p. 29)	Sample selection (p. 10-11)
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	2	1	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	TOT analysis performed but not for the reemployment outcome	Specifies ALL procedures thoroughly	Sensitivity analysis with respect to unobserved heterogeneity
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1

Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Yes	Unclear	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Kind of: apart from few extensions it was intended to provide an operational replication of the JOBS 1 experiment (p.42)		-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Yes	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Summarized on p. 43		-
Confounding (Judgement)	-	2	2
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	Discuss the (Dynamic)CIA on page 21 ff (mostly a technical discussion)	Discuss assumptions on p. 8-9. Mentions cases where the assumption of no anticipation may be violated
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	-	No	No
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-	Yes and more is added	Yes and more is added Censoring level: 33 % (p. 11)
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-	Matching	Timing-of-event
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-	Propensity score (probit) stratified on duration (1-2, 3-4 and 5-8 quarters) and local linear kernel regression using scores and starting month of the unemployment spell	Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (1, 2,3, months, more than a year)

Author	Winterhager, Heinze, Spermann
Year	2006
Country	Germany
Language	English
Publication	Labour Economics
Sequence generation (Judgement)	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	High
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-
Blinding (Judgement)	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	1
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sample selection (508) otherwise no mentioning of missing data. No losses to common support
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis, allowing non-recipients to receive a voucher two months later at the earliest.
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-

A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-
Confounding (Judgement)	1
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Discuss the CIA on page 509 (fine discussion)
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	A survey among caseworkers and voucher recipients and responsible managers in the job centres
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	Yes and more is added
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	Matching
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	Propensity score (probit), nearest neighbour matching with replacement

13.2.2 Risk of bias grading of evidence

The starting point for RCTs was the highest quality rating. RCTs were downgraded if sequence generation and allocation concealment were high or unclear or the score on the incomplete outcome data or selective reporting items were 4. The starting point for NRSs was low quality. NRSs were downgraded if the score on confounding, incomplete outcome data or selective reporting were 4.

Study info	Author	Ahmad, Svarer	Baumgartner, Caliendo	Benmarker, Skans, Vikman
	Year	2009	2008	2012
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Matching	NRS/Regression
	Type of outcome	HR	RD	HR
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	3	2	2
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	1	U	1
	Selective reporting	1	1	U
Grade	Starting point	L	L	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	0	0
	Final	L	L	L

Study info	Author	Bloom	Caliendo, Künn	Caliendo, Künn, Schmidt
	Year	1990	2012	2011
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT	NRS/Matching	NRS/Matching
	Type of outcome	RD	RD	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	1	1
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	L/L	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	2	4	1
	Selective reporting	1	1	1
Grade	Starting point	H	L	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	1	0
	Final	H	VL	L

Study info	Author	Caplan, Vinokur, Price, van Ryn	Corson, Haimson	Crépon, Dejemeppe, Gurgans
	Year	1989	1996	2005
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT	RCT	NRS/Timing-of-event
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	HR

Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	NR	4
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	U	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	4	2	3
	Selective reporting	3	1	1
Grade	Starting point	H	H	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	1	1	1
	Final	M	M	VL

Study info	Author	Decker, Olsen, Freeman	Dolton, O'Neill	Eden, Aviram
	Year	2000	1996	1993
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT	RCT	RCT
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	HR
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	NR	NR
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	U	L	U
	Incomplete outcome data	2	3	3
	Selective reporting	2	1	1

Grade	Starting point	H	H	H
	Upgrade/downgrade	1	0	1
	Final	M	H	M

Study info	Author	Firth, Payne, Payne	Fitzenberger, Völter	Gerfin, Lechner, Steiger
	Year	1999	2007	2002
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching	NRS/Matching	NRS/Matching
	Type of outcome	HR	RD	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	1	2	1
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	4	1	1
	Selective reporting	1	2	1
Grade	Starting point	L	L	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	1	0	0
	Final	VL	L	L

Study info	Author	Gorter, Kalb	Graversen, van Ours	Hujer, Thomsen
	Year	1996	2006	2010
	Study design/Method used for controlling	RCT	RCT	NRS/Matching

	for confounding at design stage			
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	NR	2
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	U	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	3	2	1
	Selective reporting	3	1	1
Grade	Starting point	H	H	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	1	1	0
	Final	M	M	L

