Wage Differentials between Women and Men in Denmark

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Labour Market Policy
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The Study

In this working paper we present the first male/female analysis carried out on new wage statistical data from Statistics Denmark. The purpose of the analysis is to uncover factors of importance to the differences of men's and women's hourly wages and furthermore to make up any wage differential, which cannot be explained.

The project has been carried out in the Research Group on Labour Market Policy. The working paper has been written by researcher, Mette Caroline Deding, M.A. (econ.), Ph.D. and Lisbeth Pedersen, head of research unit, MSc (econ), Ph.D. Dorrit Chris Nielsen has made the translation and secretarial work.

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1. Introduction

From an international perspective the wage differential between women and men is relatively small in the Nordic countries. The smallest wage differential is in Sweden (11-25 per cent) and the largest is in Finland (23-33 per cent). By comparison, the USA was 25-35 per cent in 1987, while the other European countries in 1980 were 20-30 per cent (Asplund, Barth, Smith & Wadensjö, 1996). To a large extent the still considerable wage gap in the USA is due to a large and increasing pay-rate variation, which affects women in particular, because they are at the lowest level of the wage distribution. However, a comparative analysis carried out by Gupta, Oaxaca & Smith (1999) shows that while a continued narrowing of the gender wage gap has taken place in the USA during the eighties, the wage gap in Denmark has been constant. The same is also true for Sweden and Finland. In the longer run the unchanging wage gap in the three Nordic countries will mean that Nordic women receive a relatively lower pay than women receive on labour markets in other countries.

The stagnation of the gender wage gap has been the background for a number of Danish empirical analyses. Rosholm & Smith (1996) show that the aggregate stability between 1980 and 1990 masks a number of smaller shifts within different groups. Thus the wage gap in the public sector fell slightly while rising somewhat in the private sector. The main determinant of a narrower wage gap is the rise in women's education and labour market experience. On the other hand the slowdown in the rate of wage growth rate in the public sector, where relatively many women are employed, counteracts the equalisation of the gender wage gap on the labour market in general. The increase in the wage gap in the private sector occurs in spite of an increase in women's education and work experience.

In a recent analysis Datta Gupta, Oaxaca & Smith (1998) look into the development of the gender wage gap over the period 1983-1994, where only small changes in wage differentials took place. In the public sector a number of "unexplained factors" have counteracted the narrowing of the wage gap that occurred

because of the increase in women's human capital. Among these unexplained factors the increased pay-rate variation has without doubt played a part. In the private sector, on the other hand, a male wage gap has not narrowed, largely due to an increase in the male rate of return on education.

Earlier analyses have been carried out on the basis of an hourly wage rate, which has been calculated from information about the aggregate income and an estimate of working hours from the Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension statistics. The problem with this calculation is that the Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension statistics do not include information about working hours, but only give four categories into which working time can be placed. Since women's working hours often differ from the common 37 hours, this may give grounds to distrust the calculations of hourly wages.

The analysis, presented in the following, is based on new wage information collected by Statistics Denmark. It includes information on wages for both the private and the public sector, and for contracted as well as performed working time, which makes it possible to work with far more accurate hourly wage rates. For the moment, the new wage statistics are only available for 1996 and 1997. With regard to the data quality this analysis has been carried out on data from 1996. Therefore this first gender based wage analysis is to be carried out as a cross-section analysis of the wage gap. However, this analysis includes information about the persons' labour market history since 1989. When the database is extended with more years of wage information, it will become possible to carry out the analysis of the wage gap as a panel data analysis complete with the extra information this type of data can contain.

The purpose of the study is firstly to measure the differential between women's and men's wages on the Danish labour market. Secondly the study is to assess the consequences of a number of measurable statistical factors' significance to the hourly wage differential and to assess unexplained wage differentials, if any.

2. Theoretical Explanations of Wage Differentials

The explanations of why men and women are paid differently can be divided up into three main sets. The first set of explanations is based on the differentials in qualifications, which lead to lower productivity for women than for men. The second set of explanations concerns women and men's positions on the labour market in areas with different wage levels, for example industry, sector, job level. Finally, the third set of explanations consists of examples of the employer's discriminatory behaviour.

If the explanation of the wage differential between men and women is differentials of qualifications it must be assumed that the employer pays the employees in accordance with the value of their output. When women receive lower wages than men it is either due to the fact that they have fewer educational qualifications or to the fact that they have less work experience because they have been on the labour market for a shorter time. The basic idea is that women have less human capital than men have.

Rational reasons for women having less human capital could be that women choose to spend fewer years in education because they know from the outset that they will work fewer years than men and for that reason the total benefit of education will be relatively smaller than men's. Another reason may be that women qualify for jobs in the care and education sectors where losses from being absent from the labour market for a period of time (to undertake other care responsibilities) are smaller, but on the other hand, the pay is also lower. A third explanation is that women are more often absent from the labour market because they, to a larger extent than men, are responsible for home and family and this absence results in loss of qualifications.

