Spring til...

  • Hovedindhold
  • Indholdsfortegnelse
  • Sidefod
  • Dansk da
Scientific article 1998

Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities

Authors:

  • Ebbe Groes
  • Hans Jørgen Jacobsen
  • Birgitte Sloth
  • Torben Tranaes
We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings.

Authors

  • Ebbe GroesHans Jørgen JacobsenBirgitte SlothTorben Tranaes

About this publication

  • Published in

    Theory and Decision
VIVE – The Danish Centre for Social Science Research provides knowledge that contributes to developing the welfare society and strengthening quality development, efficiency enhancement and governance in the public sector, both in municipalities, regions and nationally.
Tel: +45 44 45 55 00
E-mail: vive@vive.dk
EAN: 5798000354845
CVR: 23 15 51 17