Study info	Author	Hujer, Thomsen, Zeiss	Hujer, Zeiss	Hägglund
	Year	2006	2007	2006
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Timing-of-event	RCT
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	HR
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	1	4	NR
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	U
	Incomplete outcome data	1	2	2

	Selective reporting	1	1	1
Grade	Starting point	L	L	H
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	1	1
	Final	L	VL	M

Study info	Author	Jespersen, Much, Skipper	Johnsson, Klepinger	Kvasnicka
	Year	2008	1991	2008
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Matching	RCT	NRS/Matching
	Type of outcome	RD	HR	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	1.	NR	1
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	L/U	H
	Incomplete outcome data	1	3	1
	Selective reporting	1	2	1
Grade	Starting point	L	H	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	0	0
	Final	L	H	L

Study info	Author	Lalive, van Ours, Zweimüller	Osikominu	Pedersen, Rosholm, Svarer
	Year	2008	2012	2012
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Timing-of-event	RCT
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	HR
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	1	1	NR
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	1	3	U
	Selective reporting	1	4	4
Grade	Starting point	L	L	H
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	1	2
	Final	L	VL	L

Study info	Author	Richardson, Berg	Rodriguez-Planas, Jacob	Roland, Munch, Skipper
	Year	2001	2007	2008
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Matching	NRS/Timing-of-event
	Type of outcome	HR	RD	HR
	Confounding	1	4	1

Risk of bias judgment	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	1	4	1
	Selective reporting	1	1	1
Grade	Starting point	L	L	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	1	0
	Final	L	VL	L

Study info	Author	Rosholm, Skipper	Rosholm, Svarer	Sacklén
	Year	2009	2004	2002
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Matching
	Type of outcome	RD	HR	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	4	2
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	U	H	H
	Incomplete outcome data	4	1	3
	Selective reporting	1	4	3
Grade	Starting point	H	L	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	1	1	0
	Final	M	VL	L

Study info	Author	van den Berg, van der Klaauw	Vinokur, Price, Schul	Völter, Osikominu, Fitzenberger
	Year	2006	1995	2007
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	RCT	RCT	NRS/Matching
	Type of outcome	HR	HR	RD
Risk of bias judgment	Confounding	NR	NR	2
	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	L	L/U	
	Incomplete outcome data	1	3	1
	Selective reporting	1	2	1
Grade	Starting point	H	H	L
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	0	0
	Final	H	H	L

Study info	Author	Weber, Hofer	Winterhager, Heinze, Spermann	Behaghel, Crépon, Gurgand
	Year	2003	2006	2012
	Study design/Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	NRS/Timing-of-event	NRS/Matching	RCT
	Type of outcome	HR	RD	RD
	Confounding	2	1	

Risk of bias judgment	Sequence generation/Allocation concealment	H	H	U
	Incomplete outcome data	1	1	4
	Selective reporting	1	1	1
Grade	Starting point	L	L	H
	Upgrade/downgrade	0	0	1
	Final	L	L	M

13.2.3 Risk of bias for studies used in data synthesis for secondary outcome

Author	Caplan, Vinokur, Price, van Ryn	Cockx, van der Linden, Karaa	Crépon, Dejemepe, Gurgans
Year	1989	1998	2005
Country	USA	Belgium	France
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of Applied Psychology	Oxford Economic Papers	PSE Working Paper
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Unclear	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	High
Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-		-
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Unclear	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	High

Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-		-
Blinding (Judgement)	4	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Outcome is a combination of an objective (working more than 20 hours a week) and a subjective (working enough) measure and is self-reported		Outcome is objective and from adm. registers
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	4	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	3
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Among those assigned to the experimental condition 59% failed to show up (OBS probably a mistake, should have been 49%). Participants were defined as subjects who completed at least 6 of the 8 sessions (73 completed less than 6 sessions) Response rates around 90 except control at T3 (67%) (p. 761) OBS 14% omitted from reemployment analysis because they could not be classified (p. 763)		Sample selection p. 9 and: some unemployed (about 20%) do not send their monthly form at some point so that they are known to exit but the destination is unobserved. Therefore, estimation must be limited to individuals with known exit
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	3	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	1
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Impossible to figure out the N's		Sensitivity analysis with respect to unobserved heterogeneity
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	5	1

Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	P. 691:First, it should be stressed that we are only imperfectly informed about the length of the job tenure. For, we only know the month in which the employee was hired and whether he or she still occupied a position in the firm at the end of March 1993. Therefore, if someone left before March 1993, we only know that the job duration is lower than the number of months elapsed between the recruitment date and March 1993. In that case, we ignore whether the exit is a quit or a layoff. Nor do we know whether the individual is subsequently employed.	-
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Unclear
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Not judged due to score of 5 on the other bias item	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	-		4
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-		Discusses assumptions on p. 10 (mostly technical with a bit of justification). Concerning HR into treatment: we observe peaks related to compulsory interviews at 0, 6 and 12 months. (p. 15) Argue this is not a problem because likelihood of entry is positive at all dates
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	-		No

Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-		Yes and more is added Censoring level: 21 % (table 2)
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-		Timing-of-event
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-		Mixed proportional Hazard rate, piecewise constant baseline (3 months)

Author	Dolton, O'Neill	Graversen, van Ours	Shirom, Vinokur, Price
Year	1996	2006	2008
Country	UK	Denmark	Israel
Language	English	English	English
Publication	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A	IZA Discussion Paper	Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Sequence generation (Judgement)	Low	High	Low

Sequence generation (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Individuals eligible for a restart interview (6 months unemployment) were selected for the sample from the inflow lists on the basis of the last three digits of their national insurance (NI) numbers. An NI digit sequence known to result in a random 5% sample was used to construct our data. In this sample a control group of 582 people was randomly chosen, again by means of previously specified NI digit sequence	By birthdate	Computerized randomization procedure
Allocation concealment (Judgement)	Low	High	Low
Allocation concealment (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	The sequence generation was known by caseworkers	P. 1783: The investigators had full control over randomization of participants to the experimental and control groups
Blinding (Judgement)	3	3	3
Blinding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Informed by letter after 6 months of unemployment and participation is mandatory. Outcome is objective + survey data. The programme is TAU so the control group did not receive a letter	Outcome is objective and from adm. registers	p. 1785: One program was described as a 5-day (Sunday through Thursday) all-day seminar series (i.e., experimental condition group), while the other was described as a self-guided booklet program (i.e., control condition group). To ensure equal motivation to enter either group, only persons who expressed no preference were randomly assigned to the experimental and control groups. Outcome based on questionnaire: work 10 hours or more per week to be classified as re-employed and duration measured in months
Incomplete outcome data addressed (Judgement)	3	2	2

Incomplete outcome data addressed (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	8925 randomised. 5200 (58%) individuals completed the first survey (6 months) of which 4552 (51%) reported valid data (286 (49%) were members of the control group) and 3242 the second survey (12 months). Approximately half of the non-responses resulted from an inability to contact the individual because of invalid address records or death, whereas the other half refused to take part in the survey. Estimates of a probit equation determining survey participation suggest that the decision to participate was independent of control group status	27 wrongly assigned were deleted. 37 deleted due to moving abroad or dying. 553 deleted for not receiving UI. 43 deleted as they were not eligible (unemployed because of bad weather or work sharing arrangements. In all 13% were deleted.	Response rate at T1 66% and T2 63%. No systematic differences (p. 1790) No shows 45% but responded to questionnaire.
Free of selective reporting (Judgement)	1	1	2
Free of selective reporting (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	Sensitivity analysis concerning the assumptions about censoring (379)	-	No treatment on the treated analysis
Free of other bias (Judgement)	1	1	1
Free of other bias (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	
A priori protocol (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Yes
A priori protocol (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	P. 1781: The objective was derived from the findings of several past field experiments
A priori analysis plan (Judgement)	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear
A priori analysis plan (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-
Confounding (Judgement)	-	-	-
Confounding (Description, quote from paper or describe key information)	-	-	-

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers. Yes/No - if Yes describe the method used.	-	-	-
Relevant confounders described (See relevant sheet and list confounders and note if they were considered, precise, imbalanced or adjusted)	-	-	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At design state)	-	-	-
Method used for controlling for confounding (At analysis stage)	-	-	-