The second set of explanations is to a lesser extent related to the employees and to a larger extent to the qualities of the jobs that the men and the women hold.

The theory of the segmented labour market points out in a simplified manner that a primary sector is to be found on the labour market with good jobs and high wages and a secondary sector with poorer jobs and lower wages. The wage differential between the two sectors can be maintained because labour mobility is very limited. The weak point of the theory in relation to explaining wage differentials between men and women is that it does not explain why women find themselves in the secondary sector and why the jobs and the wages are more inferior in that section of the labour market.

The third set of explanations is often designated as discrimination theories, but includes both explanations relating to actual pay differential treatment of equal, productive employees and explanations being based on more economic rational employer behaviour.

The closest explanation to what is commonly understood as pure discrimination, is that men are more welcome than women on the labour market. The reason may be that the employers prefer to engage men rather than women, or that the men, already engaged, wish to work with other men, or that the consumers prefer to buy goods or services produced by men. If, in this way, women are less welcome than men on the labour market it will be reflected in lower wages, other things being equal.

Another explanation is that the uncertainty about women's productivity is bigger than the uncertainty about men's productivity. The uncertainty is either due to lack of knowledge or due to women's larger diversification of productivity. The bigger uncertainty implies that the employer has to obtain a kind of "risk premium" in employing women in the form of reduced wages. In this way even women who have at least as high productivity as their male colleagues, receive lower wages.

A third theoretical explanation of discrimination is that women offer their services to a smaller part of the labour market. To a larger extent they are also more reluctant than men are to move from one part of the labour market to another part

– both geographically and professionally. It means that the employers can pay women less than they pay men without the risk of limiting their possibilities of recruiting or of increasing the number of notices to quit.

The above-mentioned explanations are a number of economic theoretical arguments for the fact that women are paid less than men are, other things being equal. Not all explanations apply equally well to the Danish labour market and none of them would be able to stand alone with regard to explaining the wage gap between men and women. However, the theories suggest a number of candidates which together contribute to a fuller explanation, and above all, it can give inspiration to where to look for the reasons for the wage differentials between men and women.

3. Empirical Model

In the following analysis the wage gap is measured and decomposed. It is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of men's and women's hourly wage rates.

The analysis is carried out in two steps. First a regression analysis separately for men and women is carried out.

$\ln(w_m) = X_m b_m + e_m$
$\ln(w_f) = X_f b_f + e_f$

The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly wage rates for respectively men ($\ln(w_m)$) and women ($\ln(w_f)$). To explain the logarithm of the hourly wage rates a matrix of explanatory variables is used (education, work experience, absence, sector, trade and occupation). The matrix is called X_m for men and X_f for women and an error element (e_m/e_f).

The "gross" wage gap is calculated as follows:

$\ln(G_{mf} + 1) = \ln(wg_m) - \ln(wg_f)$

where $G_{mf} = (wg_m - wg_f)/wg_f$

and $\ln(wg_m) = Xg_m b_m$

$\ln(wg_f) = Xg_m b_f$

$\ln(wg_m)$ and $\ln(wg_f)$ are the geometrical averages of the logarithm of men's and women's hourly wages, respectively, which shows that the wage gap is measured

in proportion to the average wages of women. This is in accordance with previous analyses on Danish data (Rosholm & Smith, 1996).

The wage gap is decomposed as follows:

Assume that b* is a vector of estimated coefficients of the non-discriminating wage structure – the so-called reference wage structure. The wage gap can be decomposed into three elements:

$$\ln(Gm_f + 1) = Xg_m' (b_m - b^*) + Xe_f'(b^* - b_f) + (Xg_m - Xg_f)' b^*$$

The first element is the portion of the wage gap, which is due to the fact that the men aren't paid in accordance with b*. The second element is the portion of the wage gap, which is due to the fact that women aren't paid in accordance with b*. The third and last element is the portion of the wage gap that is due to differences in men's and women's observed characteristics.

In the following decomposition analysis the male wage structure is chosen as the reference wage structure. The first element of the decomposed wage gap disappears with that. The second element indicates the unexplained element of the wage gap. This includes differences in the rate of return on education, work experience etc. (the coefficients). The last element is the explained portion of the wage gap, which is a result of the fact that women and men have different education, work experiences and degree of absence and furthermore that women and men are unequally divided between trades and sectors.

4. Empirical measurements of the wage gap

As mentioned, the new wage information makes it possible to measure the hourly wage rate of both the contracted and performed working time. The wage is here measured by the "earnings", which comprise the total payments from the employer to the employee also including pension, wage in absence and fringe benefits. For a more detailed account of the analysis' data see appendix 1. The results of the regression analyses presented in the following are documented in full in appendix 2. In the following selected sub-results are shown. First a review of the aggregated wage differentials on the Danish labour market is presented. Then the sector specific differences are illustrated in more detail.

Measured by earnings per hour (corresponding to the contracted working time) the wage gap on the whole labour market is 20 per cent and by earnings per performed working hours the wage gap is 12.4 per cent. That the wage gap, calculated by earnings per performed working hour, is smaller than the wage gap calculated by earnings per wage hour, is an expression of the fact that the absence of men and women is unequally divided and that women are compensated for absence from the place of work to a higher degree than men. It is not surprising that the wage gap diminishes when the working time is calculated as performed working hours, because absence in this connection not only includes wages during sickness, holidays, and holidays not falling on a Sunday, but also payments in connection with childbirth and sickness of children provided that the employer pays the employee during this absence.

Figure 1 shows the wage gap decomposed in a row of column diagrams. Sector and trade do not appear together because of co-variation between these variables. Therefore wage differentials between men and women are analysed in three different models. One model in which education, work experience, absence and family conditions are included under the term HC (variables concerning the human capital of persons in a broad sense) and sector and occupation. A second

Fig. 1.

The m/f wage gap of the whole labour market. Per cent.



model where sector is replaced with trade divided into 9 categories and a third model where trade is divided into 27 categories. These three models are represented in three columns showing the wage gap under each of the two wage measures.

First of all the decomposition shows that the four components' share of the gross wage gap depends on the model specification. No matter which wage measure is used the sector component explains a relatively large proportion of the wage gap. Thus the uneven distribution of men and women over the private, governmental and municipal sectors explains a third of the wage gap. Another relatively large share of the wage gap is the unexplained proportion whose share, however, varies both between different model specifications and between different wage measures. The human capital variables explain about 3 per cent of the wage gap. This share is remarkably constant in all six columns of the figure. The human capital variables are thus with regard to explaining their share quite robust to changes in model and wage measure. Finally the occupation component forms a relatively small share of the wage gap. The wage differential between men and women is thus only to a small extent to be explained by the uneven distribution over occupational categories.

If trade is incorporated as an explaining variable instead of sector the share of the wage gap is increased, which can be attributed to an uneven distribution over occupational categories. In addition the unexplained proportion is increased.

By comparing the two columns in the first row of the figure where sector is included it shows that the sector component is reduced when switching from earnings per hourly wage rate to earnings per performed working hour. Furthermore the unexplained proportion is considerably reduced. This pattern is to be found again when trade is used as the explanatory variable. The interpretation of these changes in sector components is that women are employed in sectors with a larger flexibility in working time and thus offer a better opportunity to reconcile work and family life. On the other hand they are also lower paid and the wage

differentials between men and women in these sectors are on average bigger than the absence justifies.

In the analyses of the wage differentials of the private, national public and municipal public sectors respectively, the wage gap can be divided into three components: An HC component, an occupation component and an unexplained proportion component. The result of the decomposition is shown in Table 1.

In the private sector the wage gap is between 16 and 17 per cent, depending upon which wage measure is used. Just as in the wage gap for the whole labour market, the HC component explains about 3 per cent of the gap, while the occupation component explains the gap under 1 per cent. The largest part of the wage gap is determined by the unexplained component, at over 12 per cent.

In the national public sector the wage gap between men and women is 9.9 to 7.1 per cent. The unexplained component is a negative determinant of the wage gap, when pay is measured by earnings per performed work hour. In this case the total

Table 1.
The wage gap of the private, national public and municipal public sectors. Per cent.

	HC	Occupation	Unexplained	In total
Private sector:				
Earnings DKK/hourly wage	3.5	0.9	12.6	17.0
Earnings DKK/performed working time	3.3	0.7	12.1	16.1
National public sector:				
Earnings DKK/hourly wage	4.7	3.4	1.6	9.7
Earnings DKK/performed	4.9	3.7	-1.5	7.1
Municipal public sector:				
Earnings DKK/hourly wage	6.9	2.6	2.1	11.6
Earnings DKK/performed	6.5	2.4	-3.0	5.9

earnings are calculated as an occupation component plus the HC component minus the unexplained (3.7 + 4.9 - 1.5). The interpretation is that the wage gap is reduced as a consequence of women receiving compensation for absence more often than men. This is not the case in the private sector.

The unexplained part of the wage gap is small in the national public sector. On the other hand both the HC and occupation components are significantly larger. The gender based wage differential in the national public sector can also be explained by men's higher education and experience, together with men being employed in higher occupational positions.

In the municipal part of the public sector the wage gap is between 11.6 and 5.9 per cent. Again the unexplained part is limited and negative when pay is measured by earnings per hour of work performed. The HC component is even larger than in the national public sector while on the other hand the position component is a little smaller. In the municipal sector the gender difference can be widely explained by men's higher education. Just as in the national public sector women's pay per hour worked, in a given occupation, and with a given educational level is higher than men's because of the larger compensation for absence.

A closer look at the analyses' coefficients (see the explanation in the method section) can reveal the contents of the wage gap's unexplained part. The analysis' coefficients and standard deviations are fully explained in Appendix 2. To be able to better compare the coefficients for the three sectors and the labour market as a whole, a selection of the most interesting coefficients have been put together into a series of tables that are presented and commented upon below.

Since the analysis has shown that there is a large degree of accordance in the coefficients for the explanatory variables for the two different wage measures (earnings per indicated work hour and earnings per performed work hour), the tables for neatness sake only present the results from the wage regressions that deal with earnings per work hour performed. The coefficients show the effect for

Table 2.

The rate of return on education, work experience and part-time work. Earnings per performed working hour. Per cent.

	All sectors		Municipal Public sector		National public sector		Private sector	
	Men	women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Highest level of education:								
Primary and lower secondary school	-4.1	-3.1	-1.2	-2.6	-1.0	-3.5	-4.6	-4.6
Basic vocational training	-1.9	-2.8	-0.9	-4.1	-2.2	-2.7	-1.1	-1.5
Upper secondary school/Higher preparatory course	4.4	-0.3	0.1	-6.4	8.9	5.7	4.4	3.2
Higher commercial/ higher technical examination	2.5	-1.0	1.2	-0.7	3.9	2.0	1.1	2.6
Short-term Further education	4.6	-3.0	-5.2	-4.4	9.5	1.5	1.6	0.1
Medium-term Further education	10.6	2.6	-3.4	1.4	17.4	7.2	13.8	7.9
Long-term Further education	26.2	20.6	23.9	17.3	32.6	24.5	23.3	23.1
Supplementary training/education	-3.7	1.5	4.9	0.1	-5.2	2.0	-4.6	3.5
Work experience	2.5	1.4	2.2	1.1	2.2	1.9	2.7	2.4
Work experience (sq)	-3.9	-2.2	-3.2	-1.5	-2.9	-3.0	-4.7	-4.1
Part-time insured	-10.0	-4.8	-3.5	-2.8	-9.4	-4.7	-15.3	-8.1

men and women - individually - of being in a given category compared with a selected category that is set to zero.

The coefficients for education in the private sector show that the advantage of education is the same for men and women at the highest and the lowest educational levels (see Table 2). For higher commercial/higher technical examination women benefit more than men, while the benefit for the other educational levels is higher for men than women. These differences are largest for those with a short or medium-long post-secondary education. This pattern is also found in the

national public sector, but in the municipal public sector advantage of education at these two levels is less for men than for women.

On the private part of the labour market continuing education only has a positive effect on women's wages. The same holds true for the national public sector but not in the municipal public sector. As regards work experience women in the private sector have only a marginal smaller benefit than men. The difference in men and women's advantage from work experience can be found especially in the public sector. Finally, the negative effect of being part time insured is greater for men that for women in the private sector. The same applies in the municipal public sector, but here the negative effect on men's wages is less powerful than in the private sector.

In this analysis periodic absence from the labour market as a consequence of unemployment, leave, or sickness becomes important to pay. The coefficients for these variables are all zero and are therefore not shown in the tables.

The analysis shows that the number of children has a positive significance for both men and women's pay, but the effect is largest for women. This counts to a lesser degree in the private sector. Correspondingly, the positive effect on women's pay of having children between 0 and 2 years old is only 3 per cent in the private sector, while it is 41 and 22 per cent in the public sector. In contrast, there is a negative effect on women's pay of having children between 3 and 6, and between 7 and 17, while in the private sector only the eldest group has a negative effect on women's pay. For the eldest group the effect is negative for all three sectors.

The advantage of being in the highest occupational position (as opposed to being in occupational level 3) is greater for men that for women, is something that is common to all three sectors. On the other hand the disadvantage of being at the lowest occupation level is less for women than for men. In other words the distribution of pay across the occupational categories is wider for men than for women. In the top position the difference in men and women's benefit from be-

ing at this level is greatest in the public sector. In contrast, for occupational positions under level 3 the difference in benefit is biggest in the private sector. Put another way, men are relatively more disadvantaged by being employed at a lower level in the private sector. This is because, among other things, the distribution of wages for the lower occupational categories is greater in the private sector.

Table 3.

The importance of children and marital status. Earnings per performed working hour. Per cent.

	All sectors		Municipal public sector		National public sector		Private sector	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Number of children	0.4	1.6	0.5	2.3	0.4	1.7	0.1	0.7
Child 0/2- year-old	1.1	22.0	2.1	41.3	1.1	22.0	0.8	2.6
Child 3/6-year-old	1.0	0.3	0.2	-0.5	0.0	-0.2	1.2	1.0
Child 7/17-year-old	-0.6	-2.4	-1.1	-3.8	-0.4	-2.0	-0.4	-1.3
Single	-2.7	0.5	-0.4	0.7	-1.3	0.0	-3.3	0.3

Table 4.

The importance of being employed at one of nine levels of occupations. Earnings per performed working hour. Per cent.

Level of occupation	All sectors		Municipal public sector		National public sector		Private sector	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
1	25.4	16.6	24.3	11.9	32.7	23.8	23.8	20.6
2	6.0	6.3	10.8	5.2	3.2	5.6	7.0	12.4
4	-17.9	-8.8	-10.3	-7.6	-18.5	-11.6	-17.9	-7.4
5	-17.0	-19.1	-20.2	-17.3	-0.5	1.5	-25.5	-24.7
6	-15.3	-8.9	-6.8	-3.0	-10.3	-4.4	-29.6	-17.6
7	-17.2	-13.3	-9.8	-8.7	-2.8	-1.7	-20.9	-12.2
8	-25.3	-20.4	-12.2	-7.0	-13.2	-8.3	-28.0	-19.1
9	-23.9	-22.6	-21.5	-20.8	-19.1	-17.8	-29.3	-25.0

5. Conclusion

For the labour market as a whole the wage gap can primarily be explained by the unequal distribution of men and women across the private, and public (municipal and national) sectors. A much larger portion of women are employed in the public sector. The analysis itself points to why this is the case. Women in the public sector receive much more compensation for absence from work, which in this sector acts as a balance for the lower pay relative to men. Especially women with small children benefit from compensation for absence. On the other hand the pace of wage increase slows for women later in their work life.

It is important to note that absence from work alone far from explains the pay differential between men and women in the public sector. The wage gap is primarily a result of men that are employed in the public sector being more educated than the women are and thus being placed higher in the occupational hierarchy. It is also significant that women receive less benefit from being in the highest educational group and in the highest occupational positions. We cannot, based on this analysis, say anything about why this is the case, and of course it only explains a small part of the wage gap.

The wage gap in the private sector is significantly larger than that in the public, and a large part of this wage gap is unexplained in the analysis. Only a small part is explained by men's higher education and their higher occupational positions. Being absent from the labour market has no individual effect on pay, just as women receive the same pay increases for their work experience as men. One explanation for the large unexplained wage gap is possibly that women's pay in the private sector is generally lower as a consequence of the greater uncertainty surrounding their working hours and productivity. Future gender-wage analyses should seek to verify these and other explanations.

Appendix 1. Data Overview

There are 938,867 observations in the data material.

Pay

All employees between 25 and 59 years old in companies with more than 20 employees and a representative sample of the others are included. The present analysis is conducted on the whole population, though the data material is limited to employees between 25 and 59 years of age. Jobs under 200 hours or above 2,500 hours per year are excluded.

Earnings: (excluding inconvenience allowance) represents the combined payment from employers to employees except the inconvenience allowance. Earnings also includes, pay during sick leave, contributions to pensions, personal goods and gifts, or vacation or holiday payments. Pay during sick leave includes payments during absences due to the employee's own sickness, their child's, birth and paternity leave, accidents, and any other paid absence.

Work Hours

Paid time: the sum of the performed work hours and absent time. The term 'paid time' could be considered an expression of the contracted working hours.

Performed work hours: is the actual number of hours in which the employee was working.

Branch

The division into branches of work follows the branch nomenclature *of Danmarks Statistik* (Statistics Denmark). In this analysis this is refined to a 9-branch model and a 27-branch model.

Occupational Position

The occupational categories are divided up into 9 groups with the following contents:

1. Management on the highest level in companies, organisations, and the public sector. Directors, legislators, and higher functionaries.
2. Work requiring knowledge of the highest level within a particular area. People whose work consists of utilising knowledge of the highest level within a particular subject area.
3. Work requiring knowledge of a medium level within a particular level area. Technicians, programmers, therapists, nurses, and teachers.
4. Office work including work as a receptionist, or data inputting.
5. Sales, service, and care workers. Stewardesses, home-care workers, and barbers.
6. Work in agriculture, gardening, forestry, hunting, and fishing that requires basic knowledge, though work in this area that requires no knowledge is placed in category 9.
7. Hand Work is jobs that require education and experience dealing with materials and work processes within a certain field.
8. Process and machine operator together with transport and construction. Jobs that require knowledge that can be gained on special work courses or on the job.
9. Others. In this category are placed people involved with help functions. Cleaners, packing, and delivery person.

Geography

The company's placement in the capital or the provinces.

Information about the employee

- Work experience: The potential work experience calculated by subtracting the age from time in education, with every educational module taking a certain amount of years and education starting at age 6.

- Marital Status: single or married/cohabiting.
- Children: number of children in the family.
- Children's age: divided into 0-2 years, 3-6 years, and 7-17 years.
- Highest completed Education: Primary school, Basic Vocational Training (*efg-basisår*), secondary school (g*ymnasium*), vocational/technical secondary school (*hhx/htx*), shorter post-secondary, medium post-secondary, long post-secondary education.
- Continuing education: the combined years of study within the last 5 years.
- Absence from the labour market: the amount of absence from the labour market in the last 5 years divided up into, activation (of various types like subsidised work, or job training), unemployed on support, welfare, sickness pension, and absence for education, child rearing, and sabbaticals.
- Insurance Category: Full time/part time.

Appendix 2. Wage regressions

PRIVATE SECTOR: EARNINGS PER HOURLY WAGE RATE

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	9.211	0.003	9.446	0.003	9.127	0.004	9.304	0.004
GRUND1	-0.133	0.002	-0.049	0.001	-0.129	0.002	-0.048	0.002
GRUND2	-0.035	0.003	-0.014	0.002	-0.059	0.003	-0.019	0.002
ALMGYM	0.134	0.003	0.043	0.003	0.048	0.003	0.031	0.003
TEKGYM	0.123	0.003	0.013	0.003	0.060	0.003	0.018	0.002
KVU	0.129	0.002	0.016	0.002	0.075	0.002	0.010	0.002
MVU	0.356	0.002	0.145	0.002	0.223	0.003	0.090	0.002
LVU	0.472	0.002	0.245	0.002	0.420	0.003	0.248	0.003
EFTERUDD	-0.163	0.006	-0.072	0.005	0.041	0.007	0.023	0.006
ERF	0.034	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.024	0.000
ERFSQ	-0.055	0.001	-0.046	0.001	-0.053	0.001	-0.040	0.001
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.204	0.026	-0.142	0.022	-0.123	0.003	-0.087	0.002
ANT_BORN	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001
BARN0_2	0.007	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.003	-0.004	0.002
BARN3_6	0.009	0.002	0.010	0.002	0.015	0.002	0.010	0.002
BARN7_17	-0.003	0.002	-0.003	0.002	-0.004	0.003	-0.006	0.002
ENLIG	-0.061	0.002	-0.036	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
HOVEDST	0.124	0.001	0.093	0.001	0.126	0.001	0.097	0.001
DISCO1			0.267	0.002			0.242	0.004
DISCO2			0.070	0.002			0.123	0.002
DISCO4			-0.196	0.002			-0.083	0.001
DISCO5			-0.269	0.002			-0.259	0.002
DISCO6			-0.283	0.009			-0.175	0.019
DISCO7			-0.220	0.002			-0.137	0.004
DISCO8			-0.302	0.002			-0.220	0.002
DISCO9			-0.305	0.002			-0.253	0.002
number obs								
adj. R^2	0.362		0.524		0.310		0.438	

PRIVATE SECTOR: EARNINGS PER PERFORMED WORKING HOUR

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	9.274	0.003	9.494	0.003	9.188	0.004	9.354	0.004
GRUND1	-0.124	0.001	-0.046	0.001	-0.121	0.002	-0.046	0.002
GRUND2	-0.031	0.003	-0.011	0.002	-0.051	0.003	-0.015	0.002
ALMGYM	0.130	0.003	0.044	0.003	0.047	0.003	0.032	0.003
TEKGYM	0.116	0.003	0.011	0.003	0.066	0.003	0.026	0.002
KVU	0.122	0.002	0.016	0.002	0.061	0.002	0.001	0.002
MVU	0.337	0.002	0.138	0.002	0.204	0.003	0.079	0.002
LVU	0.447	0.002	0.233	0.002	0.395	0.003	0.231	0.003
EFTERUDD	-0.130	0.006	-0.046	0.005	0.057	0.007	0.035	0.006
ERF	0.034	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.031	0.000	0.024	0.000
ERFSQ	-0.055	0.001	-0.047	0.001	-0.054	0.001	-0.041	0.001
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.212	0.025	-0.153	0.022	-0.117	0.003	-0.081	0.002
ANT_BORN	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.002	0.007	0.002
BARN0_2	0.009	0.002	0.008	0.002	0.038	0.003	0.026	0.002
BARN3_6	0.011	0.002	0.012	0.002	0.015	0.002	0.010	0.002
BARN7_17	-0.003	0.002	-0.004	0.002	-0.011	0.003	-0.013	0.002
ENLIG	-0.057	0.001	-0.033	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001
HOVEDST	0.128	0.001	0.099	0.001	0.129	0.001	0.103	0.001
DISCO1			0.238	0.002			0.206	0.004
DISCO2			0.070	0.002			0.124	0.002
DISCO4			-0.179	0.002			-0.074	0.002
DISCO5			-0.255	0.002			-0.247	0.002
DISCO6			-0.296	0.009			-0.176	0.019
DISCO7			-0.209	0.002			-0.122	0.004
DISCO8			-0.280	0.002			-0.191	0.002
DISCO9			-0.293	0.002			-0.250	0.002
number obs								
adj. R^2	0.355		0.508		0.292		0.408	

National Public SECTOR: EARNINGS PER HOURLY WAGE RATE

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	9.081	0.004	9.157	0.004	9.057	0.005	9.170	0.005
GRUND1	-0.054	0.002	-0.011	0.002	-0.046	0.002	-0.020	0.002
GRUND2	-0.033	0.004	-0.025	0.003	-0.019	0.004	-0.011	0.004
ALMGYM	0.117	0.003	0.100	0.003	0.115	0.004	0.082	0.004
TEKGYM	0.035	0.005	0.038	0.005	0.022	0.004	0.021	0.004
KVU	0.145	0.002	0.100	0.002	0.077	0.003	0.023	0.003
MVU	0.268	0.003	0.184	0.003	0.194	0.003	0.090	0.003
LVU	0.450	0.002	0.352	0.002	0.411	0.002	0.283	0.003
EFTERUDD	0.007	0.007	-0.045	0.007	0.049	0.010	0.026	0.010
ERF	0.023	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.019	0.000
ERFSQ	-0.031	0.001	-0.028	0.001	-0.035	0.001	-0.031	0.001
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.139	0.016	-0.077	0.014	-0.074	0.003	-0.041	0.003
ANT_BORN	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.002	0.005	0.002
BARN0_2	-0.002	0.003	-0.002	0.003	0.052	0.004	0.048	0.003
BARN3_6	-0.005	0.003	-0.002	0.002	0.009	0.003	0.009	0.003
BARN7_17	-0.002	0.003	-0.002	0.003	-0.006	0.004	-0.004	0.003
ENLIG	-0.034	0.002	-0.019	0.002	-0.003	0.002	-0.002	0.002
HOVEDST	0.065	0.001	0.066	0.001	0.074	0.002	0.063	0.002
DISCO1			0.332	0.004			0.261	0.006
DISCO2			0.021	0.002			0.055	0.003
DISCO4			-0.173	0.002			-0.107	0.002
DISCO5			-0.022	0.003			-0.026	0.006
DISCO6			-0.113	0.012			-0.068	0.022
DISCO7			-0.035	0.003			0.000	0.011
DISCO8			-0.149	0.003			-0.102	0.010
DISCO9			-0.195	0.003			-0.183	0.003
number obs								
adj. R^2	0.548		0.650		0.459		0.528	

NATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR: EARNINGS PER PERFORMED WORKING HOUR

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	9.242	0.004	9.317	0.004	9.243	0.006	9.361	0.007
GRUND1	-0.055	0.002	-0.010	0.002	-0.058	0.003	-0.035	0.003
GRUND2	-0.033	0.004	-0.022	0.003	-0.035	0.005	-0.027	0.005
ALMGYM	0.104	0.004	0.089	0.003	0.092	0.006	0.057	0.006
TEKGYM	0.032	0.006	0.039	0.005	0.019	0.006	0.020	0.006
KVU	0.147	0.002	0.095	0.002	0.077	0.004	0.015	0.005
MVU	0.261	0.003	0.174	0.003	0.181	0.004	0.072	0.004
LVU	0.431	0.002	0.326	0.002	0.379	0.003	0.245	0.004
EFTERUDD	0.003	0.008	-0.052	0.007	0.041	0.013	0.020	0.013
ERF	0.024	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.022	0.001	0.019	0.001
ERFSQ	-0.032	0.001	-0.029	0.001	-0.035	0.001	-0.030	0.001
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.162	0.018	-0.094	0.016	-0.080	0.004	-0.047	0.004
ANT_BORN	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.019	0.003	0.017	0.003
BARN0_2	0.011	0.003	0.011	0.003	0.224	0.005	0.220	0.005
BARN3_6	-0.003	0.003	0.000	0.003	-0.002	0.004	-0.002	0.004
BARN7_17	-0.004	0.003	-0.004	0.003	-0.023	0.005	-0.020	0.005
ENLIG	-0.027	0.002	-0.013	0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.000	0.002
HOVEDST	0.070	0.001	0.071	0.001	0.091	0.002	0.081	0.002
DISCO1			0.327	0.004			0.238	0.009
DISCO2			0.032	0.002			0.056	0.004
DISCO4			-0.185	0.002			-0.116	0.003
DISCO5			-0.005	0.003			0.015	0.009
DISCO6			-0.103	0.013			-0.044	0.030
DISCO7			-0.028	0.003			-0.017	0.015
DISCO8			-0.132	0.003			-0.083	0.014
DISCO9			-0.191	0.003			-0.178	0.005
Number obs								
adj. R^2	0.504		0.606		0.354		0.403	

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SECTOR: EARNINGS PER HOURLY WAGE RATE

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	8.995	0.005	9.203	0.004	9.063	0.002	9.253	0.002
GRUND1	-0.097	0.002	-0.026	0.002	-0.070	0.001	-0.034	0.001
GRUND2	-0.006	0.004	0.008	0.004	-0.021	0.002	-0.021	0.001
ALMGYM	0.107	0.004	0.038	0.004	0.042	0.002	-0.007	0.002
TEKGYM	0.086	0.006	0.039	0.005	0.063	0.002	0.005	0.002
KVU	0.090	0.003	-0.059	0.003	0.106	0.001	-0.035	0.001
MVU	0.196	0.002	-0.030	0.002	0.182	0.001	0.005	0.001
LVU	0.479	0.002	0.241	0.003	0.408	0.002	0.197	0.002
EFTERUDD	0.065	0.009	0.064	0.008	0.136	0.005	0.042	0.004
ERF	0.026	0.000	0.020	0.000	0.016	0.000	0.012	0.000
ERFSQ	-0.038	0.001	-0.029	0.001	-0.023	0.000	-0.017	0.000
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.088	0.012	-0.055	0.011	-0.024	0.001	-0.014	0.001
ANT_BORN	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
BARN0_2	-0.003	0.003	-0.008	0.003	0.005	0.001	-0.004	0.001
BARN3_6	-0.001	0.003	-0.004	0.002	0.007	0.001	0.002	0.001
BARN7_17	-0.001	0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	-0.001	0.001
ENLIG	-0.031	0.002	-0.016	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
HOVEDST	0.017	0.001	0.026	0.001	0.036	0.001	0.029	0.001
DISCO1			0.271	0.003			0.154	0.002
DISCO2			0.115	0.002			0.082	0.001
DISCO4			-0.109	0.004			-0.067	0.001
DISCO5			-0.218	0.002			-0.184	0.001
DISCO6			-0.097	0.006			-0.051	0.010
DISCO7			-0.106	0.003			-0.059	0.010
DISCO8			-0.123	0.008			-0.005	0.035
DISCO9			-0.232	0.002			-0.214	0.001
number obs								
adj. R^2	0.517		0.644		0.457		0.573	

MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SECTOR: EARNINGS PER PERFORMED WORKING HOUR

	MEN				WOMEN			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error	Coefficient	Std. Error
INTERCEP	9.163	0.006	9.354	0.006	9.313	0.005	9.488	0.005
GRUND1	-0.078	0.003	-0.012	0.003	-0.058	0.002	-0.026	0.002
GRUND2	-0.023	0.006	-0.009	0.005	-0.042	0.004	-0.041	0.004
ALMGYM	0.065	0.005	0.001	0.005	-0.022	0.005	-0.064	0.005
TEKGYM	0.055	0.008	0.012	0.007	0.041	0.006	-0.007	0.006
KVU	0.085	0.003	-0.052	0.004	0.090	0.002	-0.044	0.003
MVU	0.176	0.002	-0.034	0.003	0.171	0.002	0.014	0.003
LVU	0.460	0.003	0.239	0.004	0.350	0.004	0.173	0.005
EFTERUDD	0.050	0.012	0.049	0.011	0.081	0.013	0.001	0.013
ERF	0.028	0.000	0.022	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.011	0.000
ERFSQ	-0.041	0.001	-0.032	0.001	-0.020	0.001	-0.015	0.001
AKTIVE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DAGPENGE	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KONTANT	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
UDDORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
BORORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000
SABORLOV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
SYG	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DELTID	-0.065	0.016	-0.035	0.015	-0.037	0.003	-0.028	0.003
ANT_BORN	0.006	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.021	0.002	0.023	0.002
BARN0_2	0.026	0.004	0.021	0.004	0.421	0.003	0.413	0.003
BARN3_6	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	-0.001	0.003	-0.005	0.003
BARN7_17	-0.009	0.004	-0.011	0.003	-0.035	0.003	-0.038	0.003
ENLIG	-0.017	0.002	-0.004	0.002	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.002
HOVEDST	0.036	0.002	0.044	0.002	0.061	0.002	0.055	0.001
DISCO1			0.243	0.004			0.119	0.006
DISCO2			0.108	0.003			0.052	0.003
DISCO4			-0.103	0.005			-0.076	0.003
DISCO5			-0.202	0.003			-0.173	0.003
DISCO6			-0.068	0.008			-0.030	0.030
DISCO7			-0.098	0.004			-0.087	0.029
DISCO8			-0.122	0.011			-0.070	0.100
DISCO9			-0.215	0.003			-0.208	0.004
number obs								
adj. R^2	0.375		0.459		0.183		0.203	

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